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Informal Working Group of the Social Protection Committee on the application of EU 
rules to SSGI 
 
A report by the working group 
 
Social Protection1 and Internal Market Regulation: 
Evaluation & Perspectives on the application of EU rules to SSGI 
Note from the Chair of the group:  
This report was approved by the members of the informal working group, except for 
the Commission, in a written procedure by the 16th of September 2013. The 
Commission retained its reservations concerning the text. The report contains a 
number of footnotes expressing the views of the Commission: 
1, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 37, 45, 53, 189, 191, and 194. 
The report from the informal group was forwarded to the Social Protection Committee 
which discussed the topic at its meeting on 20.02.2014.  
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FOREWORD OF THE CHAIR AND THE VICE-
CHAIR 
 
The debate on the relationship between welfare services and the EU law has intensified during the 
last 10 years. Social services and social security have been conceptually included in the category 
of services of general interest. Consequently, the general legal framework concerning the market 
regulation at the EU level has been brought into the social policy sector and the provision of social 
services has been put under the existing legal basis, although the legal framework was originally 
developed for totally different kinds of markets for goods and services. 
The working group on SSGI was set up 10 years ago under the Social Protection Committee as 
an ad hoc group of legal specialists interested in the subject. The informal working group has 
mainly focused on capacity building and problem analysis of technical and legal issues around the 
application of the EU rules to SSGI.  However, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that more 
fundamental principles underlie the debate on the application of the EU rules to social services of 
general interest; for instance if we need internal markets for social services, or to which extent 
social services, in particular, should be treated differently from other services or services of 
general interest? Opinions on these issues certainly vary, which is unavoidably reflected in the 
discussions as well as in the positions taken by different parties. 
In the discussions within the working group, we have noticed that two different approaches are 
often confronted: a wide social policy approach and a strict legal approach. The expertise which 
can surpass the theoretical and practical barriers between these two approaches is scarce. It has 
made the work extremely challenging. Introducing social impact assessment was an attempt to 
create a link between the practice of social services on the ground and the theoretical presumptions 
reflected in the legal framework and implemented by the rules. From the point of view of policy 
choices, more comprehensive analyses are needed in order to prove and verify the real impact of 
measures taken in order to make the legal framework better/more compatible with the mission and 
objectives of social services. At this point the conceptual linkage between the smooth functioning 
of the internal market and the national priorities attached to the systems of social services is vague 
and underdeveloped.                   
The two major aims of the informal working group were to clarify further the application of EU 
rules to social services of general interest and to identify problems when applying the rules to 
them. We sincerely hope that this report will cast light on both issues. At the same time the report 
aggregates the work done by the working group during its two-year mandate. The report is based 
on the texts and describing examples provided by the members of the working group as individual 
experts representing their countries and by experts from the Commission as well as on articles by 
external key note speakers at the seminars organized by the working group. Furthermore, the main 
arguments and viewpoints which were raised during the discussions at the seminars and at the 
meetings are referred to in this report. We are grateful to all who have taken part in the work for 
their valuable contributions. Nevertheless, the challenging work has not been accomplished yet. 
Some proposals for how to proceed with the work are provided in the conclusions and in other 
parts of the reports. We hope that the insights of the report will provide an input to the future work 
addressing the multifaceted relationship between EU rules and social services of general interest.   
 
 
Markus Seppelin   Muriel Rabau 





In order to comply with the Council’s conclusions of December 20102, the Social Protection 
Committee (SPC) revived in March 2011 the activities of the Informal Working Group on the 
application of EU rules to Social Services of General Interest (SSGI), hereafter the IWG. 
The Council underlined “the need to further assess the interaction between the internal market 
and social services of general interest […]”. It then invited the Member States “to identify any 
problems encountered by social services of general interest in the application of European 
legislation […]” and the Commission “to further clarify and assess the application of EU rules to 
social services of general interest, in order to enhance their legal certainty […]”. 
The IWG has already been working for many years. It is not an institutionalised group, but an 
informal working group, gathering the experts of those Member States willing to participate, 





At its meeting on 29 March 2011 the SPC renewed the mandate for the work of the IWG (see 
Annex 1) and specified the tasks on the working group as the following: 
 analysis of the new Guide prepared by the Commission services on state aid, internal 
market and public procurement rules; 
 follow-up to the Third SSGI Forum; 
 on-going debate on state aid and public procurement rules. 
 
The mandate highlighted the need to work with other institutions and partners, in line with the 
Council Conclusions of December 2010 which invited the SPC “while carrying out its work 
on SSGI […] notably through the Informal Working Group […] to ensure regular contacts with 
the European Parliament and the European Union advisory bodies, as well as with all relevant 
organisations and stakeholders (e.g. social partners and NGOs) […]”. 
The following Member States participated in the activities of the IWG: Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Norway, and Sweden. 
… 
The IWG met seven times in Brussels and organised two seminars where the other EU 
















Within the IWG and notably for this report, no formal positions were adopted. The goal was to 
raise awareness and to develop a common and better understanding of the issues raised. Within the 
IWG, the first objective was to build a common knowledge on the EU rules belonging to the 
internal market policies (state aid, freedom of services, freedom of establishment, and public 
procurement) applicable to SSGI among the members. The level of awareness on the rules was 
very different, due among others to the high turnover among participants and to the difficulty to 
find the right expertise both on social issues and EU rules. The fragmentation of social policy 
issues among several Ministries, several regional and local entities does not make work any easier. 
SSGI is a concept developed at EU level in the Commissions’ Communications of 20063 and 
2007 embracing on one side social security schemes (statutory and complementary), and on the 
other side social services directly delivered to the person. These two categories represent a large 
part of the social protection in Member States4. 
The methodology used to prepare the report is based on the debates during the meetings and on 
the contributions of the members and of the external partners as well as on the seminars which 
were organised. 
A bottom-up approach was used: it is important to begin to build a knowledge on SSGI as such 
in the Member States (where the expertise and the knowledge of the members are the focus) and 
analyse the application of the EU rules (where the Commission has a high expertise) to the 
concrete situations. This is the objective of Chapter 1, which is based on content contributions of 
the members. Two meetings of the group were dedicated to the situation of social services in 
interaction with the EU rules in the Member States, going beyond a classical “law school” 
approach. 
Chapter 2 presents the debate on state aid, public procurement and internal market rules which 
took place at the seminars. The work that the IWG carried out on the Commission’s Guide to the 
application of the European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the internal market 
to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social services of general interest5 is 
presented in Chapter 3. 
Additionally we asked members and stakeholders for their feedback and comments on the way 
the IWG had carried out its activities and on need of future work on this topic through an 
evaluation form. The issues tackled are the clarity of the rules, the organisation of the next SSGI 
Forum, and feedback on the work of the informal group. This has been summarised in Chapter 4. 
The conclusions aim to give some specific and constructive ideas and recommendations for the 
future process and content when discussing SSGI. 
 
CHAPTER 1 – SSGI IN MEMBER STATES 
Section 1 – General remarks 
As stated in the introduction, the approach applied by the IWG for the drafting of this report was a 
bottom-up one: starting from the situation in the Member States with descriptions of how SSGI are 
organised and how they “interact” with the EU rules. 
This first chapter is based on contributions from the members: oral presentations and short 
papers which are attached hereafter (Section 1). It should be noted that these contributions were 
prepared by the experts participating in the IWG and cannot be considered as official positions of 
Member States. These papers were prepared according to instructions of general nature sent to the 
experts (Annex X). 
These contributions are useful as they provide insights and questions for a deeper analysis of 
the application of the EU rules to these SSGI applied on a specific market and on the role of 
market-type mechanisms6 in the field of social protection. For the three sets of EU rules under 
our scrutiny (public procurement, state aids, and freedom of establishment and freedom to provide 
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services), the main notion is the economic activity which is to say it simply “the exchange of good 
and services” on a market7. 
The large extent of the concept of economic activity leads to the application of the EU rules 
also to the social sector. In other words, if there is the presence of a market, then the EU rules 
apply. 
A short analysis of the common and diverse features and problems is also included (Section 2). 
All the contributions are annexed to the report (see p. X) 
From the papers describing the way social services are organised in different Member States, it 
becomes evident that it is a challenging task to identify problems encountered by the public 
authorities when applying the EU rules to the organisation and financing of SSGI, often done at 
the local level. There might be several reasons for that. The way SSGI (social services delivered to 
the persons and social security systems) are organised and provided varies a lot among the 
Member States and consequently the reactions to requirements of EU law and EU level regulation 
are also different. One possible explanation is that the concrete decisions concerning the provision 
of social services are made not always near or in proximity to central government structures. 
Awareness is sometimes lacking at the national level about the problems faced in concrete 
situations at the local level. Furthermore lack of knowledge of the contents of the EU rules might 
explain as well a perception that there are no major problems or confrontations between the EU 
rules and the overall organisation of social services. The ignorance of existing case law relevant 
for the report is also problematic. More generally, the level of awareness regarding the issue seems 
to vary a lot among the members of the IWG, despite that there is a clear responsibility of central 
authorities in spreading the knowledge of rules. 
 
Some common features Some divergent features 
- local planning, delivery, decision making and 
evaluation of SSGI 
- lack of corresponding concepts and legal 
terms at the national level 
- need for capacity building 
- multiplicity of service providers and 
provision schemes 
- marginal cross-border activities 
- types of service providers and provision 
schemes 
- sources of funding of the SSGI 
- role of national and regional governments 
- method and amount of state intervention 
(direct/indirect state aid, e.g. tax privileges) 




Section 2– Analysis 
1. Diversity in the provision of social services 
One issue important to stress is the variety of the different ways to provide social services of 
general interest in the Member States. This diversity could cause also problems in identifying 
when the EU rules apply. In other words, due to the great variety of the contexts, modes and 
contents of social services, the borderlines between different functions and types of activities 
become diffused in terms of the categorisations required by the EU rules.8 
 
2. Local delivery of social services 
Except for social security schemes9, almost all the papers state that social services are provided at 
regional or local level. This is due to the subsidiarity and democratic principles in order to 




As stated before, this local nature of social services leads also to the difficulty to identify 
“where are the problems” in applying EU rules. Receiving feedback is sometimes demanding 
because of the division of competences within the Member States. 
3. Market Concepts10 
Among the different contributions, it could be said that the market concepts are not central or even 
not always relevant to SSGI. The central divide between existence and non-existence of market in 
EU internal market rules (such as state aids or public procurement rules) seems to be quite absent 
in the institutional landscape of social services in Member States. The contributions seem to 
indicate that certain rules do not apply because of the way the services are organised (no 
outsourcing, triangular relation…)11. 
It should be noted that the ideal type of a market mechanism is essentially based on an 
interaction between buyers and sellers of a particular commodity or a specific service. Supply and 
demand determine the quantity and the price of the goods by influencing each other reciprocally, 
until equilibrium is reached. Especially in the case of SSGI this necessary balance in the interplay 
of supply and demand is disrupted or suboptimal. The “basic assumption” of a functioning market 
does not apply therefore for SSGI. 
Therefore, some authors of country-specific descriptions refer to the fact that the “market” of 
social services is imperfect with many market failures, even if there is outsourcing in the provision 
of social services. The perception of several contributors reinforced the idea of “non-functioning 
markets” or quasi-markets in the field of SSGI12. 
One of the reasons for this could be that social protection as such has been built on market 
failures: “It was because free markets generally failed to guarantee adequate level of protection 
for the population as a whole that state intervention had been seen to be necessary.”13. This issue 
is really an important point because it seems that the underlying principle in the EU rules is that 
market allocation is the most efficient way to provide a service14. But in the field of social 
policies,15 it is far from the case because several conditions of a functioning market are not met 
(e.g. information asymmetries, non-competitive markets, public goods). 
In other words, the justification of the EU level regulation on these issues is based on the 
presumption that the public action or support might distort the competition in the internal market16. 
Derogations17 are also possible according to the EU rules, and give more flexibility recognising 
the facts that markets are not always functional, in the case of SGEI, and that state interventions 
are needed for a general interest purpose. This is why EU state aid rules provide for the possibility 
to intervene on these failures by imposing a public service obligation. 
The notion of “economic activities” which is very important to apply EU rules does not seem to 
be well-known and at least not well “translated” in national realities. 
The notion and the role of competition18 are not addressed in all the contributions. Moreover, it 
seems that cooperation between actorsin the provision of social services is very frequent among 
Member States19. The provision of social services is often delivered by public bodies or delegated 
to non-profit actors20. 
Nevertheless, there are some trends in encouraging competition among service providers 
notably with systems based on freedom of choice of the user. Competition is also more present 
when public procurement rules are applied (see Point 5.). 
There are some challenging questions regarding the financing of social services and the 
compatibility with the state aids or public service compensations rules. Until now, it seems there 
are very few reflections on this issue for social services of “economic nature” at the national level. 
At the EU level, state aids are forbidden in principle. There might be derogation for the financing 
of services of general interest in so far as there is no cross-subsidisation21. Cross-subsidisations 
may occur if the public money given to an entity (public or private) did not serve the general 
objective assigned to this entity. Cross-subsidisation can distort competition among providers 
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delivering the same services. These EU concerns (avoid cross-subsidisation and avoid distortion of 
competition) were not reflected in the contributions. EU rules allow for the financing of social 
services of general interest in line with the Altmark jurisprudence and with the Almunia package22. 
The important question is whether these rules are applied and to what extent “easily” applied in the 
social sectors.   
 
EU dimension of Market23 (Cross-border provision) 
According to several contributions24, it seems that there is no or very little cross-border provision 
of social services. “Cross-border” provisions may exist but are really considered as marginal. State 
aid rules apply if trade between Member States is at least potentially affected while public 
procurement rules apply if there is cross-border interest. In their absence, neither public 
procurement, nor state aid rules apply. 
Nevertheless, it has to be said that it is not because there is no cross-border or transnational 
provision of social services, that EU rules do not apply, because of the potential affectation on 
trade. EU rules have been applied for example in a purely regional situation where private 
providers were challenging the financing of public providers for hospitals, regarding the 
compliance of the Monti-Kroes package25. This is due to the fact that, as far as state aid rules are 
concerned, there could still be “an effect on trade” if providers established in another Member 
State could be interested to provide the service. 
 
4. Application of Public Procurement Rules26 
 
Public procurement rules become gradually more and more predominant in the provision of social 
services27. This is partly due to the legal certainty that these rules can provide in place of other 
financing mechanisms28. Applying state aid regulation on public service compensation is also 
considered to be less secure than public procurement29. A closer reading of the decision and 
communications leads to the application of both sets of the EU rules. The unclear link between 
both set of rules haver persistently been criticised30. 
Some experts suggest to analyse some “side effects” of the application of the public 
procurement, such as endangering the continuity of the services31, or decreasing diversity of the 
actors32 (e.g.: reducing them to a single business model)33. It was also added that public 
procurement law can restrict the freedom of choice and can endanger the robustness and 
sustainability of social infrastructures34. 
More information would be needed on the cost efficiency of the application of public 
procurement rules to social services, taking into account externalities, or the “transaction costs”35 
required for a correct application of the rules. 
Some members36 expressed the view that public procurement rules do not apply to some social 
services because of the way they are organised (no outsourcing or not an economic activity37) or 
they are not an appropriate instrument for the provision of social services38. Simplified 
procedures39 have been implemented in Lithuania. 
Moreover, alternatives to public procurement were also quoted or presented in many Member 
States: triangular relationships between local authority, service provider and user40, licences or 
insurance contracts41, public funding programmes42, subventions schemes43, and freedom of 
choice44. At the moment, there is still no certainty if public funding programmes and subventions 
schemes are really alternatives to public procurements and as such really compatible with EU 
rules45. An invitation has been expressed towards the Commission by the Council to provide 
“more information on existing alternatives to public procurement procedures when Member States 
choose to outsource the provision of social services of general interest, notably through the 
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exchange of best practices among Member States”46. The Commission replied to this invitation by 
adding a Q&A on alternatives to public procurement rules to the 2010 Guide. 
Some concerns have been expressed regarding the original proposal47 of PPR by several 
members48 regarding the threshold49, the extension of administrative burden50 or the extension 
of scope to compulsory social security systems51. 
5. The role of not for profit providers
Not for profit providers, including voluntary welfare associations, social economy actors, and 
charities, are important players in the field of social services according to several contributions52. 
However, during the debate in the IWG it was noted that for-profit providers are increasingly 
present in the provision of social services. 
In principle the EU rules are the same for all players, both profit and not for profit providers 
even if they are not playing exactly the “same game” — taking into account very divergent aims of 
non-profit and purely for-profit actors. More research on what is the equal level playing field is 
needed, and to assess the impact on not for profit providers 
“Member States are currently in the process of transposing Community legislation concerning 
public procurement, state aid and service provision in the internal market into national 
legislation. It is clear that the application of Community rules on competition, state aid and public 
procurement on social and health services of general interest presents a range of challenges for 
service providers and commissioners. Internal Market policy is the area where the EU has the 
greatest impact on the voluntary sector, and it is generally not seen as a positive one by the 
voluntary sector, as the internal market policy is believed to inhibit the activities of the sector in a 
number of ways. In many instances, it seems that the negative effects of internal market rules are 
related to the lack of clarity regarding the application of these rules, and the narrow 
interpretation of EC law by public authorities (or ‘anticipatory obedience’).” 53 
Some fears have been expressed54 regarding that the role of the non-profit sector will decline, 
due to the fact that their specificities are not recognised by the rules. However, there has been no 
discussion regarding suggestions on how to change these rules. It has also to be said that the 
increasing participation of for-profit providers can partly be explained by the political choices of 
the Member States. Due to many reasons it was not possible to be investigated comprehensively 
by the group55. 
In the new proposal for Public Procurement Directive, the specificities of the third sector 
organisations seem to have been addressed in the latest discussions. 
Moreover, it has also been said that after the incorporation of the economic activities 
of NGOs it is more problematic to involve volunteers or to promote direct user 
engagement in the delivery of services56. 
7. Other issues raised in the contributions57
There are several other issues raised in the contributions. The following ones have been suggested 
to be added as particularly interesting for our purposes. The reader can always consult each 
contribution in the annex of this report. The fact that SSGI are covered in different definitions 
spread across different policy fields in EU documents makes it difficult to find a common 
understanding. Indeed the scope of application with the exceptions is quite different across the 
different set of EU rules. 
Some difficulties have been pointed out about how to take into account the social added value 
of SSGI or the Social Return On Investment. For example, for the calculation of compensation in 
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the state aid set of EU rules, the added value of SSGI is influenced by the society in which they are 
delivered (social infrastructures, civil society, community engagement,…) and this added value 
cannot be easily calculated in order to detect an alleged overcompensation58. 
A lack of understanding at national level results also of an uneven “qualification” at the 
national level of social services, some being organised in such a way as being economic in certain 
areas and non-economic in others. Therefore, public authorities are not always aware that certain 
ways of organising SSGI will trigger the fact that these services will be considered as economic59. 
The “cherry picking” phenomenon has also been underlined60: “the tendency of private 
operators to cherry pick the most profitable customers at the expense of the more costly and 
complex cases”. 
Even if it is not entirely related to EU law as such, two contributions61 made positive remarks 
on the European quality framework on social services adopted in 2010 by the SPC. At the same 
time, one member62 expressed there exist sufficient guidelines in this area and that further 
regulation is not needed at the EU level6364. 
 
CHAPTER 2 – THE EU RULES APPLYING TO 
SSGI: THE DEBATE WITHIN THE IWG 
 
As stated in the introduction, one of the objectives of the IWG was to build common knowledge 
and raise awareness of public authorities, service providers and users, and other stakeholders, on 
the EU rules at stake and on the way they apply to social services. Therefore, the IWG organised 
two seminars on the EU rules applying to SSGI. As the mandate that the IWG had received from 
the SPC65, in line with the Council Conclusions of December 201066, which asked the IWG to 
“ensure regular contacts with the European Parliament and the European Union advisory bodies, 
as well as with all relevant organisations and stakeholders (e.g. social partners and NGOs)”, 
MEPs, representatives of the Committee of the Regions and of the European Economic and Social 
Committee, social partners and various NGOs were invited to both seminars. The seminars were 
thus attended by representatives from Eurocities, the Social Platform, Social Services Europe, 
Social Economy Europe, REVES, AGE, Union Sociale pour l'Habitat, SOLIDAR, the European 
Disability Forum, EAPN, CECODHAS, Eurodiaconia, COFACE, FEANTSA, EASPD, ENSIE, 
NHS, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, and the European Social Insurance 
Platform. Unfortunately, no MEP could participate. 
The first seminar aimed at presenting the key concepts relevant for the understanding and 
application of the rules, whereas the second seminar provided a detailed explanation of the rules 
themselves. 
The format of the seminars consisted of a keynote presentation by well-known experts 
(Koen Lenaerts67 in the first seminar, and Stéphane Rodrigues68 in the second), followed by the 
reactions from discussants (Stéphane Rodrigues in the first seminar, and Carsten Zatschler69 in the 
second) and the debate with the other participants. 
In both seminars, the questions of the participants were prepared in small groups according to 
the “world café” method, an approach which consists on debating issues in small groups. This 
method promotes the participation of all in the exchanges and ensures an effective dialogue. The 
discussions in groups were led by a facilitator. A rapporteur was chosen by each group to make a 
presentation of the discussions in the plenary session and launch the debate. 
The papers of the experts are annexed to the report. 
This chapter presents a brief summary of the main messages conveyed by the experts during the 
seminars and reflects the issues raised during the debates. No concrete conclusions were drawn from 




Highlights from the experts' presentations 
K. Lenaerts noted that the term “Social Services of General Interest” does neither appear in 
the Treaties, nor in secondary law but only in soft-law documents. Instead the terms “Services of 
General Interest” (SGI), “Services of General Economic Interest” (SGEI) and “non-economic 
services of general interest” (NESGI) can be found in primary and secondary law (notably, as far 
as primary law is concerned, in Articles 14 and 106(2) of the TFEU and in Protocol 26). This 
implies that it is the Court of Justice (ECJ) that has to define the concepts which appear in the 
Treaties while SSGI can be defined by the EU legislator and by national authorities. 
The definition of SGI can be examined under two competing models. From a more “liberal” 
perspective, SGI are seen as derogations to the EU competition rules and therefore, as all 
derogations, the concepts which appear in the Treaty have to be interpreted in a restrictive way, to 
avoid attempts by the Member States to circumvent the obligations imposed by the Treaties leading 
to the fragmentation of the internal market. The other approach considers SGI as a symbol of the 
European social model; therefore the rules should be interpreted more broadly to protect the social 
value. At the EU level, there does not seem to be a need to choose between both views as long as a 
fair balance between the general interest and the relevant internal market rules can be found. 
Protocol 26 refers to SGI as a general concept that comprises SGEI and NESGI, the difference 
between the two being the qualification of the activity carried out as economic or not. The 
question whether an activity is economic or not shall be answered in relation to each type of EU 
rules. If an activity is based on the principle of solidarity, as far as competition rules, and therefore 
also state aid rules, are concerned, then the SGI does not involve an economic activity and can be 
qualified as a NESGI. Competition rules will therefore not apply to these services. Nevertheless 
this would not exclude that the same activity can fall in the field of application of internal market 
rules, as long as the provision of the service, even if based on the principle of solidarity, is done 
“for remuneration". Member States can impose restrictions to the freedom to provide services 
insofar as these restrictions are justified and proportionate. Social concerns are considered as an 
overriding reason of general interest that could justify the restriction. 
While S. Rodrigues expressed concern for the fact that the Court can come to two different 
conclusions on the economic nature of an activity according to the set of rules at stake, K. Lenaerts 
highlighted that the application of internal market rules to a service which is considered as non-
economic within the field of competition rules (and therefore outside the remit of the application 
of these rules) is in the interest of the user as it will give him/her the opportunity to take advantage 
of the internal market. 
In this context, K. Lenaerts also noted that the control of the application of the EU rules to 
social services triggers the “protection of the social objectives” of a given service as it will check 
the abuse of those service providers that pretend to have social objectives just as a pretext to avoid 
the application of the EU rules. 
The current EU law and case law does not provide for a clear and precise definition of SGEI 
even if common features can be drawn such as the economic nature of the services, the imposition 
of public services obligations, the universal nature, the continuity and affordability, the universal 
coverage and the focus on user and consumer protection. K. Lenaerts reported that the lack of 
definition of the SGEI in EU law is considered by some scholars as positive as SGEI are evolving 
over time and need to be flexible to respect the diversity of organisation of Member States. 
Interestingly K. Lenaerts provided an example of the equilibrium to be found in this field and 
referred to the exemption of notification for a large number of social services in the 2011 state aid 
decision within the new Altmark Package70: he sees such derogation as an example of the 
application of Article 9 of the TFEU which calls for a balance between social objectives and other 
EU policies, in casu state aid. 
15 
 
S. Rodrigues presented in detail the different sets of rules that apply to SSGI. He particularly 
insisted on state aid rules and the reforms that took place in 2011 with the adoption of the new 
SGEI Package. S. Rodrigues also underlined that the new package obliges the Member States to be 
more transparent in their decision making process. This will also imply that the Commission will 
have to be more rigorous in its controls71. C. Zatschler recalled the competence of the Member 
States to define what constitutes a SSGI according to their cultural and historical background. The 
role of the Commission and of the European Court of Justice in the definition of a SSGI is limited 
to check the manifest error. 
On public procurement rules, S. Rodrigues stressed that, even if social services and health services 
fall in the field of application of the Public Procurement Directive, they benefit of a very light 
regime. The Commission proposal for a new Public Procurement Directive also foresees a specific 
regime for social services based on the limited cross-border interest that these services have. 
 
Debates and issues raised during the seminars 
The debate in both seminars showed that public authorities are concerned about maintaining the 
models of organisation and financing of SSGI while ensuring that it complies with EU rules. 
Indeed, public authorities seem more and more aware that EU rules apply to SSGI, even though 
understanding and appropriation of the rules still seems very limited, in particular among local 
public authorities and service providers. Some participants suggested exchanging best practices on 
the way the rules can be applied. Questions from the audience were also related to whom (the 
Commission or the Member States) should be responsible to ensure that the rules are understood at 
national, regional and local levels. 
Some concepts, which might seem evident for legal experts, are still not fully grasped by public 
authorities and stakeholders. The difference between economic and non-economic activities seems 
to be a source of misunderstanding, some participants pointing to the incoherence and confusion of 
qualifying the same activity as economic within the remit of internal market rules and non-
economic as far as competition rules are concerned.72 Doubts were voiced on the concepts of “in-
house provision” and notably on the percentage of activities that the in-house entity can provide to 
clients other than the controlling authority. 
Discussion showed that some public authorities do not feel confident in deciding which one 
between the different legal instruments composing the State aid package is to be applied to their 
case, probably because of the lack of understanding of the scope and objectives of each 
instrument. Some participants also reported the difficulty to determine the level of compensation 
and the unclear link between state aid and public procurement rules. It seems that these legal 
uncertainties might encourage the use of procedures or approaches that seems to ensure a greater 
level of legal certainty but might fail to fully deliver in terms of fulfilment of social objectives, 
quality of the provided service or access of disadvantaged users. Examples are public contracts 
awarded only on the basis of the lowest price or voucher systems. 
Public authorities still have questions on their margin of discretion when defining, organising 
and financing SSGI. It was recalled that until now, while there are some pending cases, there has 
been no clash between the Court or the Commission and the national authorities on the definition 
of a service as being of general interest in the social sector. 73 
Concerns were also raised by participants on the risk of “cherry picking” by private service 
providers that attract users with “good” risks, leaving the “bad” risks for public organisations and 
thus endangering the financial balance of the latest. Therefore some participants seemed quite 
sceptical about opening up the provision of social services to competition and at the same time, 
despite well-established case law74, felt doubtful about the possibility of granting special or 




CHAPTER 3 – THE WORK OF THE IWG ON 
THE COMMISSION GUIDE 
The IWG has conducted an analysis of the 2010 Commission Guide to the application of the 
European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and internal market to services of general 
interest (SGEI), and in particular to social services of general interests (SSGI)75 (hereafter the 
2010 Guide). This analysis had been requested to the IWG by the SPC which had identified among 
the tasks to be carried out in 2010 an “analysis of the new Guide prepared by the Commission 
services on state aid, internal market and public procurement rules”.76 
The analysis was conducted through a questionnaire sent to the Member States in March 2012 
(See Annex XX). Member States could send their contributions till the end of April 2012 and 
additional comments were received till November 2012. 
The questionnaire was composed of a set of seven questions concerning the following issues: 
 general comments on the 2010 Guide; 
 communication by the Member States or by the Commission on the 2010 Guide / 
awareness by stakeholders and public authorities; 
 specific comments and suggestions on the contents of the 2010 Guide / new issues that 
should be added to it. 
Fourteen Member States replied to the questionnaire (BE, DE, EE, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, AT, 
PL, SI, SK, FI, UK) and one EFTA country (NO). The contributions received do not only come 
from the members of the IWG, as the questionnaire was sent to all the Member States through the 
SPC. 
The aim of the analytical work carried out by the IWG was to provide feedback on the use of 
the Guide, as well as to influence the revision process of the 2010 Guide that the Commission 
services had undertaken between 2012 and 2013. An updated version of the 2010 Guide77 was 
published on 18 February 2013 (and slightly amended on 29 April 2013) taking on board the 
changes that occurred with the adoption of the new state aid Package in 201178. 
This new version (hereafter the 2013 Guide) takes into account comments and suggestions by 
the Member States, provided through the IWG questionnaire, as well as issues raised by Member 
States, by organisation representing service users and providers and by other stakeholders in 
the IWG meetings, seminars, conferences and other events, and the questions received by the 
Commission services through the Interactive Information Service (IIS)79. 
As announced in its introduction, the 2013 Guide will be updated to take into account the 
results of the on-going revision of the EU Public Procurements rules. 
It is worth recalling that the IWG had conducted the same analytical exercise on the 
predecessors of the 2010 Guide, and the Frequently-asked questions’ documents (FAQs) published 
by the Commission services in 200780, which offered guidance on state aid and public 
procurement. 
The report presents below, following the structure of the questionnaire, the replies of the 
Member States to the IWG questionnaire and highlights how their comments and suggestions were 
taken on board in the 2013 Guide. 
General comments on the 2010 Guide 
Generally, the 2010 Guide is perceived as a useful instrument by the respondents as it helps 
understanding the rules and provides public authorities with concrete guidance when they organise 
and finance social services. It also clarifies the terminology used at the EU level. However CY and 





One Member State (UK) states it "had few significant problems [possibly] because [it] seeks to 
meet commercial best practice standards …”. 
While some (CY, HU) seem to appreciate the Q&As (Questions and Answers) format of the 
Guide, others (AT, SK and FI) considered that this structure was sometimes difficult to follow and 
AT and FI suggested to add a keyword index. BE suggested to make an interactive version of the 
Guide. The 2013 Guide is still organised in a Q&A format but has a simplified structure as the 
questions have a continuous numbering from 1 to 237. Moreover, the 2013 Guide provides more 
straightforward answers. 
While some Member States find the 2010 Guide too long and complex (BE, EE, SK, FI), 
others (EE and FI) indicated that it would be useful to add in the introduction a more in-depth 
explanation of the rules.81 Moreover, BE, AT and FI asked to add concrete examples and a 
diagram of the procedures. The 2013 Guide responds to these requests as several examples have 
been added, taken from more recent case law as well as from the decision practice of the 
Commission. To Guide the public authorities in applying the Package, an analysis tree was added 
giving the logical steps that a public authority should go through when designing a compensation 
scheme for the provision of a social service of general interest.82 
BE also complained that the 2010 Guide is not binding for the Commission as an institution. 
Nearly all respondents requested a regular update of the Guide. In the 2013 Guide, the State aid 
chapter (Chapter 3 of the new version) has been entirely reviewed to integrate the changes that 
took place with the adoption of the 2011 state aid Package. It is structured following the different 
documents of the 2011 state aid Package and gives a clear presentation of the different legal 
instruments. 
Awareness about the 2010 Guide among public authorities and service 
providers 
Members States were asked to answer the following questions: 
 Is the Guide widely known to public authorities and service providers in your Member 
State? 
 Do you suggest any initiatives that the Commission should take to make the Guide more 
widely known or more accessible? 
 What feedback on the Guide have you received from public authorities, the service 
providers or from other stakeholders? 
Frome the replies received it appears that the level of awareness of the 2010 Guide among public 
authorities, especially among local ones, is not very high. The Guide was spread by the ministries 
in some Member States through their websites (BE, EE, AT, PL, SK, NO, FI) or sent directly to 
other administrations at national and/or regional level (BE, LT, LU, AT, SI) as well as to 
stakeholders (LU, AT, SI). DE indicated that the Guide was also available on the intranet of the 
Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. 
Various Member States (BE, DE, EE, CY, LT, LV, HU, AT, SI, UK and NO) reported a 
limited or no feedback on the 2010 Guide from public authorities, stakeholders and service 
providers. BE and EE coordinated the answer to the questionnaire between different public 
authorities and stakeholders. CY indicates that the main difficulty is transposing EU rules into 
national or local law. HU and FI also flagged the poor quality of the translation. The 2013 Guide 
was published in all official languages and is accessible on line.83 
BE reported that it had organised specific seminars for the social economy enterprises and for 
local public authorities where the 2010 Guide was used as a complementary source of information. 
SI also used the Guide in trainings and indicated that it organised specific meetings between 




initiatives developed by national public authorities or stakeholders. FI and NO developed or will 
develop specific guides. DE invites interested parties to also consult specific guides issued by 
stakeholders. SK envisages setting up an informal coordination network of stakeholders to 
promote exchange of information and experience related to the subject of SSGI. 
BE and LT indicated that the Guide should be more widely circulated through internet, e.g. put 
on more easily accessible webpages of the Commission's website. BE, CY and UK also indicated 
that the dissemination could be done through specific focal points like national networks or 
European networks, e.g. Europe Direct information centres, or through the social partners. 
Thematic seminars also seem to be an interesting way to raise awareness (BE, LT, PL, SK). UK 
also mentioned that the Guide could be disseminated through articles in professional journals and 
trade papers. 
Comments and suggestions on the contents of the 2010 Guide / new issues 
that should be added to it 
Member States were asked to reply to the two questions concerning, on the one hand, comments 
and suggestions on the contents of the 2010 Guide and, on the other, new issues that should be 
added to it, structuring their answers according to the six core sections of the Guide: 
 Section 2: the concepts; 
 Section 3: the application of state aid rules to SGEI and in particular to SSGI; 
 Section 4: the application to SSGI of the rules on public procurement; 
 Section 5: the simultaneous application of the state aid rules and the rules on public 
contracts and services concessions to SGEI; 
 Section 6: the application to SGEI, and SSGI in particular, of the Treaty rules on the 
internal market (freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services); 
 Section 7: the application of the Services Directive to SGEI and, in particular, to SSGI. 
Eleven of the 15 respondents (BE, DE, EE, CY, LT, AT, PL, PT, SK, FI and NO) replied at least 
partially to these two questions. Their answers are presented below following the structure of the 
two questions, which mirrors the structure of the 2010 Guide. 
 
Section 2: the concepts 
The section on concepts is generally welcomed. Nevertheless, BE, CY and FI indicated that the 
concepts still seemed quite abstract and difficult to incorporate into the national context. 
AT, DE and LT underlined the need to emphasise even more the primary competence 
of Member States in defining SGEI. Q&A 4 of the 2013 Guide provides a clear answer to this 
issue, stating that the public authorities have a “considerable discretion when it comes to defining 
what they regard as services of general interest”. 
CY requested more concrete examples to help public authorities define SSGI. 
Some Member States called for additional clarification on the difference between “economic” 
and “non-economic” activities (BE, LT and SK) and the notion of “market” (BE and PL). The 
box listing non-economic activities in the 2013 Guide has been enriched with clearer examples 
(including childcare in Norway and public hospitals in Spain).84 On the notion of “market”, the 
existing answers have been revised and redrafted to take into account the guidance given in the 





Section 3: State aid rules 
As for the section of the 2010 Guide which covers state aid rules, several Member States indicated 
that it was too early for them to provide comments and suggest new issues to be added as the new 
set of rules had been adopted too recently (December 2011). 
Further clarification was asked for on various notions: 
 the “impact on trade between Member States” for local services (FI): guidance is 
provided in Q&A 36 of the 2013 Guide. Moreover Q&A 38 has been enriched with 
additional examples, one particularly related to social services on mental health care units 
in Portugal; 
 “services for work integration” (FI): an explanation of the scope of this concept is given 
in Q&As 99 and 100; 
 “ancillary activities of hospitals” (DE, FI): guidance has been provided in Q&A 
92 on the scope of the definition of ancillary services for hospitals; 
 “significant investment” (DE): an explanation of the concept of “significant investment” 
is given in Q&A 101. Q&A 102 provides further guidance on the duration of an 
entrustment in cases where a significant investment is required and needs to be amortised 
for a longer period; 
 “typical well-run undertaking” (BE, EE, SK, FI,): the Q&A explaining the 4th Altmark 
criterion has not been redrafted but Q&A 110 gives the differences between the 
conditions of the Altmark judgment and the conditions laid down in the decision; 
 the “net avoided cost methodology” (FI): an explanation of the rationale to introduce this 
methodology within the Framework and when to apply it is provided in Q&A 171; 
 the act of entrustment (BE, FI): the section on the act of entrustment has been enriched 
with revised and additional Q&As. Q&A 59 specifically refers to the case when a service 
provider develops a service that would not be in response to a public demand, an issue on 
which BE and FI asked for clarifications; 
 the principle of “selectivity” (DE, FI). 
BE, EE and FI also requested more detailed guidance on the methodologies for the calculation of 
the public services compensation. This part of the 2013 Guide has been redrafted to take into 
account the new rules of the 2011 state aid Package. 
BE, CY and FI indicated that more examples should be provided, more specifically on Court 
judgments directly related to SSGI (AT). Additional examples were added where relevant to the 
2013 Guide. Typical examples can also be found in the 3rd Biennial Report on Social Services of 
General Interest published by the Commission services on 20 February 2013.86 
BE asked also for clearer guidance on the cumulation between the general de minimis regulation87 
and the SGEI de minimis regulation.88 To provide guidance on this issue, a specific Q&A89 was 
added to the 2013 Guide. Moreover, the section on the compensation covered by the de minimis 
regulations has been added to the 2013 Guide to explain the aim of the new regulation and the 
difference between the two regulations. 
Finally, BE asked for clarification on the application of state aid rules to the funding granted 




Section 4: public procurement rules 
Some respondents (BE, EE, FI and NO) asked for additional clarifications on concepts such as 
“in-house” (EE), the “cross-border interest” (BE, EE, FI), “services concession” (NO) as well as 
the procedures such as the amendment of contracts91 (EE) and the possibility to reserve public 
procurements to non-profit organisations (NO). BE asked to add references to more recent case 
laws whereas SK asked for additional examples to be added to this section. 
Some general comments were made on the use of public procurement procedures in the 
provision of social services. NO raises the issue that the needs of users are not sufficiently taken 
into consideration through public procurement procedures and that public procurement can have 
negative effects on service continuity and the evolution of the needs of the users; moreover, NO 
indicates that the use of quality criteria is quite difficult to evaluate.92 BE asked for more 
information on alternatives to public procurements as stated in the annex of the 2010 Council 
Conclusions which invites the Commission to clarify and provide more information on the existing 
alternatives to public procurement procedures.93 
As mentioned previously, the Commission services will take these comments into consideration 
when they will update the 2013 Guide once the Directives on public procurement and on 
concessions will be adopted. This was also requested by EE, CY and FI. 
 
Section 5: simultaneous application of state aid and public procurement rules 
BE, SK and FI asked for further clarification on the link between public procurement and state aid 
and in particular on the circumstances when it is required to simultaneously apply both state aid 
and public procurement rules. The combination of the rules is seen as quite complex for 
stakeholders (NO). DE, FI and NO asked for more clarification on the exceptions to the 
application of public procurement rules. This issue is explained in Chapter 5 of the 2013 Guide 
which might be updated when the new public procurement rules are adopted. In the 2013 Guide 
three Q&As on this issue (Q&As 113, 114 and 188) have also been added to Chapter 3 on state aid 
rules. 
 
Sections 6 and 7: the Treaty rules on the internal market (freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services) and the Services Directive 
Very few comments were made on these two sections. BE, DE, LT and FI asked for a 
clarification of the services that were not covered by the Services Directive and SK asked for a 
clarification of the notion of cross-border provision. BE referred to the Council Conclusions of 
2010 which asked the Commission to “study and assess potential questions which could arise 
around social services of general interest and the freedom to provide services and the right of 
establishment”. 
BE suggested that new issues should be presented in the Guide such as the definition of social 
services in the external trade policies and the collaboration between several partners in the 
provision of services of general interest. 
Finally, the activity carried out by the IWG on these issues was very effective: the issues that 
the Member States have raised when relying to the IWG questionnaire have largely been taken 
into account in the revision of the 2010 Guide. The comments on public procurement and 
concession rules and on the internal market rules will undoubtedly also influence the future 
revisions of the Guide. 
One issue which, however, should deserve further attention is how to raise awareness on 
the Guide and promote its utilisation and, thus, a correct application of the rules by the public 




CHAPTER 4 – EVALUATION & PERSPECTIVES 
Section 1 - Process 
This fourth chapter is the outcome of the feedback received from the members and from the 
stakeholders on the evaluation form sent in December 2012 (Annex 1). The issues tackled are the 
clarity of the application of the rules on state aid, internal market and public procurement to SSGI, 
the organisation of the next SSGI Forum, and the feedback from the members on the activities of 
the IWG. 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw perspectives for the future of the work on this complex 
issue of SSGI. 
We received 14 contributions from the following members: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Italia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Norway, Sweden, and 
Estonia. 
The stakeholders having made a contribution were the following: the Social Platform, Age 
Platform, Caritas Europe, REVES, Business Europe, and FEANTSA. 
By doing so, the working group has realised its mandate about a contribution on the “follow-up 
to the Third Forum” and the contacts “with the European Parliament and the European Union 
advisory bodies, as well as with all relevant organisations and stakeholders (e.g. social partners 
and NGOs)”. 
Feedback was received in different ways, covering lots of details in some cases. This chapter 
tries to summarise the contributions and does not necessarily always reflect all the details given in 
the contributions. Tackling concerns and expressing new ideas in a constructive way have helped 
significantly the mutual learning process. 
 
Section 2 - Content94 
1. Clarity on how to apply the EU rules 
a) Clarity or not? 
The first question deals with the clarity of the current European legal framework 
applicable to SSGI. 
 
According to the answers received, nine members95 considered that there is not enough 
clarity on how to apply EU rules to social services in national contexts. 
 
The many administrative levels involved in national contexts are also given as an 
explanation for the difficulties of coordination or awareness on this issue. The fact that 
the European concepts are considered as problematic or improper to be used in the social 
sector was also advanced by two experts96: more oriented market logic in the European 
regulations and general interest in the national ones. The use of public procurement has 
also been considered as problematic97 or not appropriate98, and some guidance has been 
requested on this issue99. The difficulty to identify which social services are affected by 
EU rules is also pointed to100 or the dispersion of social services among various public 
authorities101. Support to local authorities through support materials, and help in legal 
questions should also be promoted102. Member States should also be a good example for 
their local authorities103. 
 
For five members104, there is enough clarity; however, for some respondents105, open 
questions remain because of the ruling process of the Court of Justice itself106, or by the 









Four stakeholders (Social Platform, Age Platform, Caritas Europe and REVES) consider 
there is not enough clarity on how to apply the current set of rules, whereas Business 
Europe and FEANTSA believe there is enough clarity. 
 
Other interesting points were raised from the consultations. 
 
The fact that legislation on SSGI is built on exemptions or exceptions to the various 
set of EU rules brings legal uncertainty as interpreted in a narrow sense108. The clarity 
to know if and how to apply EU rules is not always clear regarding social services for 
older people which evolve very rapidly109. To be certain that the new approaches to 
these social services are compatible with EU rules is not so easy for the promoters of 
these services. 
 
The Social Platform and FEANTSA acknowledge that progress has been achieved on 
the recognition of the specific characteristics of SSGI in recent legislation concerning 
public procurement, state aid and concessions. 
For the Social Platform, two main problems still remain: 
   Firstly, there are different concepts and definitions in the 
different sets of EU rules. A unique legislation on the basis of Article 14 of 
the TFEU and Protocol 26 would create legal certainty and coherence. 
  Secondly, there is no clarity about the compatibility of 
modalities and rules on the provision of social services developed in 
Member States (including the notion of grant / subvention; quasi in-house) 
and EU laws that are applicable to social services. 
 
The whole issue of the application of the EU rules remains difficult for local and regional 
authorities110. 
 
It was also commented that it would be difficult to define SSGI that are a primary 
competence of MS and local authorities, that the general interest is defined quite 
differently by MS, and that clarifications should be brought through guidance and 
collaboration between Member States111. 
 
b)  Problems identified in practice and workable solutions 
 
The questionnaire allowed the members to raise the problems they are facing in the 
application of the EU rules to the provision of social services. From the contributions, two 
categories of concerns exist which are of course interrelated: one regarding the 
application of the EU rules, and the other on the design of these rules applicable to SSGI. 
 
The clarifications brought over the years were appreciated112. However, several members 
proposed solutions that, according to them, would enhance the understanding and the 
application of the rules in the national context. 
 






Application of the 
EU rules 
 
Type of concerns113 
 
 SOLUTIONS suggested in concreto Suggested by the experts 
of 
 
Different aspects regarding 
Commission “explanation 
documents”114 
The Guide needs more explanation, concrete definitions and criteria to help 





While respecting the confidentiality of the data exchanged (no public 
connection), one could consider seeking an answer from the Commission on a 
specific compensation case that could be viewed as an official position (based 
on the old letters in antitrust policy; these could be “Altmark orientation 




Faster update of the Guide as public authorities cannot wait over a year to get 
concrete answers to the application of the new set of rules, especially if they 
have 2 years to comply with the legislation, even for existing legislation. 
 
Belgium 
Lack of knowledge should be 
reduced by Seminars & Trainings 
 Share practices of Member States, how they applied the rules, what 
problems they had to solve during the process of implementation. 
 
 Twinning Programmes between Commission and Member States 
such as Officials “on the spot”, i.e. in social institutions or entities, 
dealing with social projects during an appropriate period of time 
(suggested name for such exchanges: “Back to Social Reality”) 
 
 Training Programmes financed by the Commission for social 
services’ managers on how to understand and apply EU rules (see as 
a model: Training of National Judges in EU Competition Law and 
























 Specific SOLUTIONS Suggested by the experts 
of 





 Need of legal clarification: common rules, concepts are needed, the boundary between 
SGEI and SGNEI is not clear 
 
 Need of specific legal framework adapted specifically to SSGI 
 
 Need of more information on the various forms of provision of services (in-house, 
public-private partnership, inter-municipal cooperation, authorisation schemes, 
compensation or subsidy, regulated competition and the user’s choice, etc.). 
 
  the cost efficiency (and administrative cost especially) of the application of the EU 
rules to social services, should be taken into account in the design of the EU rules 
 
 A Commission communication on how to articulate EU public procurement rules and 
EU State aids rules 
 
Lithuania, Estonia 














Lack of definition Specific 
definition 
In order to be able to give guidance on the SSGI from the point of view of EU state aid 







A public consultation on the interpretation/implementation of Article 9 of the TFEU (which 
impact on the application of EU rules to SSGI?) 
 
The scope of Article 9 of the TFEU: may such a new provision imply a reconsideration of the 
pertinence of the current EU rules applying to social services, and not only for future proposals 
from the Commission? 
 
The Better Regulation Mechanism, as ruled by the Inter-Institutional Agreement of 2003, which 
may imply a debate on how the application of EU rules to social services is complying with the 
principle of proportionality (Article 5.4 of the TEFU). See also the new Commission 










a) Problems encountered at national level and possible initiatives from Member States 
Since the organisation, financing and design of many social services are set at regional and local level, a kind of “missing link” exists between the European and central 
governments on one side and the regional and local authorities on the other side. 
 
One should take also into consideration the organisation of the Member States and the autonomy of regions and local authorities who are not obliged to report to the national 
authorities on how they organise the service provision. Nevertheless the application of EU law is still a responsibility of the national authorities, drawing attention to the 
competencies of different levels within Member States. 
 
Therefore, in order to take into account this situation the following question has been asked to the members: “What initiatives could Member States take to help regional and 
local public authorities better understand and apply EU rules?” 
 
Initiatives that Members States could take to help regional and local public authorities better understand and apply EU rules. 
 
Type of initiatives Specific initiatives Proposed by the 
experts of 
"Tools" Continuing with the existing EU tools. Austria 
Shared number of actions and interventions with the Central Ministries, Regions and Municipalities for 
the management of social services/services of general economic interest (SGEI), addressing the 
European rules on state aid, internal market and public procurement, in order to give a clear 
presentation of the rules applying to SSGI. 
 
Italy 
Initiate a more systematic 
approach & methodology 
 With the help of the Commission, a specific and scientific approach with a clear methodology 
and objectives has to be developed. As already proposed during the working group, the 
starting points have to be the social services themselves or the possible themes challenged by 
the EU rules within SSGI. Instead of speaking of “state aids”, the topics “financing of social 
institutions” or “governance of social institutions” have to be clearly announced and tackled. 
Instead of speaking about freedom to provide services in general terms, the topics 
“authorisations schemes within social services” and “conditions to provide social services” 
have to be treated. The social institutions in charge of providing these services have to be 










 Identification of markets within social services for the crucial distinction of economic and 








Seminars, examples of the best practices, case studies, etc. 
 
Czech Republic 
Regular symposiums and training dedicated to the successive reforms. France 
 Specific seminars and specific meetings.  Portugal 
Website - Vademecum The use of various tools with respect to information on the rules, including a vademecum and a website. Denmark 
Publication of a Guide for local services focusing on the management of social services/services of 
general economic interest (SGEI), addressing the European rules on state aid, internal market and 
public procurement, in order to give a clear presentation of the rules applying. Local services are very 
concerned on how to secure the public procurement. 
France 
A more user-friendly version of the Commission´s Guide, online information.  Portugal  
Consultations & 
Communications 
More communication and consultations on the relevant topic. In particular, going through the EU 
legislation during the preparations of different actions should be stressed. The clarification of the whole 
picture is also very important. Nevertheless the role of national authorities is limited because they are 
not in a position to interpret the rules in the last level; they are not able to give any definite answers to 
complex questions emerging from the local level actors. 
Finland 
Guidance Promote guidelines, support materials, dedicate participants in working groups, etc. Lithuania 
Cooperation There are different institutions of cooperation between government and local authorities (e.g. 
Government and self-government Joint Committee) and between government and non-profit 
organisations (Public Utility Council). Office of Competition and Consumer Protection and Public 
Procurement Office provide a wide range of information and advisory activities. E.g.: at the moment 
the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection developed a wide range of consultations with 





Other interesting points were raised by stakeholders on the initiatives at the national level115: 
 Create a high level group to exchange on the challenges of social protection and 
social security and how those challenges could be better met at the EU level. 
 The idea of the creation of “a one point information desk” within Member States 
where regional and local public authorities and other stakeholders would be able to 
get a clear answer to their specific questions116. 
 The creation of an indicative non-binding register of social services, which specifies, 
for each form of organisation, the economic and non-economic nature of the activity. 
 The organisation of training activities for regional, local public authorities and 
service providers to better understand and apply EU rules117. 
 The exchange of information and good practices in the implementation of EU rules 
(e.g. public procurement: implementation of social considerations, how to measure 
quality, how to ensure continuity, users' involvement, etc.; state aid: how to draft a 
mandate, how to calculate compensation, how to classify a service as economic or 
non-economic)118 and facilitating a network of local authorities119. 
 A possible action to be taken could be to create an “alliance” between the EU level120 
(and included the SPC) and intermediary bodies that might have better access to the 
local and regional level in order to improve the knowledge and understanding of EU 
rules applying to SSGI. This alliance should benefit from a kind of acknowledgment 
from the EU level. 
2. The organisation of the next Forum on SSGI: still a shared idea 
 
Since 2007, three Forums on Social Services of General Interest (SSGI) have been organised; 
in Lisbon (2007), in Paris (2008) and in Brussels (2010)121. These Forums were High Level 
EU conferences organised by the respective Presidencies of the Council, with the support 
from the Commission and financed from the EU budget. They have involved EU institutions, 
national, regional and local authorities as well as relevant stakeholders. 
 
These Conferences have given an opportunity for public authorities, stakeholders and 
institutions to voice concerns about the issues related to the provision of social services and 
the application of EU rules. 
 
The Commission Communication of December 2011122 acknowledges that the Forums have 
been “essential in sharing information and promoting dialogue and better understanding of 
the rules among stakeholders”, and recalled the organisation of the next forum in 2013123. 
 
Therefore, one question of the questionnaire invited the members and the stakeholders to 
express their interest in having a next forum, the subjects which could be tackled within the 
forum, and the approach and methods that should be applied to the organisation of this type of 
conference. 
 
At this time, the question which presidency will take up the initiative to organise the next 
forum is not yet solved. 
 
a) The interest of having the next forum 








According to some reactions, organising a forum feeds to a continued process of 
discussions125. 
 
b) Subjects to be tackled 
Some of the suggested topics were the application of public procurements rules and of the 
state aids package, as well as the quality framework. These have already been discussed in 
previous editions of the forum. 
Beside these issues, several other issues were proposed by the members and stakeholders, 
including also new perspectives on the discussed ones: 
 




o Identification of bottlenecks in EU regulation regarding social services127; 
o Implementation of the rules in Member States, obstacles and solutions128; 
o Economic and non-economic activity, trace the limits of the non-economic 
sphere to obtain a better definition, set the scope129; 
o Applying competition and market regulation to the provision of SSGI130; 
o Is the EU law favouring market logics in the social sector? If this is the case, is 
this suitable? Are the rules stimulating profit providers’ appetites in the social 
sectors? Added value of economic regulation applicable to SSGI131. 
 
o What is the level of application of the EU rules in the different Member States132; 
o The results of the last forum on SSGI – overview of progress133; 
o Creating of special legal base for SSGI – systematisation of existing rules and 
documents related to SSGI in one document or some special documents134; 
o Concession directive135; 
o the new SGEI package and the Altmark judgment; how should they be applied 
preferably in concrete examples; 
o “collateral” effects of the rules and how can they be tackled. For e.g. the length 
of the act of entrustment. The Commission argues that it is better to have a short 
term act of entrustment as a public authority can change more frequently than a 
service provider. Nevertheless, what are the effects on the long-term 
employment of the workers of these services (long-term contracts) especially in 
sectors with precarious working conditions. Beyond the working conditions, it is 
also the continuity of the service for the beneficiaries which is really at stake136; 
o the new legislation137; 
o define non-economic sphere and examples how Member States could help local 
authorities better understanding and applying EU rules with a clarification of the 
legal aspects for SSGI138; 
o legal framework: current situation and prospects139. 
 
The stakeholders: 
o update on how EU rules apply to SSGI using clear examples to help raise 
awareness and a more coherent understanding across the EU140; 
o Developing a regulation based on Article 14 of the TFEU, Protocol 26 and 
Article 36 of the EU Charter on fundamental rights on the key principles and 
conditions (economic and fiscal, but also the values mentioned in Protocol 26) to 
provide, commission and fund social services, by guaranteeing universal access, 
quality, affordability, accessibility, territorial availability141; 










 other than legal: 
 
The members: 
o freedom of decision and action of the Member States; differences and similarities 
between Member States in how to organise and provide social services143; 
o the context of new developments in the field of social innovation and social 
entrepreneurship144; 
o How to improve or at least how to maintain the quality of social services?145 
o Markets and quasi-markets in the social sectors146. 
o What is the added value of a European approach on social services? A peer 
review approach on social services? How can we ensure the fundamental role of 
SSGI to be pursued? How can we guarantee the accessibility to social and health 
services of high quality?147 
o a reflection should be started on a more policy-oriented approach in line with the 
recommendations set in the AGS (2012 and 2013) and recommendations issued 
(sporadically) to Member States to ensure a better access to social and care 
services. This would also give a more positive approach of the issue and “bring 
back together” the public authorities with the application of EU rules and maybe 
alleviate the fear of applying them wrongly148. 
o Quality framework of SSGI149. 
o Taking into account the social objectives of the EU, but looking at the impact of 




o Politically burning topics: measuring the social impact151; 
o how to implement the social investment package152; 
o employment in the social sector, impact of austerity measures153; 
 
o How can we improve the interaction between local authorities and non-profit 
organisations in the provision of social services?154 
o The role of social services in social market economy and the Exchange of 
experiences between EU Member States on the challenges they face in this 
respect155; 
o social services as part of an EU social agenda (not internal market agenda)- 
using a different EU starting point156; 
o unlocking the employment potential of social serivces and tackling the worsening 
work conditions157; 
o structural funds and social services/social economy158; 
o social service innovation (rather than social policy/product innovation)159. 
c) Methods and organisation 
Six members160 suggested on having workshops where concrete situations are analysed 
in order to see where there are the “problems” in the provision of SSGI. Legal lessons 
are considered to be relevant161. External expert presentations are also required162. 
Preparation of such a conference is of course essential in order to give accurate 
information to the audience for example in a form of a manual163. 
 
The stakeholders expressed also their views on the preferable methods and organisation. 
Emphasis has been put on the preparation with a fair representation of both public and 
non-profit sector, as well as social partners164. Concrete case studies have been also a 
request165. Enough time to raise questions and publicy available documents are also 
required166. The necessity to involve all Member States not only at national level, but also 
at regional and local levels is also a request from previous debates167. An interesting point 








of the Social Protection Committee168. On the form of the forum, “a mix between polical 
forum and a learning seminar”169 was proposed, or the exchange of best practices170, was 
also an intersting idea. 
3. Evaluations of the group’s work  
a) working methods 
The feedback requested was about the arrangements of the meetings, seminars, 
interaction, dialogue between different parties, the use of the cloud computing 
system, etc. 
 
Generally speaking, the members appreciated the working methods applied. The 
presentation made by the members was a positive contribution to the group’s work. 
 
Interaction and active participation of the members might be improved in the future. 
The low participation could partially be explained by the fact that the knowledge of 
the experts coming from the social departments about the internal market rules 
(including state aids) is probably weak. In this sense, it could be said that the IWG 
was in an intense learning process to all the members involved. Profound knowledge 
of both the social sector and the legal framework is required from the members in 
order to make the group function optimally. The turnover of the staff in the Member 
State is also a point to be taken into account. In this sense, the method suggested by 
the Chair to present the reality of social services (where the knowledge of the 
members is high) by “confronting” it to the EU rules was interesting171. The seminars 
have contributed to the knowledge of the members, but still more efforts have to be 
made to improve the level of knowledge and awareness. In this sense, revealing “real 
problems” or tricky issues in the application of the rules seems to be a very 
challenging mission if the awareness of the rules or the “right way” to apply them is 
not even present… 
 
The cloud computing (a workspace where to put all the documents) has faced some 
“tricky moments” but was generally considered as an efficient tool of collaboration, 
even if it could have been used more and in a more systematic way to improve 
participation. It is a good way to have all the information on one site / platform and 
could enable lively debate among the members between the meetings. 
It was also suggested that conclusions and decisions should come out of every 
discussion172. 
b) relevance of the issues discussed 
The topics discussed were those present in the mandate173 of the IWG and were 
considered relevant. 
The reasons for the difficulty to effectively discuss these topics might be the different 
level of competencies or cross-competencies (social and economic law) required. Quality 
is a topic in which several members174 have expressed their interest and which have of 
course a strong link with the legal issues: regulation of quality of SSGI (especially long-
term care services), and regulation of accessibility of SSGI. 
Discussing national realities of social services, how national authorities are increasingly 
diversifying the ways in which social services are organised, provided and financed, was 








c) relevance of the studies / questionnaires referred to (specify the study) 
The work of the IWG was supported by various reports, papers and studies. 
The Progress financed study published by the Commission in 2011175 on four types of 
social services (long-term care, childcare, social housing and employment services), 
which was presented by the authors in one of the meetings, was considered useful176 as it 
provided a multifaceted picture on the organisation of social services in some Member 
States. It was also considered as a basis for a deeper analysis, and a starting point to 
assess the pertinence of some EU rules177 (e.g. public procurement rules not so widely 
used in some of the fields analysed, or public compensation). Some criticism was made178 
on the limited coverage of social services or limited number of Member States (20 on the 
organisational/legal aspects, 10 on quality issues) which do not have a global picture of 
social services across the EU or to assess the overall performance of the SSGI in 
achieving their general interest goals and objectives. 
Legal papers, such as those annexed to the present report were considered useful179. Other 
studies, conducted with the support of the Commission, were suggested180 as topical for 
the work of the working group such as the European Commission, Liberalisation and 
privatisation in the EU, Services of general interest and the roles of the public sector181, 
and Introduction: EU law, Governance and Social Policy182. Nevertheless, the large 
quantity of different documents and legal acts related to the SSGI issues disrupts effective 
practical work183. 
 
The questionnaire on the applicability of the Guide was also considered as a good 
opportunity for the members to express doubts and uncertainties about the use of the EU 
rules applicable to SSGI184. 
 
d) asked contributions of the members (presentations, papers, opinions) 
The Chair gave the members concrete assignments in order to present the situation of SSGI in their 
own countries. 
 
The mutual learning process based on the different presentation was considered useful and adding 
value to the work of the IWG. It could constitute the very beginning of a methodology to assess 
the difficulties and common problems faced by the several authorities in applying EU rules to 
SSGI. This could help to provide possible solutions to the problems identified. This was 
considered also a good practice to involve the participants in the discussions. 
 
Improvements were also suggested such as short summariesand how to ensure that available 
material could be more effectively disseminated185. Due to the large variety of topics and MS 
positions and interests, it was considered to be difficult to have sound debates186. It has also been 
pointed out that countries’ presentations should be prepared with indication whether public 
procurement mechanism or rather “entrustment acts” are in use187. The level of compliance 













This chapter makes a synthesis of what kind of conclusions could be drawn regarding the outcome 
of the work of the working group. It clarifies what has been learnt on the application of the EU 
rules to SSGI in the working group until now. 
 
This has led us to a few concluding observations with specific recommendations for the content of 
the work and process to be pursued. We identified several key points and for some there are 
divergent interpretations and room for further debates. The identification of these bottleneckscould 
be considered as added value to the work carried out by the IWG and could prove to be a really 
interesting basis for further work, especially for the organisers of the next SSGI Forum. 
 
1. Observations 
Diversity is a predominant characteristic of SSGI in the different Member States and common 
features are therefore not easy to detect on the basis of which one can draw clear conclusions and 
make recommendations. We agree that this diversity of the various organisations of SSGI has to be 
respected in the future as well according to the subsidiarity principle189, and in line with the 
Treaties and in particular with Protocol 26. Preference of one type of organisation of SSGI has to 
be avoided190. It is said that promoting one single model is not the objective of EU level 
regulation191. However, we still have scarce knowledge about the outcome of the application of the 
EU rules on the diversity of the modes of provision of SSGI. As the provision of SSGI in MS will 
constantly evolve in the future we have to address possible new problems faced by providers in 
general and provide a better exchange of knowledge including case studies about the application 
of the EU rules. Silo’s expertise, meaning that the various expertise are not interconnected, was 
underlined as a negative factor to raise awareness about the EU rules applied to SSGI. There is 
clearly a lack of cross-cutting expertise on social, legal and economic spheres in various national, 
regional and local authorities when applying the EU rules to SSGI. “Cross-fertilisation” 
discussions should be promoted among different experts from Member States: experts on state aid, 
public procurement and internal market rules and experts from social protection should have more 
fruitful and structured discussions on the interactions of their topics. To create shared 
understanding of these cross-sectoral issues takes time. The SPC could promote specific topic 
meetings, also with representatives of civil society. 
 
On the Commission side, there is still a demand to receive feedback in order to know the effects or 
impacts of the EU rules on SSGI192. Moreover, the same applies normally to the national level / 
central government level because the effects of the rules on the service performance are recognised 
best at the local level where the services are delivered. 
 
It seems also that there are flaws in the implementation or in the application of the EU rules. We 
still have a blurred picture on whether the EU rules are always applied when it is required. If a set 
of rules is found to be difficult to apply in practice due to several possible factors, there is a 
tendency to avoid it by looking for completely different solutions. That might result even in 
neglecting the existing possibilities to support social services of general interest in compliance 
with the EU rules. Therefore, the administrative burden involved in any legally binding procedures 










2. Process recommendations 
For the future work on these issues, other working methods have been suggested than the current 
SPC IWG. The extra added value at the European level would be exchange of experiences on a 
practical level.  
 
A peer review approach with a clear and practical subject or case studies to be tackled has received 
support from several members. These case studies could for example be focused on practical 
solutions where EU rules have been successfully implemented in line with the social objectives. 
An online working platform where experts can share practices and remind each other of important 
texts to be followed and analysed was also suggested and supported by the group. 
 
The exercise of clarification is of permanent character, because of the constantly evolving 
jurisprudence (e.g. the notion of economic activity), the complexity and the multiplicity of the EU 
rules as well as the perceived difficulty to apply them to the social sector. A “gap” or a missing 
link between the local (municipal) and the national level was highlighted. The direct application of 
EU rules at the local level was frequently referred to as a problem and it might require simplified 
models to be elaborated in cooperation between the national authorities and the EU. 
 
Continuing with the existing tools, such as the Guide or the Interactive Information Service, and 
making better use of them were also suggested. The exchange of describing problems and 
receiving answers from competent authorities — as used within the past years — could be 
continued and also be promoted. 
 
In particular the terminology used should be made easier to understand for decision makers at the 
national and local level. It would be desirable to make an evaluation of the new version of the 
Guide — integrating new provisions for public procurement and concessions. 
Even if the working group was mainly dealing with legal questions, it has to be stressed that 
beyond these questions, very often, political questions are at stake. Such questions have to be more 
explicit in order to raise awareness about the contents of the rules among administrations, experts 
and politicians. 
E.g193.: 
‐ Instead of speaking about state aids, financing of SSGI have to be clearly addressed; 
‐ instead of speaking about public procurement and social services, the choice of service 
providers has to be addressed; 
‐ “authorisation schemes compatible with EU legislation” look more interesting than the 
“service directive” and “social services”. 
Specific attention should be paid to the terminology used when one is working on SSGI. SSGI are 
covering a lot of services which often do not have the same meanings, coverage, or organisations. 
The lack of common terminology is not a new issue in the field of EU social policies and is of 
particular relevance to SSGI. Although some improvements have been achieved there are still 
issues left concerning terms and concepts used within the SSGI field. 
 
3. Recommendations for the substance matters to be dealt with 
It has proved to be hard to reach any consensus on the nature of the EU rules and the ultimate aims 
they pursue. More work has to be carried out on the market aspects of the EU rules. At the origins, 
the EU rules belonging to the competition and internal market policies were not focusing on the 
social services and social security (SSGI) as such, but apply — with their derogations and exceptions 








sector is nowadays also included. Moreover, there is an evolution in the organisation of SSGI with 
the involvement of private, and for-profit providers. Therefore, the outsourcing of the provision of 
these services to external providers has also triggered the application of EU rules on state aid, public 
procurement and internal market. A deeper analysis on the use of public procurement for SSGI 
should give the global picture to assess and measure this trend. 
 
If the EU rules are on the one hand — originally — market centred195, on the other hand they are 
not applicable to SSGI earmarked as non-economic. Even if the EU rules apply, there are 
derogations, exceptions from general rules or principles laid down by the EU Treaty.  
 
There are divergent views on, whether these exemptions give enough “room for manoeuvre” to the 
organisation of SSGI (e.g. the choice of the most appropriate service provider) or safeguard 
sufficiently the public interests involved in the service provision, or treat neutrally for-profit vs 
not-for-profit actors. 
 
We still lack information on the extent to which the different set of rules are applied in different 
countries. For example in the field of state aids/competition rules, the question to know if there is a 
market or not in a certain field of social services remains unclear. However, the existence of the 
market is a crucial factor in determining the economic / non-economic nature of the activity. 
Moreover this crucial question can receive several interpretations. The question whether a broad 
interpretation of a market in Member State A can have a consequence in Member State B is not 
solved either. 
 
In order to further improve the application of the EU rules to SSGI in the future, an assessment of 
them could also be carried out taking into account the different quality criteria set for 
smarter/better regulation. Attention should be given in particular to the administrative burden and 
to implementation costs, overlaps of sets of rules, impact assessment on social services, 
achievement of expected benefits at minimum cost based on evidence and the respect of principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality196. 
 
The better balance between social policy aims on one side and economic and efficiency 
considerations on the other side, has also received different interpretations in the working group. 
According to some the applicable rules tend to favour economic goals (such as competition), for 
others the rules are seen as neutral, and for still others the rules are protective of social objectives. 
More evidence on these opinions is, however, needed. The idea of the complementarity of these 
goals was also expressed, taking into account also the value for paid taxes also at national level197. 
The bases of equal treatment of for profit providers and not for profit providers should also be 
better investigated in the future. 
 
These challenging questions are of course complex issues both at the crossroads of solidarity and 
economy, of national and EU competencies, but are nevertheless interesting and they are crucial to 
be analysed and tackled in order to measure and decide on the future evolutions and developments 
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1 The experts of the Commission do not agree with mentioning « social protection » in the title of the Report 
of the Informal Working Group (IWG). They argue that the IWG has received a mandate to deal with the 
application of EU rules to social services of general interest. This has been the exclusive focus of the IWG's 
activities. The provision of social services represents just one type of intervention within the scope of "social 
protection". This is a much broader concept as it covers not only the provision of social services but also cash 
benefits such as pensions, unemployment benefits and money transfers for people with disabilities, families, 
etc. as well as goods provided directly to people in need (wheelchairs for PwD, furniture provided to the poor 
…).  
The application of EU rules to social protection in general raises issues that have never been discussed in the 
IWG as they were well beyond the mandate received by the IWG; they also concern EU rules which are not 
those at stake when discussing social services (e.g. pensions and non-discrimination).There is also a part of 
the social protection which is provided by the employers and this too was not in the mandate of the WG and 
has not been dealt with within the IWG. 
The Commission services therefore insists on avoiding the utilisation of the term "social protection" in the 
title and in the text of the report.”. 
2  Council Conclusions “Social Services of General Interest: at the heart of the European social model”, 
3053rd EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL POLICY, HEALTH and CONSUMER AFFAIRS Council meeting 
Brussels, 6 December 2010 
3 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, COM(2006) 177 final, Implementing the Community 
Lisbon programme: Social services of general interest in the European Union, {SEC(2006) 516}: “What do 
we mean by social services in the European Union? In addition to health services, which are not covered 
by this communication, we find two main categories of social services: statutory and complementary social 
security schemes, organised in various ways (mutual or occupational organisations), covering the main 
risks of life, such as those linked to health, ageing, occupational accidents, unemployment, retirement and 
disability – other essential services provided directly to the person. These services that play a preventive 
and social cohesion role consist of customised assistance to facilitate social inclusion and safeguard 
fundamental rights. They comprise, first of all, assistance for persons faced by personal challenges or 
crises (such as debt, unemployment, drug addiction or family breakdown). Secondly, they include activities 
to ensure that the persons concerned are able to completely reintegrate into society (rehabilitation, 
language training for immigrants) and, in particular, the labour market (occupational training and 
reintegration). These services complement and support the role of families in caring for the youngest and 
oldest members of society in particular. Thirdly, these services include activities to integrate persons with 
long-term health or disability problems. Fourthly, they also include social housing, providing housing for 
disadvantaged citizens or socially less advantaged groups. Certain services can obviously include all of 
these four dimensions.” available on the following link: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0177:FIN:EN:PDF  
4 According to the Commission services the following text should be added here "Social protection however 
also covers cash benefits and reimbursement as well as the provision of goods." to clarify the only partial 
overlapping between the notion of social protection and the notion of social services. 
5 SEC(2010) 1545 final of 7 December 2010. This Guide has in the meantime been updated and a new 
version has been published on 15 February 2013 (SWD(2013) 53 final) 
6 The following definition can be given: “Market-type mechanisms are defined as “encompassing all 
arrangements where at least one significant characteristic of markets is present.” In the area of service 
provision, the prime instruments include outsourcing (contracting out), public private partnerships (PPPs) 
and vouchers.” See Market-type Mechanisms and the Provision of Public Services by Jón R. Blöndal, ISSN 









                                                                                                                                     
The European Commission’s experts do not agree with the fact that the report calls EU rules applying to 
social services "economic rules" and "market-type mechanisms" and presents them as belonging to a 
market logic which is imposed to the social sector and aims at changing its nature/is dangerous. This is in 
their opinion not correct:  
 State aids rules applying to social services do not aim at promoting competition in the 
provision of a given social service or at protecting competitors providing the same social 
service. As explained in the Guide of the Commission services on the application of EU rules 
to social services (hereafter, the Commission services' Guide) financing in a correct way a 
social service provider does not give the right to another provider to receive the same or equal 
financing. The purpose of State aid rules applying to Services of General Economic Interest 
(SGEI) including Social Services of General Interest (SSG) is to avoid cross-subsidisation, i.e. 
that money that should have been spent for financing a service in the public interest is instead 
used to finance other activities in other markets and distort competition in those markets. 
Moreover, State aid rules applying to SSGI recognise that missions of general interest can be 
financed. They aim at ensuring that the financing is really targeted to the general interest 
objectives. One can therefore say, as Judge Lenaerts, that State aid rules applying to SGEI 
protect the objective of general interest – the social objective for SSGI ! - from the risk that 
public resources are instead allocated to commercial activities; 
 EU Public procurement rules do not have to apply to SSGI in all circumstances. They apply 
only if a public authority decides to "buy" a service against remuneration. It is the fact that the 
public authority has already chosen the market logic (deciding to outsource the service to 
external providers) that triggers the application of the EU Public Procurement rules. Even 
when outsourcing the public authorities can use alternative models and not just procurements. 
And when procuring, they do not have to choose the most economic service provider without 
taking into account the quality of the service;  
 Internal market rules are protecting not only the providers but also the users of social services 
as they allow the users to take advantage of the offer of services in other MSs.  
Moreover, according to the Commission services EU rules applying to SSGI take into account the 
specificities of these services:  
 State aid rules offer an exemption from the obligation of notifying to the Commission State aid 
to social services;  
 A much lighter EU Public Procurement regime apply to procurement of social services;  
 Social objectives can justify restriction to freedom of establishment and freedom to provide 
services.  
Even the contributions received by the Social Platform and by FEANTSA state that progress has been 
achieved in the EU rules as far as the recognition of the specificities of SSGI is concerned.”.  The 
European Commission’s experts propose an alternative text “The set of rules discussed in the IWG are 
related to State aid, internal market and public procurement. These rules apply whenever the activity 




9 Which are very often absent in the debates at EU levels despite the fact that SSGI encompasses also social 
security systems. See Commission Communication already mentioned and quoted in Footnote 2.  
10 According to the Commission services, this title and the contents of this sub-section aim at presenting EU 
rules applying to social services as belonging to a market logic which is unfamiliar to social services and 
not appropriate for their provision. 
11 The experts of the European Commission note that EU rules do not impose one single "market oriented" 
model for financing social services. For instance Public Authorities do not have to outsource the provision of 
the services and to apply EU Public Procurement rules. Even when outsourcing they can use alternative 
models and not just procurements. And when procuring, they do not have to choose the more economic 
service provider.  The contributions seem to indicate that certain rules do not apply because of the way the 
services are organised (no outsourcing, triangular relation…)”. 
12 AT, DE, BE, FI. Of course EU rules on state aid applying to social services provide for the possibility to 
intervene on these failures by imposing a public service obligation according to set procedures.        
13 Hartley DEAN, Social Policy, Short Introductions, Polity Press 2012, Second Edition, p. 116.   
According to the experts of the European Commission the report should build on the positions 








                                                                                                                                     
analysis that is exchanged by all the experts in the IWG and avoid quoting external sources and 
analysis that have not been discussed inside the group.  
14 According to the experts of the European Commission the idea that the application of EU rules to SSGI is 
related to the "principle in the EU rules that market allocation is the most efficient way to provide social 
services" is not clearly explained.  EU rules do not assume that market allocation is always efficient; 
otherwise they would not include provisions for SSGIs to be funded or provided by the State. State aid rules 
applying to social services allow for financing of these services within a general interest logic. 
15 Julian LE GRAND, RAY V. F. ROBINSON, The Economics of Social Problems: The Market Versus the 
State; 1984, MAC MILLAN EDUCATION LTD, p. 265 
16 The experts of the European Commission note that, differently from what is stated in the sentence, the ratio 
of State aid rules applying to SGEI is that there is a market failure and that public service obligation are 
imposed.” 
17  The Commission services note that it is too restrictive and biased to present in the report just as 
"derogations" the specific rules applying to social services that the Council and the European Parliament 
have adopted in the field of public procurement and internal market and that the Commission has adopted 
in the field of State aid. These rules take into account the specificities of these services. In particular: 
• only two out of the 84 articles of the EU Public Procurement Directive (Directive 2004/18/EC 
of 31 March 2004) apply to the procurement of social services, thus offering to public 
authorities a wider flexibility for the procurement of social services; 
• the Almunia package on State aid, which sets out the rules for the financing of services of 
general interest, grants preferential treatment to social services whose financing is notably 
exempt from the obligation of notification to the Commission. 
The Commission services have therefore suggested to redraft this part of the text so as to indicate that some 
members of the IWG have expressed the view that the existing EU rules applying to social services are to 
be considered as "derogations" to the main sets of rules and others participants have pointed out to the fact 
that the EU legislator has taken into account the specificities of social services notably by establishing 
specific rules in the area of State aid, internal market and public procurement. This will reflect better the 
diversities of opinions expressed in the IWG. Opinions recognising the progresses made in the EU legal 
framework and the fact that the new rules take into account the specificities of social services were 
expressed notably by SE and MT experts as well as by the Social Platform and FEANTSA. 
18 The experts of the European Commission note that State aids rules applying to social services are not about 
promoting competition in the provision of a given social service or protecting competitors providing the 
same social service. As explained in the in the Commission services' Guide financing in a correct way a 
provider of social services does not give the right to another provider to receive the same/equal financing. 
The purpose of State aids  rules applying to SGEI is to avoid cross-subsidisation, i.e. that money that 
should have been spent for financing a service in the public interest is instead used to finance other 
activities in other markets and distort competition in those markets.”. 
 
19 The Commission services note that EU Public Procurement rules facilitate certain forms of cooperation 
among public authorities by excluding them from their field of application. This exclusions have already 
been recognised by the Court (and explained in the Commission services' Guide) and are currently being 
codified in the new Public Procurement Directives that will be adopted in January 2015 following a 
Commission proposal of December 2011.  
20 Also called in Germany or Austria “self-administration”, Fr in its contribution in the various types of 
interventions: delegation of public service, in house. Finland stressing the importance of the NGO sector.   
21 According to the Commission services this paragraph is misleading as it states that "At the EU level, state 
aids are forbidden in principle" and that "There might be derogation for the financing of services of general 
interest in so far as there is no cross-subsidisation" mentioning only at the end that "EU rules allow for the 
financing of social services of general interest in line with the Altmark jurisprudence and with the Almunia 
package" adding just afterwards "The important question is whether these rules are applied and to what 
extent “easily” applied in the social sectors". The report should have clearly explained that in 2005 the 
Commission adopted a first package (Monti-Kroes package) clarifying how State aid rules apply to social 
services, updated in 2011 (Almunia package). The report should also have explained that ample guidance 
on how to apply this package is provided in the Commission services' Guide.   
22 For more details on the way the Altmark jurisprudence and the Almunia package apply, see Guide [ADD 








                                                                                                                                     
23 According to the Commission services, this title and the contents of this sub-section aim at presenting EU 
rules applying to social services as belonging to a market logic which is unfamiliar to social services and 
not appropriate for their provision. 
24 DE, BE, PT, FR 
25 Case T-137/10 Coordination bruxelloise d’institutions sociales et de santé (CBI) v. Commission, not yet 
reported, concerning Commission decision C(2009)8120 of 28 December 2009, on the funding granted by 
the Belgian authorities to the public hospitals belonging to the IRIS network in the Région Bruxelles-
Capitale, by way of compensation for hospital and non-hospital services they provide in the form of 
services of general economic interest (NN 54/09), OJ 2010 C 74/1  
26 The Commission services suggest to start this section by reminding that only two articles of the Public 
Procurement Directive currently in force apply to social services. 
27 See the following papers: FI, BE, FR, NO in its presentation, DE for the promotion of employment.  
28 Belgium, France, Finland, Austria. 
29 See also a paper published in the European State aid Law Review on this issue highlighting the same trend, 
Karl-Heinz Lambertz and Matthieu Hornung State Aid Rules on Services of General Economic Interest: 
For the Committee of the Regions, the Glass is half-full, EStAL 2, 2012: 
 “In addition, rules badly applied risk resulting in litigation and in repayment of aid granted. In case of 
doubt, a public authority may be tempted not to grant funding (State aid) or to hide behind well-known and 
legally uncontested procedures, which is the case regarding tenders. Therefore, in recent years, public 
procurement has become an automatism in some fields of activities such as health or the social sector. 
However, this goes against an association-based approach in these fields because associations often lack 
the capacity to participate in tenders and because tenders do not or hardly take into account non-market 
relevant aspects such as social innovation.” 
30 DE, FI, BE. See also in Chapter 3. The Guide explains this link in Chapter 5, highlighting that State aid 
rules have different aims and scope, and both have to be complied with when setting up SSGI According to 
the Commission services “State aids and Public procurement are not alternative”. 
31 BE, FI, Norway in its presentation 
32 Finland 
33  How to avoid these “side effects” is explained in the Guide. 
34 DE 
24 FI  
36 PT,  DE 
37  However, according to the Commission, the concept of economic activity is not pertinent as far as public 
procurement rules are concerned. 
38 AT 
39  It should be noted that the Directives establish limited rules or a light regime for social services. 
Transparency and non-discrimination principles apply to procurement of social and health services when 
there is a certain cross-border interest.   
40  DE 
41  PT 
42  PT, SL 
43  BE 
44  DK 
45  The Commission services do not agree with the statement that "there is still no certainty if public funding 
programmes and subventions schemes are really alternatives to public procurements and as such really 
compatible with EU rule". Public funding programmes and subventions schemes can be compatible with EU 
rules insofar as they comply with applicable State aid rules. Moreover, when public procurement rules apply, 
the selection of the provider to be funded shall be done in compliance with public procurement rules. 
46 Council Conclusions “Social Services of General Interest: at the heart of the European social model”, 
3053rd EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL POLICY, HEALTH and CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Council meeting 
Brussels, 6 December 2010 
47 Please consider that the positions expressed are reflecting positions on the original proposal. On-going 
negotiations and amendments may have changed positions. 
48 DE, FR, AT. 








                                                                                                                                     
50 DE 
51 BE in a specific paper discussed at the SPC 
52 BE, AT, DE, FI, PT, FR  
53 VOLUNTEERING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION , Educational, Audiovisual & Culture Executive 
Agency (EAC-EA) , Directorate General Education and Culture (DG EAC) , Final Report submitted by 
GHK, 17 February 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/doc1018_en.pdf . 
According to the experts of the European Commission, it is not clear which processes of transpositions are 
referred to in this paragraph. State aid rules have changed in 2011.  While in disagreement with the choice of 
adding in the IWG report texts from external sources not discussed in the IWG, the Commission services were 
also wondering why the recommendations drawn by the study were not also quoted. The Commission services 
note also that the study has a scope which is much larger than social services: moreover it is specifically 
focused on sport organisations.  
54 FR, BE, FI 
55 
56 FI 
57   
58 DE 
59 FR 
60 FI, and to some extent PT. 




65  SPC/1102/3 
66  See Council conclusions adopted on 6 December 2010 on “Social services of General Interest (SSGI): at 
the heart of the European Social Model” (Council doc. 17566/10). 
67  Koen Lenaerts is a Professor of European Law at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Vice-President 
of the European Court of Justice. 
68  Stéphane Rodrigues is a Professor at the Université Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne) and is partner in a 
Brussels law firm. 
69  Carsten Zatschler is Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
70  See Chapter 3. 
71  S. Rodrigues referred to the Court decision of 7 November 2012 on the Brussels hospitals (Case T-
137/10, Coordination bruxelloise d’institutions sociales et de santé (CBI)). 
72  On this point see above the opinion of K. Lenaerts. 
73  See cases of manifest error listed in Q&A 7 of the 2013 Guide (p. 24).  
74  Cases C-320/91 Corbeau (1993). 
75  SEC(2010) 1545 of 7 December 2010. 
76  See SPC/1102/3 2011 Activities of the SPC Informal Working Group on the Application of EU rules to 
SSGI. 
77  SWD(2013) 53 final/2 of 29 April 2013. 
78  The new State aid Package, often known as Almunia package, is composed of:  
(i) the Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to 
compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest (OJ C 8, 11 January 2012, 
p. 4), which clarifies the basic concepts of State aid relevant for SGEI;  
(ii) the Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to 
certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (OJ L 7, 
11 January 2012, p. 3), which defines the conditions under which financing for a SGEI (the ‘public service 








                                                                                                                                     
  
(iii) the European Union framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation (2011) (OJ 
C 8, 11 January 2012, p. 15), which sets out the rules the Commission will use when assessing SGEI 
compensation that is not exempted from notification by the Decision. All such compensation has to be 
notified to the Commission that will then decide on its compatibility with the internal market;   
(iv) the Commission Regulation on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general 
economic interest (OJ L 114, 26 April 2012, p. 8), which provides that SGEI compensation which amounts 
to less than EUR 500 000 per undertaking over three fiscal years does not fall under State aid scrutiny. 
79  The IIS put in place by the Commission services in January 2008 answers questions from citizens, public 
authorities, service users, service providers and other stakeholders. It is accessible on the following 
webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/services_general_interest/registration/form_en.htm. 
80  SEC (2007) 1514 and SEC(2007) 1516 of 20 November 2007. 
81  The work done in the IWG as reflected in this report was a good occasion to raise awareness and foster 
knowledge on the EU rules applicable to SSGI. 
82  See Q&A 20 of the 2013 Guide. The analysis tree can also be found through the following link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/analysis_tree_en.pdf. 
83  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/public_services_en.html. 
84  See box in Q&A 27. 
85  See Footnote 78 above. 
86  SWD (2013) 40 final. 
87  Commission Regulation No 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of 
the Treaty to de minimis aid, OJ L 379/5 of 28 December 2006. 
88  Quoted in Footnote 78 above. 
89  See Q&A 78. 
90  See Q&As 189 and 196. 
91  See Q&As 58 and 205 of the 2013 Guide. 
92  However, as stated in the 3rd Biennial Report on p. 20, “public authorities can also, at various stages of 
the public procurement procedures, introduce requirements concerning the quality, continuity and 
comprehensiveness of the service in question”. See also Q&As 203 to 209 which explain how to draft 
specifications so as that (i) the awarded service responds to the changing needs of the users and can be 
adapted to changing circumstances; (ii) quality requirements are included in the award; (iii) the freedom of 
choice of the users is preserved; and (iv) the familiarity with the local context or the non-profit nature of 
the provider are taken into account. 
93  See on this issue Q&A 216. 
94  
95 BE, FI, FR, EE, IT, LT, PT, NO, SV 
96 BE, FI  
97 FI 
98 PL 





104 AT, PL, SI, DK, CZ 
105 AT, PL, SE 
106 PL, SV: “Clarifications will come over time with new jurisprudence”.  
107 AT 
108 CARITAS Europe. 









                                                                                                                                     
111 Business Europe 
112 BE, AT, PT, SV 
113   
114  
115  
116 AGE PLATFORM 
117 The Social Platform 
118 The Social Platform, FEANTSA 
119 FEANTSA 
120 REVES 
121 You will find materials on the previous forum (3rd forum in Brussels) on these links: Summary 
report of the 3rd Forum on SSGI in English, French and Dutch: EN : 
http://www.socialsecurity.fgov.be/docs/nl/news/ssgi_summary_report.pdf  
FR: http://www.socialsecurity.fgov.be/flipping-book/SSIG-FR/files/pmo_forum-fr_03.pdf  
 
Materials, documents, pics and videos available: 
http://www.socialsecurity.fgov.be/eu/en/agenda/26-27_10_10.asp  
122 Brussels, 20 December 2011 Commission’s Communication of 20 December 2011, A Quality Framework 
for Services of General Interest in Europe, COM(2011) 900 final, available on 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/speeches-statements/pdf/20111220_1_en.pdf  
123 Quoted in Footnote 3 above [ENSURE UPDATE]. Accessible in:
 http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/speeches-statements/pdf/20111220_1_en.pdf 
124 AT, BE, CZ, DK, FI, FR, EE, LT, NO, SV. For the Stakeholders : Caritas Europe, Age Platform, Social 
Platform, FEANTSA, REVES. 
125 BE, Caritas Europe. 
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174 LT, BE, FR, SI, EE 
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189 According to the experts of the Commission:” The subsidiarity principle is irrelevant in this context as 
social policies are Member states’ competence”. 
190  
191 According to the Commission services  there is not just one model of organisation and financing of social 
services which complies with the applicable EU rules: instead different modes of organisation can all be in 








                                                                                                                                     
provision, financing of in-house provider, concessions, outsourcing through Public Procurement, triangular 
models…” 
192 The Commission services suggests to add a sentence referring to the fact that the Commission encourages 
Member States, regional/local public authorities as well as service providers and users to identify clearly 
the problems related to the application of EU rules to social services. 
193  
194 According to the experts of the European Commission “The change which triggered the application of the 
rules is not a jurisprudential evolution of the notion of economic activity but the fact that in the past social 
services were often organised in ways which did not imply that an economic activity was performed 
 
196  
197 In other words, making sure taxpayers money goes to the “right services” and that these services are well 
run, thus getting “value for money”, or to prevent leakage of taxpayers money from their intended target to 
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Abstract. This article aims to shed some light on the concepts embedded in the expres-
sions ‘services of general interest’ (‘SGI’), ‘services of general economic interest’ (‘SGEI’), ‘non-
economic services of general interest’ (‘NSGI’) and ‘social services of general interest’ (‘SSGI’). 
It is submitted that the expression ‘SGI’ conveys a general concept which comprises both 
SGEI and NSGI. SGEI may be distinguished from NSGI in that only the former involve 
an economic activity. In contrast to SGI, SGEI and NSGI, the expression ‘SSGI’ is nowhere 
to be found in primary EU law. This means that it is for the EU legislator and, as the case 
may be, for the Member States to define such expression. Furthermore, this article supports 
the contention that a definition of the principles and conditions underpinning the operation 
of SGI must be capable of adapting to changing times and social perceptions, whilst being 
respectful of the vertical and horizontal allocation of powers set out in the Treaties. Vertically, 
a definition of SGI must not impinge upon the powers retained by the Member States. In 
the absence of harmonisation, it is for the Member States to define the services they consider 
to be of general interest, unless they commit a manifest error of assessment. In the presence of 
* All opinions expressed herein are personal to the author.
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EU harmonising measures, the margin of discretion enjoyed by the Member States is, if still 
existent, narrowed down, given that national authorities are required to comply with the 
objectives pursued by the EU legislator. Horizontally, a definition of SGI must not encroach 
upon the prerogatives of the Commission in the realm of competition law. Moreover, in light 
of Article 9 TFEU and secondary EU legislation, the specific features of SSGI must be taken 
into consideration when determining the compatibility with EU State aid rules of public 
service compensation awarded to the providers of those services. An EU conceptual framework 
for the SGI must thus be the result of a constructive dialogue between the different levels of 
governance, as well as of a balanced solution among different policy areas in relation to which 
the EU enjoys competences.
Keywods: services of general interest, vertical and horizontal allocation of powers in the 
European Union.
Introduction
Stakeholders have often complained that the debate on services of general interest 
(‘SGI’) suffers from a lack of clarity on terminology.1 This is due to the fact that the 
expressions ‘SGI’ and ‘services of general economic interest’ (‘SGEI’) are not defined in 
the Treaties.2 In addition, the expressions ‘SGI’, ‘SGEI’ and ‘social services of general 
interest’ (‘SSGI’) are often used interchangeably and inaccurately.3 In this regard, the 
purpose of the present contribution is thus to shed some light on those basic concepts. 
Before proceeding to examine each one of them, I would like to make two general 
observations. 
Unlike the expressions ‘SGI’ and ‘SGEI’, the expression ‘SSGI’ is nowhere to be 
found in the Treaties.4 Articles 14 TFEU and 106(2) TFEU only focus on SGEI. The 
same applies to Article 36 of the Charter which lays down the right to access to SGEI. 
For its part, Protocol (No 26) on SGI contains the expressions ‘SGI’, ‘SGEI’ and ‘non-
economic services of general interest’ (‘NSGI’). But no mention is made to SSGI. The 
1 See Commission Communication, ‘Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe’, of 20 
December 2011, COM (2011) 900 final (‘the 2011 Commission Communication’), at 3.
2 See e.g. Rodrigues, S. The application to services of general economic interest, notably to social services 
of general interest, of the EU rules related to state aids, public procurement and the internal market. One 
year after the Commission’s Guide - SEC(2010)1545 final. European Journal of Social Law. 2011, 4: 255. 
3 See the 2011 Commission Communication, supra note 1, at 3.
4 Communication from the Commission - Implementing the Community Lisbon programme - Social ser-
vices of general interest in the European Union {SEC(2006) 516}, COM/2006/0177, at 4 (‘under [EU] 
law, social services do not constitute a legally distinct category of service within [SGI]’). In the same way, 
see van de Gronden, J. W. Social Services of General Interest and EU law. In: Szyszczak, E.; Davies, J.; 
Andenæs, M.; Bekkedal, T. (eds.) Developments in Services of General Interest. The Hague: Springer, 
2011, p. 125 (who argues that ‘[t]he term SSGI is used only in policy documents of the Commission and 
not in primary and secondary EU law’). 
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latter is a concept coined by the political institutions of the EU and of the Member 
States. This difference is by no means irrelevant. Since the expressions ‘SGI’, ‘SGEI’ 
and ‘NSGI’ are set out in EU provisions of constitutional ranking, it is for the European 
Court of Justice (the ‘ECJ’) to define the concepts embedded therein. By contrast, when 
defining what is to be understood by SSGI, one must turn to the EU legislator and, where 
appropriate, to national authorities. Needless to say, the definition of SSGI provided for 
by the political institutions of the EU and of the Member States must be consistent with 
primary EU law as interpreted by the ECJ.   
Moreover, SGI may be examined under two competing socio-economic models.5 
On the one hand, from an ordoliberal perspective, SGI may be seen as derogation from 
the Treaty provisions on competition. Supporters of that model argue that, just as any 
derogation from the substantive law of the EU, the concept of ‘SGI’ is to be interpreted 
restrictively. Otherwise, Member States would be encouraged to qualify certain activities 
as SGI in order to circumvent the obligations imposed on them by the Treaty provisions. 
Accordingly, a broad reading of the expression ‘SGI’ would adversely affect interstate 
trade and would eventually lead to the fragmentation of the internal market. On the other 
hand, SGI may be seen as the symbol of the European social model,6 according to which 
Member States try to counter market forces which, in the absence of any public control, 
would prevent certain groups – for example, persons facing financial and economic 
difficulties or who are geographically isolated – from having access to SGI. For some 
Member States, SGI are part and parcel of their national identity the protection of which 
is guaranteed by the Treaties, notably by Article 4(2) TEU. In accordance with this 
second socio-economic model, EU institutions must strive to protect SGI from any 
threat which may impair their proper functioning. 
The EU must, however, not really choose between those two competing socio-
economic models, as the role of SGI in the EU legal order is being defined by striking a 
fair balance between the general interest pursued by such services and the effectiveness 
of the relevant Treaty provisions governing the internal market. 
A constructive debate on SGI must therefore be open to nuances. It is only by striking 
the said balance that one may portray the role of SGI in the EU legal order accurately. 
When interpreting primary EU law, it will be for the ECJ to set out the basic elements 
that must be included in such balance. When the EU legislator has adopted measures, the 
ECJ will interpret and apply them in ways consistent with that same balance.
1. Services of General Interest: A general Category
Only in Protocol (No 26) reference is made to the expression ‘SGI’. This Protocol 
contains three different concepts. First, as its title shows, it serves to stress the importance 
5 Lenaerts, K.; Gutiérrez-Fons, J. A. « Le rôle du juge de l’Union dans l’interprétation des articles 14 et 106, 
paragraphe 2, TFUE » Revue Concurrences. 2011, 4: 7.
6 Karayigit, M. T. The Notion of Services of General Economic Interest Revisited. European Public Law. 
2009, 15: 575. 
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of SGI. Second, Article 1 provides some clarifications regarding Article 14 TFEU. It 
lists, in a non-exhaustive fashion, the values underpinning the principles and conditions 
governing the operation of SGEI. Finally, Article 2 states that ‘[t]he provisions of 
the Treaties do not affect in any way the competence of Member States to provide, 
commission and organise [NSGI]’. 
In light of a systematic interpretation of Protocol (No 26), it seems that the 
expression ‘SGI’ conveys a ‘general’ concept which comprises both SGEI and NSGI. 
This is actually how the Commission understands the expression ‘SGI’.7 
Moreover, in relation to the vertical allocation of powers between the Union and its 
Member States, the distinction between SGEI and NSGI is of crucial importance. Whilst 
in relation to SGEI, the Union shares competences with the Member States, national 
measures relating to the provision, commission and organisation of NSGI fall outside 
the scope of application of EU competition law. This does not mean, however, that no 
other Treaty provisions may apply to NSGI. As explained below, Member States must 
comply with the Treaty provisions on free movement and EU citizenship. 
2. Drawing the Distinction between SGEI and NSGI
The distinguishing feature as between SGEI and NSGI lies in the fact that the 
former always involve an economic activity. The Treaty provisions on competition only 
apply to ‘undertakings’ which are defined as natural or legal persons who carry out an 
economic activity, i.e. ‘any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given 
market’.8 However, if a SGI operates exclusively under the principle of solidarity and 
is subject to public control, or that service is linked to the exercise of State prerogatives 
and to the fulfilment of State responsibility towards the population,9 then such a SGI 
does not involve an ‘economic activity’ within the meaning of competition law.10 That 
SGI will be qualified as a NSGI and thus, the Treaty provisions on competition will not 
7 See the 2011 Commission Communication, supra note 1, at 3 (‘SGI are services that public authorities of 
the Member States classify as being of general interest and, therefore, subject to specific public service 
obligations […]. The term covers both economic activities […] and non-economic services. The latter are 
not subject to specific EU legislation and are not covered by the internal market and competition rules of 
the Treaty. Some aspects of how these services are organised may be subject to other general Treaty rules, 
such as the principle of non-discrimination’).
8 See Case 118/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2599, paragraph 7; Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy 
[1998] ECR I-3851, paragraph 36; Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov and Others, paragraph 75.
9 Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft [1994] ECR I-43, paragraph 30, concerning the control and 
supervision of air space, and Case C-343/95 Diego Calì & Figli [1997] ECR I-1547, paragraphs 22–23, 
concerning anti-pollution surveillance of the maritime environment.
10 See, in the same vein, Communication from the Commission of 11 January 2012 on the application of the 
European Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic 
interest, [2012] OJ C 8/4 (‘the 2012 Commission Communication’), paragraph 16, which, in light of 
the case-law of the ECJ, provides the following examples of activities involving ‘the exercise of public 
authority’: ‘(a) the army or the police; (b) air navigation safety and control; (c) maritime traffic control 
and safety; (d) anti-pollution surveillance; and (e) the organisation, financing and enforcement of prison 
sentences’.
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apply. In the field of social security and health care, 11 this can be seen in cases such 
as Poucet et Pistre,12 FENIN,13 AOK Bundesverband14 and, more recently, in Kattner 
Stahlbau.15 
However, the question whether an activity has an economic nature is not answered 
in the same way as to all Treaty provisions to be applied to the case at hand. Thus, the 
freedom to provide services, enshrined in Article 49 TFEU, covers all services which 
are ‘normally provided for remuneration’,16 but services may still ‘be provided for 
remuneration’ if they involve an activity based on the principle of solidarity. Indeed, 
Article 49 TFEU applies even if the service is not paid for by those benefiting from it.17 
It follows that the principle of solidarity underpinning NSGI excludes the application 
of the Treaty provisions on competition, but not those on free movement and EU 
citizenship. 
2.1. NSGI and the Treaty Provisions on Free Movement
Sickness insurance schemes normally operate under the principle of solidarity: the 
contributions made by healthy members of such a scheme are used to fund medical 
treatment provided to members in need of healthcare. Alternatively, solidarity may 
also take place where a Member State funds its national healthcare system by having 
recourse to the general budget. This means that patients do not pay for medical treatment 
themselves. Instead, they receive ‘benefits in kind’. For both types of regimes, the ECJ 
has held that Article 49 TFEU applies.18 In so doing, it rejected the thesis according to 
which, just as state education,19 hospital services were ‘special’ and did not constitute 
11 See the 2012 Commission Communication, supra note 10, paragraphs 21 et seq., which states that public 
hospitals that are ‘directly funded from social security contributions and other State resources and provide 
their services free of charge to affiliated persons on the basis of universal coverage’ are not ‘undertakings’ 
for the purposes of the Treaty provisions on competition law. By contrast, ‘services which independent 
doctors and other private practitioners provide for remuneration at their own risk are to be regarded as an 
economic activity. The same principles would apply as regards independent pharmacies’.
12 Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637.
13 Case C-205/03P FENIN v Commission [2006] ECR I-6295.
14 Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01 AOK Bundesverband and Others [2004] ECR 
I-2493.
15 C-350/07 Kattner Stahlbau [2009] ECR I-1513.
16 See e.g. Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland v Grogan [1991] ECR 
1-4685.
17 See Case C-352/85 Bond van Adverteerders and Others [1988] ECR 2085.
18 See e.g. Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, paragraphs 44–46; Case C-385/99 
Müller-Fauré and van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, paragraph 100, and Case C-372/04 Watts [2006] ECR 
I-4325, paragraph 92. 
19 Neither the Treaty provisions on free movement nor those on competition law apply to State educational 
services which form part of the national educational system, are mainly or entirely funded by the State 
and are under State supervision, since they do not have an economic nature. The fact that private operators 
can provide similar services is not relevant in that respect. See e.g. Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 
5365; and Case E-5/07, Kindergarten, judgment of the EFTA Court of 21 February 2008 (holding that 
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an economic activity for the purposes of application of the freedom to provide services. 
In its view, there is an ‘economic link’ owing to the fact that cross-border patients have 
to advance the payment for the medical services he or she receives in the host Member 
State. The fact that those patients then get reimbursed by the Member State of affiliation 
is not sufficient to call into question that link.20 
In order to guarantee the stability of national healthcare systems, affiliation to an 
insurance scheme is often compulsory and the number of healthcare providers is limited. 
This means that an insured person may only receive medical treatment from professionals 
who have concluded contractual agreements with or form part of that scheme. Often, 
if a patient wishes to receive medical treatment from professionals other than those 
belonging to the insurance scheme, he or she must request a prior authorisation. In 
this regard, the ECJ has consistently held that a system of prior authorisation deters 
‘the patients concerned from applying to providers of hospital services established in 
another Member State and constitutes, both for those patients and for service providers, 
an obstacle to the freedom to provide services’.21 However, it is legitimate for the 
Member State of affiliation to restrict the freedom to provide services, if such restriction 
is necessary to counter ‘the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of a 
social security system’.22 Likewise, the objective of maintaining a balanced medical 
and hospital service open to all is an overriding reason in the general interest capable of 
justifying an obstacle to the freedom to provide services.23   Moreover, any restriction to 
the freedom to provide services must comply with the principle of proportionality, i.e. it 
must not exceed what is objectively necessary for that purpose, meaning that the same 
result may not be achieved by less restrictive rules. 
Accordingly, even if the Treaty provisions on competition are not applicable to 
NSGI, the Treaty provisions on free movement may still apply to those services. Article 
2 of Protocol (No 26) must thus be interpreted in this vein. Whilst it is for the legislation 
of each Member State to determine, in particular, the conditions concerning the 
requirement to be insured with a social security scheme and, consequently, the method 
public kindergartens in Norway do not involve economic activity). However, see the 2012 Commission 
Communication, supra note 10, paragraph 28, which states that a distinction should be drawn between 
publicly funded education and ‘services financed predominantly by parents or pupils or commercial 
revenues. For example, commercial enterprises offering higher education financed entirely by students 
clearly fall within the latter category. In certain Member States public institutions can also offer 
educational services which, due to their nature, financing structure and the existence of competing private 
organisations, are to be regarded as economic’. Moreover, the fact that neither the Treaty provisions on 
free movement nor those on competition law apply to State educational services does not rule out the 
application of other Treaty provisions, notably Articles 18, 19, and 20 TFEU. See, e.g., Case 293/83 
Gravier v City of Liège [1985] ECR 593 and Case C-73/08 Bressol [2010] ECR I- 2735.
20 Müller-Fauré and van Riet, supra note 18, paragraph 89, and Watts, supra note 18, paragraph 89.
21 Smits and Peerbooms, supra note 18, paragraph 69, and Müller-Fauré and van Riet, supra note 18, 
paragraph 44, and Watts, supra note 18, paragraph 98.
22 Smits and Peerbooms, supra note 18, paragraph 72, and Müller-Fauré and van Riet, supra note 18, 
paragraph 73, and Watts, supra note 18, paragraph 103.
23 Smits and Peerbooms, supra note 18, paragraph 73, and Müller-Fauré and van Riet, supra note 18, 
paragraph 67, and Watts, supra note 18, paragraph 104.
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of financing that scheme, the Member States must nevertheless comply with [EU] law 
when exercising those powers.24 The ruling of the ECJ in Kattner Stahlbau illustrates 
this point. 25 
2.2. Kattner Stahlbau: an Example
In Kattner Stahlbau, Kattner, a private limited company active in steel construction 
and the manufacture of staircases and balconies, decided to cancel its compulsory 
affiliation to Maschinenbau- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft (Employers’ liability 
insurance association in the mechanical engineering and metal sector, ‘MMB’). However, 
MMB informed Kattner that cancelling the affiliation was legally impossible. Kattner 
challenged that decision, arguing that compulsory affiliation to MMB was contrary to 
the freedom to provide services as it was prevented from entering into a contract with a 
Danish insurance company prepared to insure it against accidents at work, occupational 
diseases and accidents on the way to and from work, on the same terms as MMB. It 
also alleged that MMB’s position as exclusive provider was in breach of ex Articles 81 
EC and 82 EC (now Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU), i.e. the Treaty provisions on 
competition.
At the outset, the ECJ examined whether the latter provisions were applicable to 
MMB, i.e. whether MMB was an ‘undertaking’ within the meaning of Articles 101 
TFEU and 102 TFEU. In this regard, it pointed out that the insurance scheme at issue in 
the main proceedings operated under the principle of solidarity.26 First, it was financed by 
contributions the rate of which was not systematically proportionate to the risk insured.27 
Second, the members of the scheme at issue constituted a ‘risk community reflecting the 
risks incurred in that branch of industry’.28 This meant that readjustment mechanisms 
were put in place where a member of that scheme had significantly exceeded the average 
expenditure of all the members.  Finally, ‘the value of the benefits paid by employers’ 
24 See e.g. Kattner Stahlbau, supra note 15, paragraph 74 (referring to Smits and Peerbooms, supra note 18, 
paragraph 46).
25 See also Case C-355/00 Freskot [2002] ECR I-5263 (where the ECJ examined the compatibility of a 
Greek social security scheme in agriculture which imposed a compulsory insurance against damage 
caused by natural risks, with the freedom of establishment).
26 See the 2012 Commission Communication, supra note 10, paragraphs 18 et seq., which lists, in a non-
exhaustive fashion, the factors that may be relevant when determining whether a social security scheme 
is governed by the principle of solidarity, namely ‘(a) whether affiliation with the scheme is compulsory; 
(b) whether the scheme pursues an exclusively social purpose; (c) whether the scheme is non-profit; 
(d) whether the benefits are independent of the contributions made; (e) whether the benefits paid are not 
necessarily proportionate to the earnings of the person insured; and  (f) whether the scheme is supervised 
by the State’. In the same way, the Commission considers that the following factors may be relevant when 
determining whether a social security scheme involves an economic activity: ‘(a) optional membership; 
(b) the principle of capitalisation (dependency of entitlements on the contributions paid and the financial 
results of the scheme); (c) their profit-making nature; and (d) the provision of entitlements which are 
supplementary to those under a basic scheme’. If a scheme combines ‘features of both categories, [then] the 
classification of the scheme depends on an analysis of different elements and their respective importance’. 
27 Kattner Stahlbau, supra note 15, paragraph 44.
28 Ibid., paragraph 47.
51
Koen Lenaerts. Defining the Concept of ‘Services of General Interest’ in Light of the ‘Checks and Balances’... 1254
liability insurance associations such as MMB is not necessarily proportionate to the 
insured person’s earnings’.29 As to the supervision by the State, the ECJ found that 
the degree of latitude enjoyed by MMB was strictly delimited by German law, given 
that the German legislator had laid down the factors that must be taken into account in 
calculating the contributions payable under the scheme at issue, as well as an exhaustive 
list of benefits that could be provided under that scheme.30 Hence, the ECJ ruled that 
MMB operated in accordance with the principle of solidarity and under State control. 
MMB could not therefore be considered as an undertaking for the purposes of the Treaty 
provisions on competition. 
However, the ECJ found that such scheme restricted the freedom to receive 
services of undertakings that are covered by it, as it prevented those undertakings from 
approaching providers of insurance services established in Member States other than the 
Member State in which they are affiliated.31 
As to the justification of the restriction, the compulsory affiliation to the statutory 
insurance scheme at issue sought to ensure the financial equilibrium of one of the 
traditional branches of social security, in this case, insurance against accidents at work 
and occupational diseases. That objective, the ECJ recalled, constituted an overriding 
reason in the general interest protected by EU law.32 As to the principle of proportionality, 
the ECJ observed that a compulsory affiliation scheme such as that of MMB was apt 
to ensure the financial equilibrium of a branch of social security. By grouping together 
all undertakings covered by that scheme within risk communities, that scheme was able 
to operate in accordance with the principle of solidarity. As to whether the compulsory 
affiliation scheme went beyond what was necessary to attain the objective pursued, the 
ECJ left this determination to the national court, making, nonetheless, two observations. 
First, it found that the statutory insurance scheme at issue did not preclude undertakings 
covered by it from taking out supplementary insurance with private insurance companies. 
Second, and most importantly, such scheme sought to avoid ‘cream skimming’: the ECJ 
observed that, in the absence of a compulsory affiliation, private insurance would focus 
on attracting customers with ‘good’ risks, ‘leav[ing] employers’ liability insurance 
associations such as MMB with an increasing share of ‘bad’ risks, thereby increasing 
the cost of benefits, particularly for undertakings with older employees engaged in 
dangerous activities; those associations could no longer offer pensions at an acceptable 
cost to such undertakings. Such a situation would arise particularly in a case where […] 
the statutory insurance scheme at issue, inasmuch as it applies the principle of solidarity, 
is characterised, in particular, by the absence of a strictly proportionate link between 
contributions and risks insured’.33
Thus, Kattner Stahlbau shows that the scope of application of the Treaty provisions 
on free movement is broader than that of the Treaty provisions on competition. As van 
29 Kattner Stahlbau, supra note 15, paragraph 55.
30 Ibid., paragraph 62.
31 Ibid., paragraph 83.
32 Ibid., paragraph 85.
33 Ibid., paragraph 90.
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de Gronden observes, free movement law is ‘capable of breaking open social security 
schemes, whereas the role of competition law is limited in this respect’.34
3.  Services of General Economic Interest
3.1. General observations
Article 14 TFEU provides that, without prejudice to the competence of the Member 
States, the Council and the European Parliament shall adopt in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure regulations defining the principles and conditions which 
enable SGEI to fulfil their mission. Those regulations shall also set the conditions to 
provide, to commission, and to fund such services. Introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the 
last sentence of Article 14 TFEU thus provides a new legal basis by virtue of which the 
EU legislator may put in place a general conceptual framework for SGEI.  
For its part, Article 106(2) TFEU provides that undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of SGEI ‘shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to 
the rules on competition law, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct 
the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them’.  In order to 
guarantee the proper functioning of a SGEI, Article 106(2) TFEU allows Member States 
to derogate from ‘the rules contained in the Treaties’. Arguably, such derogation is not 
limited to the Treaty provisions on competition so that Article 106(2) TFEU may also 
be relied upon by Member States in order to derogate from other Treaty provisions such 
as those on free movement.35 Indeed, the case-law of the ECJ reveals that Article 106(2) 
34 van de Gronden, J. W., supra note 4, p. 138.
35 In favour of such a reading, see Buendía Sierra, J. L. Exclusive rights and State monopolies under EU law. 
Oxford: OUP, 1999; Hatzopoulos, V. Recent Developments of the Case Law of the ECJ in the Field of 
Services. Common Market Law Review. 2000, 37: 80–81, and Szyszczak, E. The regulation of the State in 
competitive markets in the EU. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 217. However, see Bekkedal, T. Article 
106 TFEU is Dead. Long live Article 106 TFEU! In: Szyszczak, E.; Davies, J.; Andenæs, M.; Bekkedal, 
T., supra note 4, p. 61–102 (who argues that Article 106(2) TFEU may not operate as a derogation from 
the Treaty provisions on free movement. The reasons are twofold. First, he posits that Article 106(2) 
TFEU appears to allow derogations from free movement which pursue economic objectives. Nevertheless, 
this is at odds with the line of case-law according to which such derogations are not permitted under free 
movement law. Second, the principle of proportionality does not operate in the same way under Article 
106(2) TFEU as under the Treaty provisions on free movement. Under Article 106(2) TFEU, the ECJ 
applies a ‘soft version’ of the principle of proportionality. Conversely, in the realm of free movement law, 
the ECJ applies a ‘strict version’ of that principle. In addition, he argues that, to date, there is no example 
in the case-law of the ECJ where a justification to a restriction on free movement has been grounded in 
Article 106(2) TFEU alone. However, T. Bekkedal seems to obviate the fact that justifications based on 
financial considerations have been occasionally qualified as overriding reasons in the general interest 
protected by EU law. For example, see Watts, supra note 18, paragraph 71 (where the ECJ held that it was 
legitimate for Member States to plan and rationalise ‘efforts in the vital healthcare sector so as to avoid 
the problems of hospital overcapacity, imbalance in the supply of hospital medical care and logistical and 
financial wastage’). In addition, in the context of free movement law, the ECJ also applies a ‘soft version’ 
of the principle of proportionality where EU law does not require Member States to attain the same level 
of protection. In the absence of a protectionist intent, the ECJ favours ‘value diversity’. See e.g. Joined 
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TFEU has been applied in cases involving free movement matters.36 In addition, when 
applying that Treaty provision, the ECJ is called upon to strike a balance between, on 
the one hand, guaranteeing the effectiveness of EU (competition) law and, on the other 
hand, safeguarding the general interest pursued by national authorities. Stated simply, 
Article 106(2) TFEU must be read in light of the principle of proportionality. 
In addition to those two Treaty provisions, Article 36 of the Charter sets out the 
right to access to SGEI. It states that ‘[t]he Union recognises and respects access to 
[SGEI] as provided for in national laws and practices, in accordance with the Treaties, 
in order to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union’.
Although Articles 14 TFEU, 106 TFEU and Article 36 of the Charter refer to the 
expression ‘SGEI’, they fail to define it. In the same way, there is no general definition 
of SGEI in secondary EU legislation.37 The EU legislator has instead opted for ‘sector-
specific definitions’ of SGEI in the fields which have been subject to harmonisation.38 
It follows that, as EU law currently stands,39 there is no uniform criterion laying 
down a clear and precise regulatory definition of SGEI.40 For some scholars, the absence 
of a general definition of SGEI may be explained by the fact that those services have a 
dynamic and evolving nature.41 In this regard, W. Sauter argues that ‘[p]erceptions of 
what such services comprise, or what they do not, vary between time and place […] 
Because the concept of SGEI is a fluid one, providing a list of such services merely 
serves by way of example’.42 Despite that conceptual vacuum, he posits that one may 
Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez [2010] ECR I-4629, paragraph 68 (where 
the ECJ ruled that ‘the fact that one Member State imposes more stringent rules than another in relation to 
the protection of public health does not mean that those rules are incompatible with the Treaty provisions 
on the fundamental freedoms’).
36 See e.g. Case C-157/94 Commission v the Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699; Case C-266/96 Corsica 
Ferries France [1998] ECR I-3949.
37 But see the 2011 Commission Communication, supra note 1, at 3 (where the Commission provides the 
following general definition of SGEI: ‘SGEI are economic activities which deliver outcomes in the overall 
public good that would not be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions in terms of quality, 
safety, affordability, equal treatment or universal access) by the market without public intervention. The 
[public service obligation] is imposed on the provider by way of an entrustment and on the basis of a 
general interest criterion which ensures that the service is provided under conditions allowing it to fulfil 
its mission.’) 
38 Lenaerts, K.; Gutiérrez-Fons, J. A., supra note 5, p. 6.
39 See Case T-289/03 BUPA v Commission [2008] ECR II-81, paragraph 165 (‘[i]t must be made clear that in 
[EU] law and for the purposes of applying the [FEU] Treaty competition rules, there is no clear and precise 
regulatory definition of the concept of an SGEI mission and no established legal concept definitively 
fixing the conditions that must be satisfied before a Member State can properly invoke the existence and 
protection of an SGEI mission, either within the meaning of the first Altmark condition or within the 
meaning of Article [106(2) TFEU]’).
40 Karayigit, M. T., supra note 6, p. 577.
41 See, in this vein, the 2012 Commission Communication, supra note 10, paragraph 12 (holding that ‘[t]he 
economic nature of certain services can therefore differ from one Member State to another. Moreover, due 
to political choice or economic developments, the classification of a given service can change over time. 
What is not a market activity today may turn into one in the future, and vice versa’).
42 Sauter, W. Services of general economic interest and universal service in EU law. European Law Review. 
2008, 33: 167.
54
Jurisprudence. 2012, 19(4): 1247–1267. 1257
infer from soft-law, sector-specific EU legislation, the case-law of the ECJ and that of 
the European General Court (the ‘EGC’) some features shared by all SGEI. In his view, 
those common features are the economic nature of the services provided, the imposition 
of public service obligations,43  their universal nature, their continuity and affordability, 
their universal coverage, as well as their focus on user and consumer protection.44 
For example, the following services have been qualified as SGEI: the services 
provided by network industries (such as energy, telecommunications),45 postal 
services, public emergency services,46 water supply, waste management, public service 
broadcasting,47 sectoral pension schemes,48 and mooring services for vessels in ports.49
4. Providing a Definition of SGEI Consistent with the ‘Checks 
and Balances’ Set out in the Treaties
If, in accordance with Article 14 TFEU, the EU legislator ever decides to provide a 
general definition of SGEI, such a definition would have to incorporate the principles and 
conditions listed in Protocol (No 26).50 It would also have to be compatible with Article 
43 See the 2012 Commission Communication, supra note 10, paragraph 48. Referring to Case C-205/99 
Analir [2001] ECR I-1271, paragraph 71, the Commission considers that ‘it would not be appropriate 
to attach specific public service obligations to an activity which is already provided or can be provided 
satisfactorily and under conditions, such as price, objective quality characteristics, continuity and access 
to the service, consistent with the public interest, as defined by the State, by undertakings operating under 
normal market conditions [...] As for the question of whether a service can be provided by the market, the 
Commission’s assessment is limited to checking whether the Member State has made a manifest error’.
44 Sauter, W., supra note 42, p. 175–176.
45 In relation to network industries, it is worth noting that the qualification of a service as a SGEI may depend 
on the market circumstances of the case at hand. For example, the Commission opines that ‘in areas 
where private investors have already invested in broadband network infrastructure (or are in the process 
of expanding further their network infrastructure) and are already providing competitive broadband 
services with adequate coverage, setting up parallel broadband infrastructure should not be considered 
as a SGEI. In contrast, where investors are not in a position to provide adequate broadband coverage, 
SGEI compensation may be granted under certain conditions’. See the 2012 Commission Communication, 
supra note 10, paragraph 49.
46 See e.g. C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner [2001] ECR I-8089, and Case C-160/08 Commission v Germany 
[2010] ECR I-3713.
47 See e.g. Joined Cases T-568/08 and T573/08 M6 v Commission [2010] ECR II-3397 (confirmed by Case 
C-451/10P TF1 v Commission, order of 9 June 2011, not yet reported).
48 See e.g. Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, paragraphs 98 – 111.
49 See e.g. Corsica Ferries France, supra note 36.
50 See Article 1 of Protocol (No 26) which states: ‘[t]he shared values of the Union in respect of [SGEI] 
within the meaning of Article 14 [TFEU] include in particular:  
— the essential role and the wide discretion of national, regional and local authorities in providing, 
commissioning and organising services of general economic interest as closely as possible to the 
needs of the users; 
— the diversity between various services of general economic interest and the differences in the needs 
and preferences of users that may result from different geographical, social or cultural situations; 
— a high level of quality, safety and affordability, equal treatment and the promotion of universal access 
and of user rights.’
55
Koen Lenaerts. Defining the Concept of ‘Services of General Interest’ in Light of the ‘Checks and Balances’... 1258
36 of the Charter in so far as it must guarantee access to SGEI. Most importantly, such 
a general definition must comply with the principle of conferral and with the principle 
of institutional balance. 
4.1. The Vertical Allocation of Powers
The principle of conferral guarantees that, when interpreting the expression ‘SGEI’, 
the ECJ and, as the case may be, the EU legislator must respect the competences retained 
by the Member States. In Olsen v Commission, the EGC held that ‘Member States have 
wide discretion to define what they regard as [SGEI]. Hence, the definition of such 
services by a Member State can be questioned by the Commission only in the event 
of manifest error’.51 In the same way, in BUPA v Commission, the EGC added that 
‘the Member State has a wide discretion not only when defining a [SGEI] mission but 
also when determining the compensation for the costs, which calls for an assessment of 
complex economic facts’.52 In this regard, the EGC held that the Commission’s review 
powers are limited ‘to ascertaining whether, first, the system is founded on economic 
and factual premises which are manifestly erroneous and whether, second, the system 
is manifestly inappropriate for achieving the objectives pursued’ and ‘whether there 
has been a manifest error in the exercise of the wide discretion of the Member State as 
regards the way of ensuring that the SGEI mission may be achieved under economically 
acceptable conditions’.53 By way of example, such an error may take place where 
activities such as advertising or sponsoring are qualified as SGEI.54 
Moreover, Article 14 TFEU states that, when laying down the general principles 
and conditions underpinning the operation of SGEI, the EU legislator must comply with 
Article 4(2) TEU, which states that ‘[t]he Union shall respect the equality of Member 
States before the Treaties as well as their national identities’. Introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty, the reference to Article 4(2) TEU provides the constitutional basis for the margin 
of discretion enjoyed by the Member States. Neither the ECJ nor the EU legislator are 
entitled to second-guess the determinations made by national authorities as to whether 
a service is of general interest, unless the latter commit a manifest error of assessment. 
However, the margin of discretion enjoyed by the Member States when defining a 
SGEI is narrowed down where the EU legislator has harmonised a given field.55 This can 
51 See Case T-17/02 Olsen v Commission [2005] ECR II-2031, paragraph 216 (confirmed by order of the 
ECJ Case C-320/05P Olsen v Commission [2007] ECR I-131).
52 See BUPA v Commission, supra note 39, paragraph 214.
53 Ibid., paragraphs 266–268. See also the 2012 Commission Communication, supra note 10, paragraph 46.
54 See Rodrigues, S., supra note 2, p. 257. See also Communication from the Commission on the applica-
tion of State aid rules to public service broadcasting [2009] OJ C 257/1, at 8 (holding that the following 
economic activities may not qualify as SGEI: ‘advertising, e-commerce, teleshopping, the use of premium 
rate numbers in prize games, sponsoring or merchandising’). 
55 See Case C-206/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-3509, paragraph 45. See also the 2012 
Commission Communication, supra note 10, paragraph 46 (which states that ‘[w]here specific Union rules 
exist, the Member States’ discretion is further bound by those rules, without prejudice to the Commission’s 
duty to carry out an assessment of whether the SGEI has been correctly defined for the purpose of State 
aid control’). See also Buendía Sierra, J. L.; Muñoz de Juan, M. Some Legal Reflections on the Almunia 
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be seen in the context of Article 106(2) TFEU. In the absence of harmonising measures, 
the ECJ applies a ‘soft’ version of the principle of proportionality. This is illustrated 
by cases such as Corbeau,56 Almelo57 and Ambulanz Glöckner,58 where the ECJ found 
that the monopoly granted to the undertaking entrusted with the operation of a SGEI 
complied with the Treaty provisions on competition, in spite of the fact that the scope of 
such monopoly went beyond that of the SGI. By contrast, where the EU legislator has 
adopted harmonising measures, the ECJ applies a rather ‘strict’ version of the principle 
of proportionality. This means that national authorities must comply with the objectives 
pursued by the EU legislative framework. Any derogation from that framework, if 
possible, must be subject to strict conditions. This point is illustrated by the ruling of the 
ECJ in Federutility and Others.59  
In that case, the ECJ was asked to interpret Directive 2003/55,60 which ‘is designed 
progressively to achieve a total liberalisation of the market for natural gas in the context 
of which, in particular, all suppliers may freely deliver their products to all consumers’.61 
As of 1 July 2007, Directive 2003/55 provides that the price for the supply of natural 
gas must be determined solely by the operation of supply and demand. However, Article 
3(2) contains an exception to that principle: Member States are allowed to impose 
‘public service obligations’ on undertakings operating in the gas sector, which may 
in particular concern the ‘price of supply’. Thus, the question was, in essence, to what 
extent a Member State may rely on Article 3(2) of Directive 2003/55 with a view to 
imposing on undertakings operating in the gas sector public service obligations in order, 
in particular, to ensure that the price of the supply of natural gas to final consumers 
was maintained at a reasonable level. At the outset, the ECJ pointed out that Article 
3(2) enables the Member States to accommodate two competing interests. On the one 
hand, Directive 2003/55 pursues to establish a ‘competitive market in natural gas’. 
On the other hand, Directive 2003/55 also seeks to reassure the Member States that 
liberalisation of the natural gas market would not be carried out to the detriment of 
consumers. Accordingly, when having recourse to Article 3(2) of Directive 2003/55, 
national authorities must strive to accommodate those two competing interests pursued 
by the EU legislator. Next, the ECJ proceeded to lay down some detailed guidelines as to 
how that balance had to be struck, i.e. the way in which the principle of proportionality 
was to be applied. ‘First, such an intervention must be limited in duration to what is 
strictly necessary in order to achieve its objective, in order, in particular, not to render 
permanent a measure which, by its very nature, constitutes an obstacle to the realisation 
Package. European State Aid Quarterly. 2012, 2(Supplement): 70 (who argue that ‘Member States cannot 
define the concept of SGEI where this has already been done through EU harmonization measures’). 
56 Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2533.
57 Case C-393/92 Almelo [1994] ECR I-1477.
58 Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner [2001] ECR I-8089.
59 Case C-265/08 Federutility and Others [2010] ECR I-3377.
60 Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, OJ [2003] L176/57.
61 Federutility and Others, supra note 59, paragraph 18.
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of an operational internal market in gas […] Secondly, the method of intervention used 
must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective which is being pursued 
in the general economic interest […] Thirdly, the requirement of proportionality must 
also be assessed with regard to the scope ratione personae of the measure, and, more 
particularly, its beneficiaries’.62 Finally, the ECJ held that public service obligations be 
clearly defined, transparent, non discriminatory and verifiable, and that they guarantee 
equal access for EU gas companies to consumers.’ 
5. The Horizontal Allocation of Powers
Article 14 TFEU states that a general definition of SGEI must be adopted ‘without 
prejudice [….] to Articles 93, 106 and 107 [TFEU]’. In other words, reliance on that Treaty 
provision must comply with the powers of the Commission in the realm of competition 
law. For example, such a general definition of SGEI could not encroach upon the powers 
granted to the Commission when determining whether public service compensation 
granted to an undertaking entrusted with the operation of a SGEI constitutes aid and, 
if so, is compatible with the internal market.63 In turn, when enforcing EU competition 
law, the Commission must pay due respect to the principles and conditions laid down 
in secondary EU legislation on the basis of which SGEI must operate. A joint reading 
of the relevant Treaty provisions would thus suggest that the Commission is to operate 
as follows. 
In the absence of EU harmonisation measures, the Commission must limit itself to 
controlling whether there is a manifest error of assessment in qualifying an economic 
activity as a SGEI. Next, it will proceed to apply the four cumulative criteria laid down 
in Altmark64 for public service compensation granted to an undertaking entrusted with 
the operation of a SGEI not to constitute aid so that the prior notification obligation 
laid down in Article 108(3) TFEU does not apply. Those cumulative criteria are the 
following: First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations 
to discharge, and the obligations must be clearly defined. Second, the parameters on 
the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in 
an objective and transparent manner. Third, the compensation must not exceed what is 
necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service 
obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. Finally, 
62 Federutility and Others, supra note 59, paragraphs 33–43.
63 See, in this regard, Buendía Sierra, J. L.; Muñoz de Juan, M., supra note 55, p. 69 (who argue that ‘despite 
the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a possible new legal basis, nothing in the Treaty forces 
the Commission to use Article 14 TFEU. In fact, the main rules governing SGEIs were not modified 
with Lisbon. Indeed, Article 14 TFEU starts by recalling that the promotion of public services must be 
guaranteed “without prejudice of Article 93, 106 and 107 of the Treaty”. As a consequence, rules on State 
aid remain applicable for the compensation of SGEIs. This is maybe one of the reasons why [in relation 
to the new SGEI package, below n 73] the Commission did not choose to make the proposal under Article 
14 TFEU but instead relied on its powers conferred by Article 106(3) TFEU’). 
64 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7747.
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where the undertaking that is to discharge public service obligations, in a specific case, 
is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the 
selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the 
community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an 
analysis of the costs that a typical undertaking, well-run and adequately provided with 
the relevant means, would have incurred. If one or more of the Altmark criteria are not 
met, then public service compensation constitutes State aid and is subject to Articles 93, 
106, 107 and 108 TFEU.65
6.  Social Services of General Interest
As mentioned above, the expression ‘SSGI’ is nowhere to be found in primary EU 
law.66 It is thus for the EU legislator and, as the case may be, for national authorities 
to define the concept embedded in that expression. Of course, in so doing, they must 
respect the definitions of ‘SGI’, ‘SGEI’ and ‘NSGI’ laid down in the Treaties, Protocol 
(No 26) and Article 36 of the Charter. 
In this regard, in its 2011 Communication, the Commission states that SSGI may 
include ‘social security schemes covering the main risks of life and a range of other 
essential services provided directly to the person that play a preventive and socially 
cohesive/inclusive role’.67 
Since the social nature of a SGI is not sufficient in itself to classify that service 
as non-economic,68 a distinction should be drawn between ‘non-economic SSGI’ and 
‘social SGEI’. As mentioned above, whilst the Treaty provisions on competition do not 
apply to SSGI being NSGI, they do so in relation to social SGEI. The question is then 
whether the adjective ‘social’ brings an added value to the concepts of ‘NSGI’ and to 
that of ‘SGEI’. In my view, the reply should be in the affirmative. 
It is worth noting that the Lisbon Treaty has introduced a number of provisions, 
which aim to highlight the ‘social aspects’ of the European integration project.69 For the 
purposes of our study, it is worth examining Article 9 TFEU in some detail. The latter 
states that ‘[i]n defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall 
take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, 
the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high 
65 See e.g. Case T-354/05 TF1 v Commission [2009] ECR II-471. 
66 Sinnaeve, A. What’s New in SGEI in 2012? – An Overview of the Commission’s SGEI Package. 
European State Aid Quarterly. 2012, 2: 354 (who points out that ‘[t]he main difficulty has been the lack 
of an established definition of “social” services’).
67 See the 2011 Commission Communication, supra note 1, at 4.
68 See Rodrigues, S., supra note 2, p. 256 (‘[t]he main relevant criteria to pave the way towards an exception 
or an exclusion of the EU rules is not the social nature of the service, but the economic or non-economic 
nature of such service’). 
69 See e.g. Article 3(3) TEU which states that the Union ‘shall work for […] a highly competitive social 
market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’. See also Title IV of the Charter, entitled 
‘Solidarity’ (see Articles 27–38). 
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level of education, training and protection of human health’. Compared to its predecessor 
(ex Article 127(2) EC), Article 9 TFEU goes beyond macroeconomic employment 
issues. In de Santos Palhota, AG Cruz Villalón qualified that provision as ‘a “cross-
cutting” social protection clause’.70 The Advocate General relied on that provision (as 
well as on Article 31 of the Charter) with a view to arguing that ‘[a]s a result of the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, when working conditions constitute an overriding 
reason relating to the public interest justifying a derogation from the freedom to provide 
services, they must no longer be interpreted strictly. In so far as the protection of workers 
is a matter which warrants protection under the Treaties themselves, it is not a simple 
derogation from a freedom, still less an unwritten exception inferred from case-law. To 
the extent that the new primary law framework provides for a mandatory high level of 
social protection, it authorises the Member States, for the purpose of safeguarding a 
certain level of social protection, to restrict a freedom, and to do so without European 
Union law’s regarding it as something exceptional and, therefore, as warranting a strict 
interpretation. That view, […] is expressed in practical terms by applying the principle 
of proportionality’.71
In relation to SSGI being NSGI, if the ECJ were to follow the interpretation of 
Article 9 TFEU put forward by AG Cruz Villalón, the compatibility of a SSGI with the 
Treaty provisions on free movement would not be examined under a strict version of 
the principle of proportionality. On the contrary, in the absence of discriminatory State 
measures, the general interest pursued by the SSGI in question and the right to free 
movement would stand on an equal footing.
As to social SGEI, the interpretation put forward by AG Cruz Villalón suggests 
that, when applying the Altmark criteria, the Commission may not ‘tilt’ the balance 
in favour of the Treaty provisions on competition, but is required to follow a more 
‘balanced’ approach. Indeed, Article 9 TFEU is a horizontal Treaty provision which 
is addressed to the ‘Union’ as a whole, and not only to the EU legislator. This means 
that when the Commission ‘implements’ EU competition policy, it must bear in mind 
‘the social dimension of EU integration’. In the Commission’s own words, social SGEI 
‘have specific characteristics that need to be taken into consideration’.72 
That might explain why when adopting the ‘New SGEI Package’73 – in particular 
its Decision on the application of Article 106(2) TFEU to State aid in the form of public 
70 See Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-515/08 de Santos Palhota and Others, judgment of 7 of 
October 2010, n.y.r., paragraph 51.
71 Ibid., paragraph 53.
72 See Recital 11 of Commission Decision 2012/21/EU of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 
106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service 
compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest, [2012] OJ L 7/3.
73 The new SGEI package is composed of four different legal instruments, namely a new Communication, 
supra note 10, a revised Decision, supra note 72, a revised Framework (Communication from the 
Commission — European Union framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation, 
[2012] OJ C8/15), and a new de minimis Regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 
25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
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service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of 
SGEI (the ‘2011 Commission Decision’)74 – the Commission placed ‘greater emphasis 
on social SGEI’.75 It is worth recalling that, if one or more of the Altmark criteria are 
not met, then public service compensation constitutes State aid. However, if that public 
service compensation falls within the scope of application of the 2011 Commission 
Decision, it is deemed compatible with the internal market and exempted from the prior 
notification obligation provided for in Article 108(3) TFEU.76 In order for public service 
compensation to fall within the scope of the 2011 Commission Decision the social SGEI 
at issue must be clearly identified; the undertaking benefiting from the public service 
compensation must have been specifically entrusted with the operation of that service; 
and there must be no overcompensation.77
The threshold for the application of the 2011 Commission Decision to SGEI in 
general has been reduced. For example, whilst the 2005 Commission Decision was 
applicable to annual compensation for the service in question of less than EUR 30 
million, the 2011 Commission Decision  covers ‘compensation not exceeding an annual 
amount of EUR 15 million for the provision of [SGEI] in areas other than transport and 
transport infrastructure’.78 However, in relation to social SGEI,79 no economic threshold 
is laid down in the 2011 Commission Decision.80 
Additionally, compared to the 2005 Commission Decision,81 the 2011 Commission 
Decision has expanded the type of social SGEI which are covered by that exemption.82 
Whilst the 2005 Decision was limited to ‘public service compensation granted to 
Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic interest, [2012] OJ 
L 114/ 8). The purpose of the new SGEI Package is twofold: it seeks to clarify some basic concepts relating 
to SGEI, whilst promoting a diversified, flexible and proportionate approach. See generally Kamaris, G. 
The reform of EU state aid rules for services of general economic interest in times of austerity. European 
Law Review. 2012, 33: 55, and Sinnaeve, A., supra note 66.
74 See supra note 72.
75 See Géradin, D. Editorial: The New SGEI Package. Journal of Competition Law & Practice. 2012, 3: 2.
76 Article 3 of the 2011 Commission Decision states: ‘State aid in the form of public service compensation 
that meets the conditions laid down in this Decision shall be compatible with the internal market and shall 
be exempt from the prior notification obligation provided for in Article 108(3) [TFEU] provided that it 
also complies with the requirements flowing from the Treaty or from sectoral Union legislation’.
77 The added value of the 2011 Commission Decision lies in the fact that it aims to facilitate the application 
of the third and fourth criteria laid down in Altmark. See Kamaris, G., supra note 73, p 59. For example, 
Article 5 thereof lists the efficiency factors that must be taken into account when awarding public service 
compensation to the undertaking entrusted with the operation of a SGEI.  
78 See Article 2(a) of the 2011 Commission Decision. 
79 See Articles 2(b) and 2(c) of the 2011 Commission Decision.
80 See Recital 11 of the 2011 Commission Decision (‘undertakings in charge of social services […]  should 
also benefit from the exemption from notification provided for in this Decision, even if the amount of 
compensation they receive exceeds the general compensation threshold laid down in this Decision’).
81 Commission Decision 2005/842/EC of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC 
Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted 
with the operation of services of general economic interest, [2005] OJ L312/67.
82 See Sinnaeve, A., supra note 66, p. 355; and Righini, E. The Reform of the State Aid Rules on Financing 
of Public Services Paving the Way towards a Clearer, Simpler and more diversified Framework. European 
State Aid Quarterly. 2012, 2(Supplement): 13.
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hospitals and social housing undertakings carrying out activities qualified as [SGEI] 
by the Member State concerned’, Article 2(c) of the 2011 Commission Decision also 
covers ‘compensation for the provision of [SGEI] meeting social needs as regards health 
and long term care, childcare, access to and reintegration into the labour market, social 
housing and the care and social inclusion of vulnerable groups’.83 For Sinnaeve, the 
notion of ‘care and social inclusion of vulnerable groups’ is flexible and broad enough 
to catch any residual type of social services not explicitly mentioned in Article 2(c) 
of the 2011 Commission Decision, such as services addressing the needs of refugees, 
immigrants, disabled persons or drug addicts. Accordingly, she takes the view that 
‘Member States will in future be able to benefit from the exemption for most, if not all, 
social services’.84
Moreover, if State aid in the form of public service compensation does not meet the 
conditions set out in the 2011 Commission Decision, then prior notification is required. 
When examining the compatibility of such aid with the internal market, the Commission 
is obliged to take into account Article 9 TFEU. For example, the derogation contained in 
Article 107(2)(a) TFEU must be interpreted in light of Article 9 TFEU. 
In summary, when determining whether public service compensation constitutes 
State aid and, if so, whether it is compatible with the internal market, one must take into 
account Article 9 TFEU which is a horizontal social protection clause. Deference to that 
Treaty provision must thus take place at all stages of the Commission’s assessment, i.e. 
when interpreting the four cumulative criteria laid down in Altmark, when interpreting 
its 2011 Decision, and when interpreting the derogations from State aid rules set out in 
Article 107 TFEU. 
Concluding Remarks
Shedding some light on the expressions ‘SGI’, ‘SGEI’, ‘NSGI’ and ‘SSGI’ is not 
an easy task. The reasons are twofold. First, as mentioned above, SGI have a dynamic 
and evolving nature. A definition of the principles and conditions underpinning the 
operation of SGI must be capable of adapting to changing times and social perceptions. 
Second, a definition of SGI must be respectful of the vertical and horizontal allocation 
of powers. Vertically, a definition of SGI must not impinge upon the powers retained 
by the Member States. In the absence of harmonisation, it is for the Member States to 
define the services they consider to be of general interest, unless they commit a manifest 
error. In the presence of EU harmonising measures, the margin of discretion enjoyed 
by the Member States is, if still existent, narrowed down, given that national authorities 
are required to comply with the objectives pursued by the EU legislator. Horizontally, 
a definition of SGI must not encroach upon the prerogatives of the Commission in the 
realm of competition law.  An EU conceptual framework for the SGI must thus be the 
83  See Rodrigues, S., supra note 2, p. 266.
84  Sinnaeve, A., supra note 66, p. 355.
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result of a constructive dialogue between the different levels of governance, as well as 
of a balanced solution among different policy areas in relation to which the EU enjoys 
competences.
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Termino „visuoTinės svarbos paslaugos“ apibrėžimas  
per europos sĄJungos suTarTyse įTvirTinTo „sTabdžių ir 
aTsvarų“ principo prizmę
Koen Lenaerts
Europos Sąjungos Teisingumo Teismas, Liuksemburgas
Santrauka. Straipsnyje siekiama atskleisti tokių terminų kaip „visuotinės svarbos pa-
slaugos“ (SGI), „visuotinės ekonominės svarbos paslaugos“ (SGEI), „visuotinės svarbos ne 
ekonominio pobūdžio paslaugos“ (NSGI) ir „visuotinės svarbos socialinės paslaugos“ (SSGI) 
sampratą. Terminas „visuotinės svarbos paslaugos“ atspindi bendrą koncepciją, apimančią 
tiek ekonominio, tiek ne ekonominio pobūdžio visuotinės svarbos paslaugas. Skirtingai nei 
pirmieji trys minėti terminai, Europos Sąjungos pirminėje teisėje nėra vartojamas terminas 
„visuotinės svarbos socialinės paslaugos“. Tai reiškia, kad paliekama ES teisės aktų leidėjui 
arba valstybėms narėms apibrėžti šio termino reikšmę. Be to, šiame straipsnyje laikomasi po-
zicijos, kad principų ir sąlygų, būtinų „visuotinės svarbos paslaugų“ veikimui, samprata turi 
sugebėti prisitaikyti prie besikeičiančių aplinkybių ir socialinių iššūkių, bet kartu išlaikyti 
pagarbą vertikaliam ir horizontaliam įgaliojimų pasiskirstymui, kuris įtvirtintas ES Sutarty-
se. Vertikaliai „visuotinės svarbos paslaugų“ apibrėžimas neturi kėsintis į valstybėms narėms 
išlikusias teises. Kai nėra bendro suderinimo, valstybėms narėms paliekama teisė apibrėžti 
visuotinės svarbos paslaugų ratą, nebent jos daro akivaizdžią vertinimo klaidą. Taikant ES 
harmonizavimo priemones, valstybių narių diskrecijos teisė yra susiaurinama, atsižvelgiant, 
kad nacionalinės valdžios institucijos turi laikytis ES teisės aktų leidėjo nustatytų tikslų. 
Horizontaliai „visuotinės svarbos paslaugų“ apibrėžimas neturi kėsintis į Komisijos išimtines 
teises konkurencijos teisės srityje. Be to, remiantis Sutarties dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo 
9 straipsniu bei ES antrinės teisės aktais, turi būti atsižvelgiama į „visuotinės svarbos socia-
linių paslaugų“ specifiką, nustatant suderinamumą su ES valstybių pagalbos taisyklėmis dėl 
kompensacijų už teikiamas viešas paslaugas. ES konceptualus pagrindas „visuotinės svarbos 
paslaugų“ įgyvendinimui turi būti parengtas, atsižvelgiant į konstruktyvų skirtingų valdymo 
lygių dialogą, taip pat į subalansuotus sprendimus įvairiose politikos srityse, kuriose ES turi 
kompetenciją. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: „visuotinės svarbos paslaugos“, vertikalus ir horizontalus įgalio-
jimų pasiskirstymas Europos Sąjungoje.
Koen Lenaerts, Europos Sąjungos Teisingumo Teismo viceprezidentas; Liuveno universiteto Euro-
pos Sąjungos teisės profesorius. Mokslinių tyrimų kryptis: Europos Sąjungos teisė.
Koen Lenaerts,  Vice-President of the Court of Justice of the European Union; Professor of European 






















Report to the attention of DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion  
of the European Commission 
 




The Treaty establishing a European Economic Community (EEC), signed in Rome on 25 March 1957, laid the 
foundations for economic integration and chose a common market (called “Internal Market” since the European 
Single Act of 1986) to give substance to such economic integration. 
 
In accordance with settled case-law from the European Court of Justice (hereinafter “the ECJ” or “the Court”), 
the concept of a common market “involves the elimination of all obstacles to  intra-[EU]  trade in order  to 
merge the national markets  into a single market bringing  about conditions as close as possible  to those of a 
genuine internal market”3. 
 
Article 3.3 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), as amended by the Lisbon Treaty of 13 December 2007, 
entered into force on 1st December 2009, confirms this objective as follows: 
 
“The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, 
aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the 
quality of the environment (…)”. 
 
The new reference made to a “highly competitive social market economy” reveals that the European Union is not 
pursuing a pure liberal agenda. Economic integration, as original goal of the European construction, is now 
completed and balanced by human and social objectives as well as by sustainable development considerations. 
 
Article 2 of the TEU reflects this human and social dimension of the EU as follows:  
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. 
                                                            
1 The information contained in this publication does not necessarily reflect the position or opinion of the 
European Commission. 
2 Sorbonne Law School – University Paris 1 – International and EU Law Research Institute (IREDIES). 




And Article 3.3 TEU, respectively in its second and third paragraph, insists on the mandate given to the EU in 
combatting “social exclusion and discrimination” and in promoting “social justice and protection, equality 
between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child”, as well as 
“economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States”. 
 
To give substance to these goals, the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) has introduced within the Treaty on the functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) several provisions “having general application”. Special attention must be paid 
to two of them:  
 
- Article 9 TFEU: “In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into 
account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate 
social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and 
protection of human health”. 
 
- Article 14 TFEU: “Without prejudice to Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union or to Articles 93, 106 
and 107 of this Treaty, and given the place occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared 
values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Union and the 
Member States, each within their respective powers and within the scope of application of the Treaties, 
shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions, particularly economic 
and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfill their missions. The European Parliament and the 
Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall 
establish these principles and set these conditions without prejudice to the competence of Member States, 
in compliance with the Treaties, to provide, to commission and to fund such services. 
 
This latter provision is an important one to understanding the ratio legis of the current application of EU law to 
Social Services. Article 14 TFEU is the result of a step-by-step evolution of the EU Treaties regarding the role 
recognized to services of general (economic) interest (hereinafter “SG(E)I”) in contributing to EU objectives. 
 
The concept of SGEI has been introduced in the Rome Treaty in Article 90, paragraph 2, EEC, then after re-
numbered Article 86-2 EC and currently Article 106.2 TFEU, which states as follows: 
 
“Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the 
character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in 
particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must 
not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union”. 
 
As construed by the European Court of Justice, that provision “In allowing derogations to be made from the 
general rules of the Treaty on certain conditions (…) seeks to reconcile the Member States' interest in using 
certain undertakings, in particular in the public sector, as an instrument of economic or fiscal policy with the 
Community's interest in ensuring compliance with the rules on competition and the preservation of the unity of 
the Common Market”4. One may say, twenty years on, that SGEIs may be used as well as an instrument of 
                                                            




social policy. The recent emergence of the concept of Social Services of General Interest (SSGI) in the EU soft-
law5 may be considered as a confirmation of such interpretation6.  
 
The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) introduced a new provision on SGEIs: Article 16 EC, now Article 14 TFEU, was 
a significant step to take into consideration the role of public services as an obligation and not as derogation any 
more7. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty is completing this evolution by transforming that provision into a new legal basis for the EU 
legislature to adopt regulations in the field of SGEIs (last sentence added); by introducing a new Protocol on 
Services of General Interest8 and by giving legal binding force to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
including, inter alia, Article 36 related to access to SGEIs.   
 
Considering this new holistic approach resulting from the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Council has underlined « the 
need to further assess the interaction between the internal market and social services of general interest in view 
of the social aims of the European Union, without prejudice of the powers of the Member States, in order to 
supply quality services meeting users' specific needs »9. Such an interaction relies on two essential freedoms: 
free movement of factors of production (I) and free competition (II). 
 
To that regard, Free Movement and Competition Rules may be considered as complementary tools to shaping 
the Internal Market, by stimulating economic activity with a view to ensuring both an optimum allocation of 
resources and maximum consumer welfare, and by pursuing general social goals, in particular in terms of 
cohesion and of quality of service10. 
  
                                                            
5 See Commission Communication related to SSGI on 26 April 2006 (COM(2006) 177 final) and Commission 
Communication on "Services of general interest, including social services of general interest: a new European 
commitment": COM(2007)725 on 20 November 2007 and Communication "A Quality Framework for Services 
of General Interest" in Europe, COM(2011) 900 of 20 December 2011. 
6 See also SEC (2010) 1545 final of 7 December 2010, hereinafter « The SGEI Guide ». The present Report will 
make, when necessary, some reference to this Guide, in order not to repeat what it has already addressed but to 
give an overview of the rationale of EU rules applying to Social Services and to insist on some fundamental 
issues and on some recent legislative changes or proposals since 2010. For a critical analysis of the SGEI Guide: 
RODRIGUES, in European Journal of Social Law, n°4, December 2011, pp. 254-267. 
7 See ROSS, ‘Article 16 E.C. and services of general interest: from derogation to obligation?’, (2000) 25, 
European Law Review, 22-38. 
8 See Protocol N° 26 attached to TEU and TFEU: Article 1: “The shared values of the Union in respect of 
services of general economic interest within the meaning of Article 14 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union include in particular: — the essential role and the wide discretion of national, regional and 
local authorities in providing, commissioning and organising services of general economic interest as closely as 
possible to the needs of the users;  — the diversity between various services of general economic interest and the 
differences in the needs and preferences of users that may result from different geographical, social or cultural 
situations; — a high level of quality, safety and affordability, equal treatment and the promotion of universal 
access and of user rights.” - Article 2: “The provisions of the Treaties do not affect in any way the competence 
of Member States to provide, commission and organise non-economic services of general interest”. 
9 See EPSCO Council Conclusions of 6/7 December 2010, « Social Services of General Interest: at the heart of 
the European Social Model », paragraph 19. 
10 See ALBORS-LLORENS, “Competition Policy and the shaping of the Single Market”, in BARNARD and 




I – Free Movement rules and Social Services 
 
Article 26.2 TFEU states that the Internal Market shall comprise “an area without internal frontiers in which the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the 
Treaties”. This free movement provision, with a potentially very wide scope, acts as “a driving force” in the 
creation of the Internal Market11. 
 
As far as the present Report is focusing on Social Services, the sole EU rules related on free movement of 
services will be examined, as exposed by the TFEU (A) and as put in practice by the EU legislature with some 
directives like those ones on Public Procurement and the Services’ Directive (B).   
 
A. Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services in Primary law: the 
basic rules 
Free movement of services includes two rights: the right of establishment (articles 49 to 55 TFEU) and the 
freedom to provide services (articles 56 to 62 TFEU). The distinction is due to the fact that freedom of 
establishment is corresponding to a permanent activity of a national of a Member State in the territory of another 
Member State, while freedom to provide services implies that a national of a Member State is temporarily 
pursuing his activity in the territory of another Member State12. 
 
However, there is a common ratio for both these provisions, i.e. prohibiting restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State (article 49 TFEU) and on 
the freedom to provide services within the Union in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in 
a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended (article 56 TFEU). 
 
However, these freedoms are not absolute or unconditional. They may suffer exceptions. Some derogations are 
indeed possible on the basis of the derogating provisions of Article 51 TFEU (i.e. for activities which in that 
State are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority) and of Article 52 TFEU (i.e. 
restrictions justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health), as well as on the basis of other 
non-economic and public-interest requirements or ‘overriding reason in the general interest’, as developed by 
the case-law of the European Court of justice and which may include social objectives. 
 
For the purpose of the present Report related on the application of EU rules to social services, three key concepts 
need to be scrutinized: the concept of services (i); the concept of restriction (ii) and the concept of overriding 
reason in the general interest (iii). 
 
(i) Concept of services 
 
Services are not defined in detail in the TFEU, even if Article 57 TFEU states as follows: 
« Services shall be considered to be ‘services’ within the meaning of the Treaties where they are 
normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to 
freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons.  
                                                            
11 See SNELL, Goods and Services in EC Law. A Study of the Relationship Between the Freedoms, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 34. 




« ‘Services’ shall in particular include: 
(a) activities of an industrial character;  
(b) activities of a commercial character;  
(c) activities of craftsmen;  
(d) activities of the professions. »  
 
It stems from this provision that a service may be considered as an economic activity (i.e. “any activity 
consisting in offering goods or services on a given market”)13 when it « normally » yields a « remuneration ». 
Consequently, as some authors pointed out, “services which are normally remunerated, but sporadically 
provided free of charge, are not excluded”14. 
 
Indeed, according to settled case-law, « the essential characteristic of remuneration lies in the fact that it 
constitutes consideration for the service in question »15. Accordingly, « the pursuit of an activity as an employed 
person or the provision of services for remuneration must be regarded as an economic activity within the 
meaning of Article 2 of the [EC] Treaty »16. 
 
However, the Court also held that « the work performed must be genuine and effective and not such as to be 
regarded as purely marginal and ancillary »17 and that economic activities may fall within the scope of Article 
50 of the Treaty « even if some of those services are not paid for by those for whom they are performed »18. 
 
This latter position is particularly relevant regarding the application of Articles 49-56 TFEU to social or health 
services when they do not necessarily have to be paid for by the person for whom they are performed. It’s why, 
for example, the Court held that « the fact that hospital medical treatment is financed directly by the sickness 
insurance funds on the basis of agreements and pre-set scales of fees is not in any event such as to remove such 
treatment from the sphere of services within the meaning of Article [50] of the Treaty »19. 
 
Last, but not least, the qualification of service does not depend either on the national definition (e.g. non-market 
services) given to it (insofar the EU concept is an autonomous one) or either on the legal status of the provider, 
which may be public or private and for-profit or not-for-profit. Answering to a preliminary ruling related to the 
application of EU law to national legislation prohibiting the holding of certain lotteries in a Member State, the 
Court held that : « Although in many Member States the law provides that the profits made by a lottery may be 
used only for certain purposes, in particular in the public interest, or may even be required to be paid into the 
                                                            
13 Pursuant to definition given by the Court within the scope of EU competition rules: see Part II infra and 
notably Case 118/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2599, paragraph 7, and Case C-
35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851, paragraph 36. 
14 See LENAERTS and VAN NUFFEL, Constitutional Law of the European Union, 2nd edition, 2005, p. 227. 
15 See Case 263/86, Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, paragraph 17. 
16 See Case 13/76 Donà v Mantero [1976] ECR 1333, paragraph 12, and Case 196/87 Steymann v 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1988] ECR 6159, paragraph 10. One may note that even though neither Article 2 of 
TEU and of TFEU make a reference to ‘economic activities’ anymore, this concept is still an effective one to 
construe the notion of service, as well as the notion of undertaking for the implementation of the EU competition 
rules : see infra. 
17 See Steymann, paragraph 13. 
18 See Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders (B.V.A.) and Others v Netherlands State [1988] ECR 2085, 
paragraph 16. 




State budget, the rules on the allocation of profits do not alter the nature of the activity in question or deprive it 
of its economic character »20. 
 
As explained by the SGEI Guide, « in order to determine whether a given service constitutes an economic 
activity subject to the Treaty rules on the internal market (…), a case-by-case examination must be made of all 
the characteristics of the activity in question, particularly of the way the service is provided, organized and 
financed in the Member State concerned »21. 
 
As to date, the ECJ has regarded several social services as services within the meaning of the free movement 
rules22, notably social care for elderly people23, social security scheme24 (including retirement pension 
scheme)25 and social housing26. 
 
(ii) Concept of restriction 
The original substance of the free movement of services was and is still the prohibition of any discrimination for the 
providers outside of the Member State from which they are nationals. This is a variation of the principle of equal 
treatment as stated respectively in Article 49, second paragraph, and Article 50, last paragraph, of the TFEU: 
 
- Article 49, second paragraph: « Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and 
pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular 
companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions laid 
down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the 
provisions of the Chapter relating to capital ». 
 
- Article 50, last paragraph: « Without prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating to the 
right of establishment, the person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his 
activity in the Member State where the service is provided, under the same conditions as are imposed 
by that State on its own nationals ». 
 
However, the ECJ case-law gave to the principle of free movement another dimension beyond the non-
discrimination principle : « (…) the Treaty requires not only the elimination of all discrimination against a 
person providing services on the ground of his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it 
applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, when it is 
liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Member 
State where he lawfully provides similar services »27. 
 
Consequently, any measure prohibiting, impeding or rendering less advantageous the activities of a provider of 
services or the possibility for a recipient (in another Member State) to benefit from such services must be 
considered as infringing the EU Internal Market rules. 
                                                            
20 See Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] E.C.R. I-1039, paragraph 35. 
21 See under Section 6.2 of the SGEI Guide. 
22 See also other examples, infra, regarding the non-economic qualification within the scope of EU competition rules. 
23 See Case C-70/95 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395. 
24 See Case C-355/00, Freskot [2003] ECR I-5263 and Case C-350/07 Kattner Stahlbau [2009] ECR I-1513. 
25 See Case C-271/09, Commission v Poland, not yet published. 
26 See Case C-567/07, Sint Servatius [2009] ECR I-9021. 




(iii) Concept of overriding reason in the general interest 
The Court has identified some social objectives as 'overriding reasons of general interest' allowing the Member 
States to justify restrictions on the free movement provisions. It has been so held in order to protect workers 
against social dumping28, to preserve the financial balance of a social security system29 or to guarantee the 
provision of a service of general interest30. 
 
These social-oriented derogations are accepted by the Court pursuant to a case-by-case approach and under a 
strict control of proportionality31. That is to say, as explained by the SGEI Guide, that any national restrictive 
measure must be “suitable for guaranteeing the achievement of one or more legitimate objectives invoked by that 
Member State and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives” 32. 
 
B. Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services in Secondary law : the 
Public Procurement rules and the Services’ Directive 
 
The implementation of EU Treaty rules (primary law) may be completed or reinforced by the adoption of EU 
acts (secondary law). Two important examples illustrate such a possibility: the Public Procurement Directives 
(B1) and the Services’ Directive (B2). 
 
B.1. Public Procurement rules and Social Services 
 
As the Court has held, the purpose of coordinating at EU level the procedures for the award of public contracts is 
« to eliminate barriers to the freedom to provide services and goods and therefore to protect the interests of traders 
established in a Member State who wish to offer goods or services to contracting authorities established in another 
Member State »33. Stated differently, the Public Procurement or Public Contracts EU Directives34 are instruments 
adopted in order to facilitate and to give substance to Articles 49 and 56 TFEU in the area of public contracts. 
 
Consequently, the contracting entities concluding such contracts (whatever covered by the specific scope of 
application of the Public Contracts Directives) are bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty, in 
                                                            
28 See Case C-49/98, Finalarte [2001] ECR I-7831. 
29 See Case C-158/96, Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931. 
30 See Joined Cases C-282/04 and C-283/04, Commission v. Netherlands [2006] ECR-I 9141, paragraph 38. 
31 See the leading case: Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299. 
32 See section 6.5 of the SGEI Guide. 
33 See Case C-360/96 Gemeente Arnhem, Gemeente Rbeden v BFI Holding [1998] ECR I-6821, paragraph 41. 
34 See Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the 
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (OJ L 134, 
30.4.2004, p. 1–113) +  Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on 
the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service 
contracts (OJ L 134, 30.4.2004, p. 114–240) + Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply 
contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security (OJ L 216, 
20.8.2009, p. 76–136). These texts are currently under a proposal of revision (COM(2011)895 and 896 final of 





general, and the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality, in particular35. That general 
principle of EU law implies an equal treatment of economic operators from any Member State by the contracting 
authorities, and, more particularly, « an obligation of transparency in order to enable the contracting authority 
to satisfy itself that the principle has been complied with »36. 
 
Pursuant to case-law, such an obligation of transparency which is imposed on the contracting authority consists 
« in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the services 
market to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed »37. 
 
To that purpose, the Directives set up some rules on advertising and transparency (e.g. publication of notices, 
information obligations, etc.), as well as some rules on the conduct of the award procedure (choice of the 
participants, selection criteria of the candidates, etc.). 
 
Regarding the application of these Directives to Social Services, it must be bore in mind that the definition of a 
public contract is the following one: “contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing between one or more 
economic operators and one or more contracting authorities and having as their object the execution of works, 
the supply of products or the provision of services within the meaning of this Directive”38.  
 
Pursuant to settled case-law, the pecuniary nature of the contract means that “the contracting authority which has 
concluded a public (…) contract receives a service pursuant to that contract in return for consideration”39. In a 
more recent case, the Court explains that such a service “must be of direct economic benefit to the contracting 
authority”40. This is not the case when a public authority is exercising some regulatory powers (e.g. urban 
planning powers), insofar as it is not the purpose of such an exercise, “intended to give effect to the public 
interest, to obtain a contractual service or immediate economic benefit for the contracting authority”41. 
 
Anyway, the concept of public contract may cover the provision of some social services, as it is confirmed by 
Annex II attached to the Directive 2004/18/EC (which lists the services covered by the notion of public service 
contracts): item 25 of this Annex is explicitly related to “Health and Social Services”.  
 
However, two elements must be taken into consideration: first, the provision of some social services may be 
excluded from the scope of the Directive 2004/18/EC (B.1.1°); secondly, within the scope of application of the 
Directive 2004/18/EC social services benefit from a special regime (B.1.2°). 
 
B.1.1° - Exclusion from the scope of application of Directive 2004/18/EC 
 
Two categories of exceptions must be distinguished, depending on their source, either from the Directive itself 
(i) or from case-law (ii). However, exclusion from the Directive does not mean in all circumstances exclusion 
                                                            
35 See first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU: “Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice 
to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited”. 
36 See Case C-275/98 Unitron Scandinavia and 3-S [1999] ECR I-8291, paragraph 31. 
37 See Case C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH [2000] ECR I-745, paragraph 62. 
38 See Article 1.2 (a) of the Directive 2004/18/EC, hereafter “the Directive”. 
39 See Case C-399/98 Ordine degli Architetti and Others [2001] ECR I-5409, paragraph 77, and Case C-
220/05 Auroux and Others [2007] ECR I-385, paragraph 45. 
40 See Case C-451/08 Helmut Müller [2010] ECR I-2773, paragraph 49. 




from the field of application of the EU general rules and in particular of the Treaty principles of transparency and 
non-discrimination (iii). 
 
(i) Legislative exclusions 
 
The Directive sets up two categories of exclusions by imposing thresholds amounts to be applicable and by 
explicitly excluding some public contracts from its scope of application. 
 
 Thresholds amounts for public contracts 
 
Pursuant to Article 7 of the Directive, only public contracts which have a value exclusive of value-added tax 
(VAT) estimated to be equal to or greater than specific thresholds must be awarded in accordance with the rules 
set up by the Directive. Concerning the provision of services, these thresholds are the following ones, as from 1st 
January 201242: 
 
- EUR 130 000, for service contracts awarded by contracting authorities considered as central 
government authorities (see Annex IV of the Directive); 
 
- EUR 200 000, for service contracts awarded by contracting authorities other than those considered as 
central government authorities, i.e. local or regional authorities. 
 
The Proposal Reform of Directive 2004/18/EC will not change the principle of the thresholds, as well as the 
rules governing mixed procurement (i.e. contracts consisting of services and/or supplies and/or works) and the 
methods for calculating the estimated value of procurement43. 
 
However, it will introduce a new threshold of EUR 500 000 for public contracts for social and other specific 
services. These services are listed in Annex XVI of the proposal directive and their scope will be more explicitly 
named by comparison with the current Annex II B of the Directive 2004/18/EC which refers to “other services” 
(see also infra, regarding the specific regime for social services):  the annex lists not only « Health and social 
services », but also « Administrative educational, healthcare and cultural services », « Compulsory social 
security services » and « Benefit services »44. 
 
Regarding the proposal for a directive on the award of concession contracts, the threshold would be EUR 5 000 00045. 
 
 Excluded contracts 
 
Section 3 of the Directive provide for some excluded contracts from its scope of application. Regarding social 
services, one may pay attention to the following exclusions: 
 
                                                            
42 See Regulation (EU) N°1251/2011 of the Commission of 30 November 2011, OJ L 319, 2.12.2011, pp. 43-44. 
43 See Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the proposal COM(2011)896. 
44 See also Annex X of the proposal of directive on the award of concession contracts. 




- Employment contracts46. Such an exclusion is maintained by the proposal for a new public 
procurement directive47. 
 
- Service concessions48: i.e. contracts of the same type as a public service contracts “except for the fact that 
the consideration for the provision of services consists either solely in the right to exploit the service or in 
this right together with payment”49. This legislative definition has been completed by case-law. The Court 
held that “the fact that the supplier does not receive consideration directly from the contracting authority, 
but is entitled to collect payment under private law from third parties, is sufficient for that contract to be 
categorized as a ‘service concession’ (…) where the supplier assumes all, or at least a significant share, of 
the operating risk faced by the contracting authority, even if that risk is, from the outset, very limited on 
account of the detailed rules of public law governing that service”50. 
 
This specific exclusion is currently under revision with a proposal to set up a specific directive on the award of 
concessions, with the view to integrate and consolidate the current case-law. Under the new text, a ‘service 
concession’ would be defined as “a contract for pecuniary interest concluded in writing between one or more 
economic operators and one or more contracting authorities or contracting entities and having as their object 
the provision of services (…) where the consideration for the services to be provided consists either solely in the 
right to exploit the services that are subject of the contract or in that right together with payment”51. 
 
The proposal gives also more precision on the notion of “right to exploit the services”, by explaining that it 
“shall imply the transfer to the concessionaire of the substantial operating risk” and that “the concessionaire shall 
be deemed to assume the substantial operating risk where it is not guaranteed to recoup the investments made or 
the costs incurred in operating the works or the services which are the subject-matter of the concession”52. That 
economic risk may consist in either of the risk related to the use of the works or the demand for the provision of 
the service or the risk related to the availability of the infrastructure provided by the concessionaire or used for 
the provision of services to users. 
 
Consequently, the service concession contract would not be an exception in itself anymore. However, it will be 
submitted to a specific regime, different and more flexible that the current regime for the other public contracts, 
notably in terms of publications and transparency and of conduct of the procedure to choose the participants and 
to award the contract (see also infra, on the specific regime for social services). 
 
- Service contracts awarded on the basis of an exclusive right53: the Directive shall not apply to public 
service contracts awarded by a contracting authority to another contracting authority or to an association 
of contracting authorities on the basis of an exclusive right which they enjoy pursuant to a published 
law, regulation or administrative provision which is compatible with the Treaty54. Pursuant to Directive 
                                                            
46 See Article 16(e) of the Directive. 
47 See Article 10(e) of the proposal COM(2011)896. 
48 See Article 17 of the Directive. 
49 See definition given by Article 1.4 of the Directive. 
50 See Case C-206/08 Eurawasser [2009] ECR I-8377, paragraph 80. 
51 See Article 2.1 (7) of the proposal COM(2011)897. 
52 See Article 2.2 of the proposal COM(2011)897. 
53 See Article 18 of the Directive. 
54 See also the non-discrimination clause stated by Article 3 of the Directive: “Where a contracting authority 
grants special or exclusive rights to carry out a public service activity to an entity other than such a contracting 





2004/17/EC (i.e. the Utilities Directive), exclusive rights mean “rights which arise from a grant made 
by the competent authorities of a Member State by way of any legislative, regulatory or administrative 
provision the effect of which is to limit the exercise of activities (…) to one (…) entit(y), and which 
substantially affects the ability of other undertakings to carry out such activity on the same territory 
under substantially equivalent conditions”55. 
 
In addition to these excluded contracts, attention must be paid also to what the Directive calls the reserved 
contracts. Article 19 states that “Member States may reserve the right to participate in public contract award 
procedures to sheltered workshops or provide for such contracts to be performed in the context of sheltered 
employment programs where most of the employees concerned are handicapped persons who, by reason of the 
nature or the seriousness of their disabilities, cannot carry on occupations under normal conditions”. Such a 
special arrangement may be potentially often used to provide social services and would be extended by the 
reform of the directives56  to “economic operators whose main aim is the social and professional integration of 
disabled and disadvantaged workers”. Besides, the share of disabled or disadvantaged workers in those 
workshops, economic operators or programmes, will be reduced to more than 30% (instead of 50%, i.e. “most 
of”). A similar provision will be introduced in the new directive on the award of concession contracts57. 
  
(ii) Case-law exclusions  
 
The ECJ case-law has developed two main exclusions: in-house situations and horizontal cooperation. 
 
 In-house situation: 
In-house situations are excluded from the scope of application of the Directive insofar as there is no contract, i.e. 
no agreement between two separate persons. According to settled case-law, this is the case where two conditions 
are met, i.e. where the local or public authority exercises over the person concerned “a control which is similar 
to that which it exercises over its own departments [= first condition] and, at the same time, that person carries 
out the essential part of its activities with the controlling local authority or authorities [= second condition]”58. 
 
Regarding the first condition, relating to the control, the Court held that “where a number of public authorities 
own a concessionaire to which they entrust the performance of one of their public service tasks, the control 
which those public authorities exercise over that entity may be exercised jointly”59. 
 
Regarding the second condition relating to the essential part of the entity’s activities, it may be met if account is 
taken of the activities which that entity carries out with all the authorities which control it60. The Court has 
recently given more precision holding that “where, in their capacity as contracting authority, a number of public 
authorities jointly establish an entity with responsibility for carrying out their public service mission, or where a 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
awards to third parties as part of its activities, the entity concerned must comply with the principle of non- 
discrimination on the basis of nationality”. 
55 See Article 2(3) of Directive 2004/17/EC. 
56 See Article 17 of the proposal COM(2011)896. 
57 See Article 20 of the proposal COM(2011)897. 
58 See the leading case: Case C-107/98 Teckal [1999] ECR I-8121, paragraph 50. 
59 See Case C-324/07, Coditel Brabant SA [2008] ECR I-8457, paragraph 50. 
60 See, Case C-340/04 Carbotermo and Consorzio Alisei [2006] ECR I-4137, paragraphs 70 and 71, and Case C-




public authority subscribes to such an entity, the condition established by the case-law of the Court to the effect 
that, in order to be exempted from their obligation to initiate a public tendering procedure in accordance with the 
rules of EU law, those authorities must jointly exercise over that entity control similar to the control they 
exercise over their own departments, is fulfilled where each of those authorities not only holds capital in that 
entity, but also plays a role in its managing bodies”61. 
 
However, “where a contracting authority intends to conclude a contract for pecuniary interest relating to services 
(…) with a company legally distinct from it, in whose capital it has a holding together with one or more private 
undertakings, the public award procedures laid down by [the] directive must always be applied”62. 
 
The main reason for such a restrictive interpretation prohibiting any private participation to the capital to 
consider an in-house situation is that, in the Court's opinion, the relationship between a public authority which is 
a contracting authority and its own departments “is governed by considerations and requirements proper to the 
pursuit of objectives in the public interest”, while any private capital investment in an undertaking “follows 
considerations proper to private interests and pursues objectives of a different kind”63. 
 
In order to take into consideration such case-law derogation, the on-going reform of the Public contracts 
directives is intended to introduce a specific provision related to in-house situation, both in the current 2004 
Directives and in the proposal for a directive on the award of contract concession. The texts proposed by the 
Commission will go a little bit further than the current case-law conditions by being more precise on the second 
condition related to the essential part of activities carried out and by consolidating as a third condition the 
absence of private participation, as follows (we underline)64: 
 
“Article 11 – Relations between public authorities 
 
“1. A contract awarded by a contracting authority to another legal person shall fall outside the 
scope of this Directive where the following cumulative conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) the contracting authority exercises over the legal person concerned a control which is 
similar to that which it exercises over its own departments. 
(b) at least 90 % of the activities of that legal person are carried out for the controlling 
contracting authority or for other legal persons controlled by that contracting authority; 
(c) there is no private participation in the controlled legal person. 
A contracting authority shall be deemed to exercise over a legal person a control similar to that 
which it exercises over its own departments within the meaning of point (a) of the first 
subparagraph where it exercises a decisive influence over both strategic objectives and 
significant decisions of the controlled legal person. 
2. Paragraph 1 also applies where a controlled entity which is a contracting authority awards a 
contract to its controlling entity, or to another legal person controlled by the same contracting 
authority, provided that there is no private participation in the legal person being awarded the 
public contract. 
3. A contracting authority, which does not exercise over a legal person control within the 
meaning of paragraph 1, may nevertheless award a public contract without applying this 
Directive to a legal person which it controls jointly with other contracting authorities, where 
the following conditions are fulfilled: 
                                                            
61 See ECJ judgement of 29 November 2012 in Joined Cases C-182/11 and C-183/11, Econord SpA, not yet 
published, paragraph 33. 
62 See Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle [2005] ECR I- 1, paragraph 52. 
63 Ibidem, paragraph 50. 
64 The directive on the award of concession contracts would include the same provision: see Article 15.1 to 15.3 




(a) the contracting authorities exercise jointly over the legal person a control which is similar 
to that which they exercise over their own departments; 
(b) at least 90 % of the activities of that legal person are carried out for the controlling 
contracting authorities or other legal persons controlled by the same contracting 
authorities; 
(c)  there is no private participation in the controlled legal person. 
 For the purposes of point (a), contracting authorities shall be deemed to jointly control a 
legal person where the following cumulative conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) the decision-making bodies of the controlled legal person are composed of representatives 
of all participating contracting authorities; 
(b) those contracting authorities are able to jointly exert decisive influence over the strategic 
objectives and significant decisions of the controlled legal person; 
(c) the controlled legal person does not pursue any interests which are distinct from that of the 
public authorities affiliated to it; 
(d) the controlled legal person does not draw any gains other than the reimbursement of actual 
costs from the public contracts with the contracting authorities.” 
 
It should be noted that the third condition related to the absence of private participation in the controlled person 
may be discussed, considering the fact that case-law is focusing on relations between such a controlled person and a 
“contracting authority”, not solely a public authority as expressed in the title of Article 1165. Consequently, in our 
opinion, a private company eligible to the qualification of “contracting authority” may benefit from the in-house 
exception. This would be the case, for example, for private companies providing social housing services, in 
accordance with ECJ case-law66.  
 
Hence, the condition related to the absence of private participation might not be applicable to such situations, in 
order to comply both with the general principle of equal treatment between public and private undertakings (see 
Article 106§1 TFEU)67 and with the EU rule of neutrality regarding the system of property ownership (see 
Article 345 TFEU)68. 
 
 Horizontal cooperation: 
Considering that “a public authority has the possibility of performing the public interest tasks conferred on it by 
using its own administrative, technical and other resources, without being obliged to call on outside entities not 
forming part of its own departments”69 and that such a possibility for public authorities to use their own 
resources to perform the public interest tasks conferred on them “may be exercised in cooperation with other 
public authorities”70, the Court held that a contract is excluded from the scope of the Directive where it may be 
analyzed as “the culmination of a process of inter-municipal cooperation between the parties” and that it contains 
requirements to ensure that the public service task is carried out71 and where the contract in question was 
                                                            
65 See Recital N°14 of the proposal COM (2011) 896 : « There is considerable legal uncertainty as to how far 
cooperation between public authorities should be covered by public procurement rules. The relevant case-law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union is interpreted divergently between Member States and even between 
contracting authorities. It is therefore necessary to clarify in what cases contracts concluded between 
contracting authorities are not subject to the application of public procurement rules (…)”. 
66 See Case C-237/99 Commission v. France [2001] ECR I-939, paragraph 60. 
67 See infra, in section II on competition rules. 
68 Article 345 TFEU: « The Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system 
of property ownership”. On this provision: AKKERMANS and RAMAEKERS, “Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 
295 EC), Its Meanings and Interpretations”, in European Law Journal, Issue 3, 2010, pp. 292-314. 
69 See Case Stadt Halle, paragraph 48. 
70 See Case C-295/05 Asemfo [2007] ECR I-2999, paragraph 65. 




concluded “solely by public authorities, without the participation of any private party, and does not provide for 
or prejudice the award of any contracts” that may be necessary in respect of the performance of the public 
service task72. 
 
More recently, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ confirmed that “European Union public procurement law 
precludes national legislation which authorizes the conclusion, without an invitation to tender, of a contract by 
which public entities establish cooperation among each other where – this being for the referring court to 
establish – the purpose of such a contract is not to ensure that a public task that those entities all have to perform 
is carried out, where that contract is not governed solely by considerations and requirements relating to the 
pursuit of objectives in the public interest or where it is such as to place a private provider of services in a 
position of advantage vis-à-vis his competitors”73. 
 
Even though such exclusion is based only on two rulings from the ECJ, in order to enhance legal certainty the 
Commission has proposed to integrate and consolidate it in its reform of the public contracts directives of 
December 201174, as follows: 
 
“Article 11 – Relations between public authorities 
(…) 
“4. An agreement concluded between two or more contracting authorities shall not be deemed 
to be a public contract within the meaning of Article 2(6) of this Directive where the following 
cumulative conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) the agreement establishes a genuine cooperation between the participating contracting 
authorities aimed at carrying out jointly their public service tasks and involving mutual 
rights and obligations of the parties; 
(b) the agreement is governed only by considerations relating to the public interest; 
(c) the participating contracting authorities do not perform on the open market more than 10 % 
in terms of turnover of the activities which are relevant in the context of the agreement; 
(d) the agreement does not involve financial transfers between the participating contracting 
authorities, other than those corresponding to the reimbursement of actual costs of the 
works, services or supplies; 




The same debate may take place as for the in-house exception regarding the possibility for a private company to 
be qualified as “contracting authority”, i.e. to benefit from this new exception on horizontal public service 
cooperation. 
 
(iii) Consistent application of the EU general rules 
 
Exclusion provided for by the Directive or by the Court does not mean exclusion from all EU rules. It is 
consistent case-law that the award of public contracts outside the scope of the Directive is to remain subject to 
                                                            
72 Ibidem, paragraph 44. 
73 See ECJ judgement of 19 December 2012, in Case C-159/11, Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Lecce a.o., not yet 
published, paragraph 40. 




the fundamental rules of EU law, and in particular to the principles laid down by the Treaty on the right of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services75. 
 
However, a distinction has to be made, depending on the source of exclusion. 
 
Regarding the case-law exclusions, the Court seems to impose to public authorities to comply with the principle 
of equality of treatment: in its Hambourg case, the Court insisted on the fact that “cooperation between public 
authorities does not undermine the principal objective of the Community rules on public procurement, that is, 
the free movement of services and the opening-up of undistorted competition in all the Member States, where 
implementation of that cooperation is governed solely by considerations and requirements relating to the pursuit 
of objectives in the public interest and the principle of equal treatment of the persons concerned (…) is 
respected, so that no private undertaking is placed in a position of advantage vis-à-vis competitors”76. The issue 
is not so clear concerning the in-house exclusion. However, we do consider that such an exception is the 
consequence of the interpretation of the notion of contract, within the scope of the Directives and so is to be 
submitted, at least, to the same regime than that of exclusions provided for by the Directives themselves. 
 
Regarding these exclusions, the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination on the ground of 
nationality and the consequent obligation of transparency are applicable only in the event that the contracts are 
“of certain cross-border interest”77, i.e. where these contracts were of certain interest to an undertaking located 
in a different Member State to that of the relevant contracting authority, and that that undertaking was unable to 
express its interest in that contract because it did not have access to adequate information before the contract was 
awarded78. 
 
As explained by the SGEI Guide, such situations may correspond to contracts with a very modest value for the 
provision of social services on a specific market segment where it is unlikely that economic operators from other 
Member States will be potentially interested in providing the services in question79. 
 
It seems that this de minimis approach has inspired the proposal for a new directive on public contracts and the 
introduction of the EUR 500 000 threshold for social services, as referred to above. Indeed, the Commission 
refers to a kind of presumption of absence of cross-border interest under such a threshold, as explained as 
follows (we underline): 
 
“The evaluation on the impact and effectiveness of EU public procurement legislation has shown that 
social, health and education services have specific characteristics which make them inappropriate for 
the application of the regular procedures for the award of public service contracts. These services are 
typically provided within a specific context that varies widely between Member States due to different 
administrative, organizational and cultural circumstances. The services have, by their very nature, only 
a very limited cross-border dimension. Member States should therefore have large discretion to 
organize the choice of service providers. The proposal takes account of this by providing a specific 
regime for public contracts for these services, with a higher threshold of EUR 500 000 and imposing 
only the respect of basic principles of transparency and equal treatment. A quantitative analysis of the 
                                                            
75 See Case C-92/00 HI [2002] ECR I-5553, paragraph 42. 
76 See Case C-480/06, op. cit., paragraph 47. 
77 See Case C-507/03 Commission v. Ireland [2007] ECR I- 9777, paragraph 29. 
78 Ibidem, paragraph 32. 




values of contracts for the relevant services awarded to economic operators from abroad has shown 
that contracts below this value have typically no cross-border interest” 80. 
 
One may assume that such consideration justify also the special regime awarded to social services both under the 
current directives and under the proposals to reform them81. 
 
B.1.2° - Special regime for social services under Directive 2004/18/EC 
Pursuant to Article 21 of the Directive 2004/18/EC, contracts which have as their object services listed in Annex 
II B, as for social services, are not subject to all the rules provided for by the Directive82. Indeed, they shall be 
subject solely to the specific rules governing technical specifications83 and to the obligation for the contracting 
authorities which have awarded a public contract to send a notice of the results of the award procedure no later 
than 48 days after the award of the contract84. On top of those requirements the Treaty principles of equal 
treatment and of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality and the consequent obligation of transparency 
must be complied with. 
 
The reform of the public procurement directives will confirm this specific regime for social services both in the 
new framework directive on public procurement85 and in the new directive on the award of concession 
contracts86. 
 
The reasons for such a specific treatment are clearly exposed in Recital 11 of the proposal for a directive on 
public procurement as follows (we underline): 
 
“Other categories of services continue by their very nature to have a limited crossborder dimension, 
namely what are known as services to the person, such as certain social, health and educational 
services. These services are provided within a particular context that varies widely amongst Member 
States, due to different cultural traditions. A specific regime should therefore be established for public 
contracts for these services, with a higher threshold of EUR 500 000. Services to the person with values 
below this threshold will typically not be of interest to providers from other Member States, unless there 
are concrete indications to the contrary, such as Union financing for transborder projects. Contracts 
for services to the person above this threshold should be subject to Union-wide transparency. Given the 
importance of the cultural context and the sensitivity of these services, Member States should be given 
wide discretion to organise the choice of the service providers in the way they consider most 
appropriate. The rules of this directive take account of that imperative, imposing only observance of 
basic principles of transparency and equal treatment and making sure that contracting authorities are 
able to apply specific quality criteria for the choice of service providers, such as the criteria set out in 
the voluntary European Quality Framework for Social Services of the European Union's Social 
Protection Committee17. Member States and/or public authorities remain free to provide these services 
themselves or to organise social services in a way that does not entail the conclusion of public 
contracts, for example through the mere financing of such services or by granting licences or 
authorisations to all economic operators meeting the conditions established beforehand by the 
contracting authority, without any limits or quotas, provided such a system ensures sufficient 
advertising and complies with the principles of transparency and non-discrimination”. 
 
                                                            
80 See Section 5(2) of the Explanatory Memorandum and Recital (11) of COM (2011) 896. 
81 See infra by reference to Recital 11 of the proposal for a directive on public procurement. 
82 See SGEI Guide, under questions 4.2.4 to 4.2.6, 4.2.8 to 4.2.11, 4.2.13 to 4.2.15, and 4.2.17. 
83 See Article 23 of the Directive. 
84 See Article 35(4) of the Directive. 
85 See Articles 74 to 76 of the proposal COM (2011) 896. 




Consequently, the reform insists on the “specificities” of the social services to be taken into account by the 
contracting authorities. It’s why Member States will be imposed to “ensure that contracting authorities may take 
into account the need to ensure quality, continuity, accessibility, availability and comprehensiveness of the 
services, the specific needs of different categories of users, the involvement and empowerment of users and 
innovation”87. 
 
Moreover, Member States will be invited to consider the possibility to provide “that the choice of the service 
provider shall not be made solely on the basis of the price for the provision of the service”88. This latter 
provision is echoing the invitation made by the EU Council in its conclusions on SSGI of December 2010, 
asking to the Commission “to clarify and to provide more information on (…) the use of the contract award 
criterion of the most economically advantageous tender instead of the lowest price for the award of social 
services contracts, when public procurement procedures are organized for supplying social services of general 
interest”89. 
 
B.2. The Services’ Directive and Social Services 
 
Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the 
internal market (hereafter “the Services Directive”)90 has been adopted in order to “facilitate the exercise of the 
freedom of establishment for service providers and the free movement of services, while maintaining a high 
quality of services”91, both by consolidating and integrating ECJ case-law, notably the three-tier test of non-
discrimination, necessity and proportionality for any national measure related to access and/or exercise of an 
activity service92 and by imposing to Member States administrative simplification (e.g. points of single contacts) 
and cooperation (e.g. mutual assistance  and alert mechanism) as well as an efficient policy on quality of 
services93. 
 
Regarding the necessity test, the Services Directive confirms that the need for an authorization scheme94, which 
is potentially a restriction to right of establishment, must be justified by an overriding reason relating to the 
public interest95, including preserving the financial equilibrium of the social security system; the protection of 
consumers, recipients of services and workers; combating fraud (including social fraud) and, more broadly 
speaking, “social policy objectives”96. 
 
Regarding the scope of application, the Services Directive shall not apply to a different string of activities, 
notably to “non-economic services of general interest” (NESGI)97 and to “social services relating to social 
housing, childcare and support of families and persons permanently or temporarily in need which are provided 
by the State, by providers mandated by the State or by charities recognized as such by the State”98. 
                                                            
87 See Article 76.1 of the proposal COM (2011) 896. 
88 See Article 76.2 of the proposal COM (2011) 896. 
89 See Point 3(a) of the Annex related to Paragraph 25 of the ESPCO Conclusions of 6/7 December 2010 on 
“Social Services of General Interest: at the heart of the European Social Model”. 
90 OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36–68. 
91 See Article 1.1 of the Services Directive. 
92 See Chapters III and IV of the Services Directive. 
93 See Chapters II, V and VI of the Services Directive. 
94 See SGEI Guide under question 7.3. 
95 See Article 9.1(b) of the Services Directive. 
96 See Article 4(8) of the Services Directive. 
97 See Article 2.2 (a) of the Services Directive. 




Concerning the exclusion of NESGI, one may refer to the above developments on the concept of economic 
activity, and the potential application of this exclusion to some social services. Should a social service may be 
qualified of SGEI, the Services Directive shall not affect how such a SGEI is defined, organized and financed99. 
 
Concerning the specific exclusion of three categories of social services, one may refer to the Handbook on the 
implementation of the Services Directive, published in 2007 by DG Internal Market of the European 
Commission. It stems from this Handbook, the following precisions: 
 
- The notion of “charities recognised as such by the State” includes churches and church organizations 
which serve charitable and benevolent purposes. In our opinion, this category may be an open one, not 
necessarily limited to church entities, in so far as other organizations may also pursue charitable 
activities in the social field100. 
 
- The social services referred to in Article 2.2 (j) are not excluded if they are provided by other types of 
providers, for example private operators acting without a mandate from the State. For instance childcare 
which is provided by private nannies or other childcare services (such as summer camps) provided by 
private operators are not excluded from the scope of application of the Services Directive101. 
 
- Social services relating to the support of families and persons who are permanently or temporarily in a 
state of need because of their insufficient family income or total or partial lack of independence and for 
those who risk being marginalized, such as services concerning care for elderly people or services to the 
unemployed, are excluded from the scope of application of the Services Directive only to the extent that 
they are provided by any of the providers mentioned above (i.e. the State itself, providers mandated by 
the State or charities recognized as such by the State). Thus, for instance, private household support 
services are services not excluded from the Services Directive and have to be covered by the 
implementing measures. 
 
Besides, it is important to stress that should some social services be excluded from the scope of the Services 
Directive, the general EU Treaties rules are still applicable to them (except for those social services qualified as 
non-economic activities), notably the general principle of non-discrimination and the principles of free 
movement and free competition102. It’s why, for instance, equality of treatment implies that public contracts 
cannot be reserved for specific categories of undertaking, such as non-profit organizations, regardless of the type 
of services involved, including social services103. 
 
However, it stems from case-law that “a Member State may, in the exercise of the powers it retains to organize 
its social security system, consider that a social welfare system (…) necessarily implies, with a view to attaining 
its objectives, that the admission of private operators to that system as providers of social welfare services is to 
be made subject to the condition that they are non-profit-making” 104. Moreover, the Court held that “the fact 
that it is impossible for profit-making companies automatically to participate in the running of a statutory social 
welfare system of a Member State by concluding a contract which entitles them to be reimbursed by the public 
authorities for the costs of providing social welfare services of a health-care nature is not liable to place profit-
                                                            
99 See Article 1.3 of the Services Directive. 
100 See also supporting this opinion: answer given to question 7.10 in the SGEI Guide. 
101 See question 7.10 in the SGEI Guide. 
102 See question 6.4 of the SGEI Guide. 
103 See questions 4.2.10 and 6.6 of the SGEI Guide. 




making companies from other Member States in a less favorable factual or legal situation than profit-making 
companies in the Member State in which they are established”105. 
 
Last, but not least, special attention must be paid to Article 17(1) of the Services Directive which states that 
Article 16 relating to freedom to provide services and to the three-tier test of non-discrimination, necessity and 
proportionality, does not apply to SGEI which are provided in another Member State, 
 
II – Competition rules and Social Services 
 
Protocol N°27 on the Internal Market and Competition, as annexed both to the TEU and the TFEU, explains that 
“the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union includes a system ensuring that 
competition is not distorted”. 
 
Consequently, Article 119 TFEU provides that: “For the purposes set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, the activities of the Member States and the Union shall include, as provided in the Treaties, the adoption 
of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the 
internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of 
an open market economy with free competition” (we underline). 
 
To ensure that competition within the Internal Market is not subjected to distortion, prohibitions were stipulated 
for both undertakings and Member States (A). Those prohibitions require to defining a certain number of 
concepts, which find specific application within the area of social services (B). 
 
For the purpose of the present Report, it must be noted that Article 106 paragraph 1 TFEU states that:  
 
“In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive 
rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules 
contained in the Treaties, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109.” 
 
This paragraph tends to weaken the difference that could be made between public and private undertakings. 
Indeed, it states that provisions related to competition (namely articles 101 to 109 TFEU) apply to the latest and 
so does article 18 TFEU which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Such provision was 
designed to avoid temptation by the Member States to circumvent competition rules via public undertakings. 
 
A. Prohibitions under Competition rules 
 
Prohibitions for undertakings shall be distinguished from prohibitions related to State Aids. 
 
A1. Prohibitions for Undertakings (articles 101 and 102 TFEU) 
 
                                                            




As far as undertakings are concerned (see infra, about the concept), pursuant to articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 
certain forms of collusive or coordinated conducts between undertakings are deemed incompatible with the 
internal market and so is the abuse of a dominant position in a market. 
 
 Article 101 TFEU, paragraphs 1 and 2 read as follows:  
 
“1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may 
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.” 
 
Then, pursuant to article 101 TFEU, such collusive conduct necessarily implies two or more undertakings. 
 
There are three main criterion to be met: 
 
 1/ A specific conduct or practice: three categories of conducts or practices between 
undertakings may be concerned:  
 
 Agreements between undertakings, defined as: “a concurrence of wills between at 
least two parties, the form in which it is manifested being unimportant so long as it 
constitutes the faithful expression of the parties’ intention”106. Such agreements may 
be concluded formally, orally or be tacit and may be vertical (i.e. between different 
levels of the chain of production) or horizontal. 
 
 Decisions by associations of undertakings, i.e. collective or representative bodies, 
such as trade associations. 
 
 Concerted practices, which are the most difficult conducts to prove since it is defined 
as any “form of co-ordination between undertakings which, without having reached 
the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly 
substitutes practical co-operation between them for the risks of competition”107. 
However, it does not include mere exchange of information. 
 
Article 101 TFEU gives a certain number of examples of prohibited effects but the list is not exhaustive.  
 
 2/ Such conducts must affect trade between Member States: The effect may be actual or even 
potential. The former must be foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of 
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objective factors108. Moreover, this condition does not exclude agreements of undertakings in 
on Member State as long as they reinforce the compartmentalization of the market, where the 
market is susceptible to imports or where the market is incorporated in a broader one which is 
subject to inter-State trade. Finally, the effect must be appreciable. 
 
 3/ The object or the effect of such conducts must amount to prevent, restrict or distort 
competition: The object only concerns the aim pursued by the agreement. The effect of such 
conducts is appreciated by the “de minimis” rule109. Article 101 (1) TFEU does not apply if (a) 
in case of horizontal agreements, the threshold of 10% of aggregate market share owned by the 
concerned undertakings is not reached and (b) in case of vertical agreements, the threshold of 
15% of aggregate market share owned by the concerned undertakings is not reached.   
 
Article 101 TFEU also provides for the sanction of agreements or decisions which are deemed to be void. 
 
Eventually, this prohibition knows exceptions which can take the form of an individual exemption or a block 
exemption. The former is assessed on a case-by-case basis by the Commission. The latter is granted by 
regulations from the Council or the Commission for certain groups of agreements within some specific areas110.   
 
 Article 102 TFEU is related to abuse of dominant position. This provision provides that:  
 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may 
affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
 
There are three decisive elements as to whether article 102 TFEU is applicable: 
 
 There must be a dominant position: such a position is appreciated regarding the power of the 
undertaking in the relevant market. The latter is a necessary precondition111 for an alleged abuse. 
 
 
 The relevant market may be defined in terms of products and/or geography and/or time: 
  
                                                            
108 ECJ, 13 July 2006, Manfredi, joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, ECR I-6619. 
109 See Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 
81(1) [EC] (de minimis), in OJ 2001 C 368, p. 13. However, as the ECJ held recently, such a notice is of non-binding nature, 
for both the competition authorities and the courts of the Member States: see judgement of 13 December 2012, in Case C-
226/11, Expedia Inc., not yet published, paragraph 24. 
110 E.g. Research and development (Regulation 1217/2010/EU), Technology transfer (Regulation 772/2004/EC), Insurance 
(Regulation 267/2010/EU)... 




- The product market is defined with regard to the substitutability of demand and 
supply. For instance, it will be taken into account cans for different sectors of the 
market instead of only cans for fish and meat112 or only bananas instead of bananas 
and other table fruits113. 
 
- Geographically speaking, the market must be an area within the internal market where 
the product is marketed and where the conditions of competition are sufficiently 
homogeneous for the effect of the economic power of the undertaking to be evaluated. 
  
- Finally, the temporal market condition applies to certain products whose production is 
limited in time (e.g. the selling period of the World Cup football tickets114). 
 
 The dominance of the undertaking in this market: the ECJ defined it as: “a position of 
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition 
being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers.”115 
Various factors are taken into account to determine whether such a dominance exists: financial 
resources of the undertaking, technical and commercial advantages (e.g. IP rights, well-known 
brand name), barriers making it difficult to enter the market… But the most relevant factor is 
the relative market shares held by the undertaking: this factor leads to a rebuttable presumption 
of dominance if the concerned undertaking owns more than 50% of the market shares. If this 
threshold is not reached, the other abovementioned factors may be used to determine the 
dominance. 
 
 The dominant position must be abused: Dominance itself is not prohibited by EU law but such a 
position carries an obligation of responsibility for the concerned undertaking not to distort competition 
in the internal market116. The abuse is defined as follows by the ECJ: “An objective concept relating to 
the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of the 
market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition 
is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal 
competition in products or services on the basis of transactions of commercial operators, has the effect 
of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of 
that competition.”117 Two main categories of blameworthy conducts under EU law can be drawn: 
exploitative abuses (unfair conditions on consumers) and exclusionary abuses (exclusion of 
competitors). 
 
 The abuse of the dominant position must affect trade between Member States: this condition is 
appreciated similarly as it is within the scope of article 101 TFEU (cf. supra). 
 
Eventually, contrary to article 101 TFEU, the prohibition provided by article 102 TFEU is absolute. There is no 
exemption procedure. However, objective justifications may prevent the conduct from being said abusive. 
Therefore, there is an abuse only when there is no objective commercial, industrial or organizational reason for 
the concerned undertaking to behave this way. 
                                                            
112 ECJ, 21 February 1973, Continental Can, 6-72, ECR 215. 
113 ECJ, 14 February 1978, United brands, 27/76, ECR 207. 
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115 ECJ, 13 February 1979, Hoffmann-Laroche, 85/76, ECR 461. 
116 ECJ, 9 November 1983, Michelin, 322/81, ECR 3461. 





In order to prevent situations likely to be considered as abuse of dominant position, the EU legislature has 
adopted some rules to controlling concentrations between undertakings. This is the purpose of the Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 (“the EU Merger Regulation”, repealing a first set of rules 
dated of 1989)118. Any project of concentration (i.e. mergers, acquisitions and full-function joint ventures) with 
a certain EU dimension (i.e., combined aggregate world-wide turnover > EUR 5,000 million and aggregate EU-
wide turnover of each or at least two of the undertakings > EUR 250 million), must be notified to the 
Commission which will authorize it or not (under or not some conditions). 
 
At our knowledge, the EU Merger Regulation has never been applied to concentrations involving undertakings 
providing social services. 
 
A2. Prohibitions for Member States: the State Aid rules (articles 107 to 109 TFEU) 
 
We saw that articles 101 and 102 TFEU impose prohibitions to undertakings. However, they are not the only 
actors to be limited in their course of action. 
 
Indeed, Article 107§1 TFEU states a general incompatibility test on some State aid and reads as follows: 
  
“Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.” 
 
There are three decisive elements as to whether an action of a Member State falls within the scope of this 
provision: 
 
 The existence of a State aid: It is a very broad notion (see infra, §B2.) 
 This aid must affect trade between Member States. Therefore, aids that are only local or regional and 
have no cross-border effects are not caught. 
 This aid must distort or threaten to distort competition. This concept is interpreted widely. To assess 
whether there is a distortion, the ECJ compares the actual competitive environment with what would be 
the potential  competitive environment without the State intervention. 
 
These last two conditions are analysed by the Commission in order to show that the aid is liable to strengthen the 
position of its beneficiary compared to other undertakings operating in the same line of trade. However, in the 
area of State aid, this analysis is less thorough than in the area of articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 107 TFEU, paragraph 2 of article 106 TFEU (see infra) and article 93 TFEU 
(transport sector) provide for exceptions to this incompatibility test on State aid. The ECJ also provided 
exceptions (see infra, compensation for public service obligations and purely social activities) to the ban of State 
aid affecting the inter-Member States trade. 
   
                                                            




B. Concepts involved under Competition rules: what about Social Services? 
 
It appears that certain concepts are fundamental for the application of competition rules at the EU level. Those 
key concepts, such as “undertaking”, “economic activity” or “State aid”, are common to all those rules. Their 
definition is not given by the treaties but is supplemented by the case-law of the European Court of Justice or the 
decisions taken by the Commission. It must be bore in mind that those definitions are specific to the EU scheme 
and thus any national attempt to adopt their own concept is irrelevant. Besides, regarding the purpose of the 
present Report, it must be explained how these definitions are applied to Services of General Economic Interest 
(hereinafter, “SGEI”). 
 
B1. Concepts of ‘Undertaking’ and of ‘Economic Activity’ applied to Social Services 
 
The definition of the concept of “undertaking”, as settled by EU law, is fundamental insofar as it is used by 
articles 101, 102 and 107 TFEU.  
 
There is no definition of this concept within the Treaties. Then, the ECJ had to define it. Traditionally, an 
undertaking is “every entity engaged  in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status and the way in which 
it is financed.”119 Therefore, it can be said to be “functional and activity-related”120. 
 
Thus, under EU law, it appears that the concept of “economic activity” is also relevant since it is the criterion for 
defining an undertaking and thus the application of competition rules depends on it.  
 
The settled case-law’s definition of the concept of “economic activity” is also broad and functional. Such an 
activity must consist in offering goods or services on a given market121. In this respect too, any national 
definition is irrelevant122, the EU definition is an autonomous concept based on observations of real economic 
behaviour, regardless of any other qualification. It is an expression of the supremacy of EU law over national 
laws. The functional aspect of this definition leads to analyse every activity individually and independently from 
surrounding activities.  
 
As far as Member States are concerned, this criterion of “offering goods and services on a given market“ is 
similarly applied to their activities. Therefore, in the first place, it must be wondered whether the given activity 
falls within the State’s public remit (i.e. exercise of state prerogative such as police, army, public safety…). If it 
does not, then the criterion of offering goods or services on a market is applied. Since the case law does not 
require any particular legal form or independence, it is not relevant whether the body carrying the activity at 
stake has a legal personality or is separated from that of the State123. 
 
An intention to make a profit is not required. Therefore, charitable organizations can be considered as 
undertaking engaged in an economic activity under the EU definition, as well as individual persons carrying a 
professional activity. The Court has also held recently that whether or not an activity is economic in nature “does 
not depend on (…) the profitability of that activity”124. 
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It has been underlined125 that instead of giving the aforementioned positive definition of the concept of 
“economic activity”, it may have sometimes seemed easier to define it negatively, i.e. by excluding certain 
activities. Indeed, since the relevant criterion is to offer goods or services on a market, it results that the mere 
purchase of goods or services is not sufficient to amount to an “economic activity”. Therefore, the ECJ stated 
that the nature of the activity of purchasing shall be determined by the subsequent use of the goods purchased126. 
For instance, the purchase of goods solely for the purposes of private consumption does not amount to 
“economic activity”.  
 
As far as exclusions are concerned, the ECJ also excluded from the scope of the realm of “economic activity” 
activities having exclusively social objectives127. Indeed, the ECJ considered that services, such as sickness 
funds or social security systems, could not be said to undertake an economic activity. It did so with regard to 
certain criteria (see infra). Therefore, pursuant to the Höfner case definition of undertakings subject to articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, such social services were not caught by those provisions.  
 
The ECJ settled criteria in order to determine what activity has to be considered as exclusively social, and 
therefore as not of economic nature. Some criteria are considered as irrelevant in so far as they could be met by 
bodies carrying an “economic activity”. At best, they can be used as indications. Those are: 
  
- The non-profit objective128. 
- The gratuitousness of the goods or services offered. 
- The legal status of the entity engaged in the activity. 
- The compulsory characteristic of the activity. 
 
On the other hand, some criteria have been said to demonstrate the existence of an activity with exclusively 
social objectives. Those are:  
 
- The use of a redistributive methodology (principle of solidarity) rather than a profit 
methodology (principle of capitalization). In other words, the received benefits shall 
not be linked to the actual level of contributions129 or earnings. 
- The determination by law of the level of contributions and of the benefits.  
- The operators do not enter into competition with each other or with private 
institutions. 
- The affiliation to the scheme is compulsory130. 
- The scheme is supervised by the State131. 
 
These criteria were summed up within the “Communication from the Commission on the application of the 
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B2. Concept of State Aid 
 
We saw that State aid was prohibited insofar as it affects trade between Member States and is likely to distort 
competition. Under article 107, paragraph 1, TFEU, the concept of State aid involves: 
 
 An advantage in any form whatsoever given to an undertaking (see definition, supra): subsidies, grants, 
compensation for burdens imposed by the State or, on the contrary, provision of goods or services 
without adequate remuneration, foregoing the recovery of sums due to the State, preferential terms and 
tariffs, tax reductions, State guarantees, capital injections. However, the market economy investor 
principle means that there is no State aid if the State behaves under market conditions and terms, i.e. 
likewise a private investor. Furthermore, the de minimis rule also applies in this context and small 
amounts of aid (under EUR 200.000 over the course of three tax years) are excluded from the scope of 
article 107 TFEU133. 
 
 This advantage must be granted by a State or through State resources (the aid is a burden for the State): 
it can be granted directly or indirectly (through private or public bodies established by the State to 
administer the aid134). 
  
 It must be granted in a selective manner: There must be an advantage for the beneficiary of the aid, 
compared to the situation of undertakings under the same legal and factual conditions135. The relevant 
criterion, in this regard, is whether the aid is directed at supporting the entire economy indiscriminately 
or at supporting certain undertakings or even an entire industry. 
 
The interpretation of the selective advantage criterion has lead the Court to combine it with the application of 
Article 106, paragraph 2 TFEU where aids are granted to undertakings entrusted with the operation of SGEI (see, 
infra). To that regard, in its Altmark case, the ECJ ruled that compensation for public services obligations do not 
amount to State aid if four conditions are met136: 
 
o It is a genuine public service: the recipient undertaking is actually in charge of a public service and its 
obligations are clearly defined137. 
o The parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in 
an objective and transparent manner. 
o The amount of the compensation does not exceed what is actually necessary to cover the costs incurred 
by the public service obligations (a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations can be taken into 
account)138. 
o When the undertaking is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for 
the selection of the tenderer capable of providing the service at stake at the least cost to the community, 
the cost analysis to be carried in order to determine the level of compensation must demonstrate that a 
typical undertaking, well-run and adequately provided with the necessary means so as to be able to meet 
the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred the same costs 139. 
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The Altmark case reflects a significant change in the application of State aids’ rules to SGEI, by privileging a 
compensatory approach linked to the qualification of State aid itself. The traditional approach was based on the 
following reasoning: any subvention to an undertaking performing a SGEI is a State aid within the scope of 
Article 107 TFEU, but may be considered as compatible with the Internal Market should conditions of Article 
106.2 TFEU (see infra, as a general exception to EU rules) be met140. The new Altmark test identifies public 
service compensation which is not State aid. However, its four cumulative conditions are, in fact, often difficult 
to be met, notably the fourth condition, in absence of public procurement procedure to select the undertaking to 
be in charge of the SGEI. 
 
For this reason, the Commission has decided to adopt in November 2005 a set of rules often known as Altmark 
package (or Monti-Kroes Package) in order to identify and make secure situations where the fourth Altmark 
criterion is not met: in such circumstances, the public service compensation must be considered as a State aid 
but, should it fulfills the conditions set by the package, it is deemed to be compatible with the internal market. 
This set of rules was as follows: 
 
 A Commission decision141 based on article 86, paragraph 3, of the EC Treaty (now, article 106, 
paragraph 3, TFEU) that specifies the conditions under which State aid in the form of public 
service compensation is compatible with the internal market. The main aim was to ensure legal 
certainty for SGEI providers. The decision declared some SGEI compatible with the internal 
market and exempted from the obligation of prior notification to the Commission. These 
exemptions only concerned: 
 
- annual compensation below EUR 30 million for  undertakings with an average annual 
turnover of less  than EUR 100 million; 
- compensation for hospitals and social housing; 
- compensation for air or maritime links to islands; 
- compensation for airports and ports - average annual traffic not more than 1 million 
(airports) or 300 000 (ports) passengers. 
 
Moreover, some requirements were set out regarding the compensation granted by the State to the providers of 
SGEI: 
- operation of the SGEI shall be entrusted to the undertaking concerned by way of one 
or more acts; 
- the compensation shall not exceed the costs incurred by the SGEI and a reasonable 
profit; 
- such costs must be calculated on the basis of the generally accepted cost accounting 
principles; 
- Member States must carry out regular checks to make sure that there is no 
overcompensation; 
- In such a case, mechanisms of repayment must be established. 
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 A Community framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation142: 
applicable to public service compensation granted to undertakings in connection with activities 
subject to the rules of the EU Treaty, (with the exception of the transport sector, and the public 
service broadcasting sector covered by the Communication from the Commission on the 
application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting). This text spelled out the 
conditions under which public service compensation which constitutes State aid and is not 
covered by the decision (as it does not comply with the thresholds set in the Decision) can be 
found compatible with the common market pursuant to ex-Article 86(2) EC. 
 
 A revision of the Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of 
financial relations between Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial 
transparency within certain undertakings, which imposes to undertakings carrying on both 
SGEI activities and pure commercial activities to establish separate and reliable accounts 
relating to such different activities143.  
 
This “Altmark Package (I)” has been the object of less than twenty Commission decisions. It is interesting to 
emphasis that in a recent case, the General Court has insisted on the duty for the Commission to check that any 
condition established in its decision 2005/842/EC is met but also on the obligation for Member States to be the 
most clear and transparent as possible in establishing the SGEI mission and the calculation’s parameters of the 
compensation144.  
 
The “Altmark Package” has been reformed recently, on 20 December 2011 by the so-called “Almunia Package” 
and completed in April 2012 with a de minimis Regulation. 
 
So, the Almunia package (or the “new SGEI package”) contains: 
 
o a Communication on the application of the EU State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision 
of SGEI 145: the aim is to clarify some basic concepts, for instance the notions of economic activity, of 
SGEI-SSGI146, of State aid,… One may insist on the concept of “effect on trade”: the Communication 
confirms what already pointed out in the SGEI’s Guide, i.e. that activities presenting “a purely local 
character” are likely to not affect trade between Member States. So it has been concluded in several 
cases related to swimming pools to be used predominantly by the local population, local hospitals 
aimed exclusively at the local population, local museums unlikely to attract cross-border visitors and 
local cultural events, whose potential audience is restricted locally147. This pragmatic position is 
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particularly relevant to social services and to justify also the de minimis approach in terms of amounts 
of State aid (see infra), as well as the concept of “cross-border interest” regarding the implementation 
of public procurement rules (see supra).   
 
o a Commission Decision on the application of Article 106(2) TFEU to State aid in the form of public 
service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of SGEI 148 : like the 
former one adopted in 2005, this decision sets out the conditions under which State aid in the form of 
public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of SGEI is 
compatible with the internal market and exempt from the requirement of notification laid down in 
Article 108(3) of the Treaty. Five categories of compensation are concerned: 
 
- compensation not exceeding an annual amount of EUR 15 million149 for the provision 
of SGEI in areas other than transport and transport infrastructure; 
 
- compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest by hospitals 
providing medical care, including, where applicable, emergency services; 
 
- compensation for the provision of SGEI “meeting social needs” as regards health and 
long term care, childcare, access to and reintegration into the labor market, social 
housing and the care and social inclusion of vulnerable groups150; 
 
- compensation for the provision of SGEI as regards air or maritime links to islands on 
which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which 
the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300000 
passengers; and 
 
- compensation for the provision of SGEI as regards airports and ports for 
which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in 
which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 
200000 passengers, in the case of airports, and 300000 passengers, in the case 
of ports. 
 
Several conditions have to be met in order to establish compatibility and justify exemption from 
notification: 
 
- Need for an entrustment act which shall include, in particular, the content 
and duration of the public service obligations151; the undertaking and, where 
applicable, the territory concerned; the nature of any exclusive or special 
rights assigned to the undertaking by the granting authority; a description of 
the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, controlling 
and reviewing the compensation; the arrangements for avoiding and 
recovering any overcompensation; and (this is a new procedural requirement) 
a reference to the decision. 
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- Absence of over-compensation: the amount of compensation shall not 
exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the 
public service obligations, including a reasonable profit. The costs to be 
taken into consideration shall comprise all the costs incurred in operating the 
SGEI and be calculated on the basis of generally accepted cost accounting 
principles (as listed in Article 5 of the decision). The new decision gives also 
more precision on the notion of "reasonable profit, by referring to “the rate 
of return on capital that would be required by a typical undertaking 
considering whether or not to provide the SGEI” for the whole period of 
entrustment, taking into account the level of risk and by considering that, 
except by reasons of specific circumstances, “a rate of return on capital that 
does not exceed the relevant swap rate plus a premium of 100 basis points 
shall be regarded as reasonable in any event”. 
 
- Control of over-compensation: Member States shall ensure that the 
undertaking does not receive overcompensation, by carrying out regular checks 
and, at least, every 3 years during the period of entrustment and at the end of 
that period. The undertaking has to repay any overcompensation received. 
 
- Transparency and reporting: for compensation above EUR 15 million 
granted to an undertaking which also has activities outside the scope of the 
SGEI, the Member State concerned shall publish on the Internet or by other 
appropriate means the entrustment act (or a summary) and the amounts of aid 
granted to the undertaking on a yearly basis. The Member States shall keep 
available, during the period of entrustment and for at least 10 years from the 
end of the period of entrustment, all the information necessary to determine 
whether the compensation granted is compatible with the decision. Last, but 
not least, each Member State shall submit a report on the implementation of 
this Decision to the Commission every 2 years, as from June 2014. 
 
o A revised EU Framework for State Aid in the form of public service compensation152: it establishes 
conditions to be met by State aids falling outside the scope of Decision 2012/21/EU to be declared 
compatible with Article 106(2) of the Treaty if it is necessary for the operation of the SGEI concerned 
and does not affect the development of trade to such an extent as to be contrary to the interests of the 
Union. These conditions are the following ones: 
 
- Existence of a genuine SGEI as referred to in Article 106.2 TFEU: the Commission 
insists on the fact that Member States cannot attach specific public service obligations 
to services that are already provided or can be provided satisfactorily and under 
conditions, such as price, objective quality characteristics, continuity and access to the 
service, consistent with the public interest, as defined by the State, by undertakings 
operating under normal market conditions. As for the question of whether a service 
can be provided by the market, the Commission's assessment is limited to checking 
whether the Member State’s definition is vitiated by a manifest error, unless 
provisions of Union law provide a stricter standard. The new EU Framework adds for 
a new procedural requirement by requesting from Member States to “show that they 
have given proper consideration to the public service needs supported by way of a 
public consultation or other appropriate instruments to take the interests of users and 
                                                            




providers into account”153. This does not apply where it is clear that a new 
consultation will not bring any significant added value to a recent consultation. 
 
- Need for an entrustment act specifying the public service obligations and the 
methods of calculating compensation, as well as the duration of the period of 
entrustment which should be justified “by reference to objective criteria such as the 
need to amortize non-transferable fixed assets”. In principle, the duration of the 
period of entrustment should not exceed “the period required for the depreciation of 
the most significant assets required to provide the SGEI”154. 
 
- Compliance with the Directive 2006/111/EC (see supra)155 and with Union public 
procurement rules156. 
 
- Absence of discrimination, i.e. where an authority assigns the provision of the same 
SGEI to several undertakings, the compensation should be calculated on the basis of 
the same method in respect of each undertaking157. 
 
- Absence of overcompensation: amount of compensation must not exceed what is 
necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including 
a reasonable profit. Similar notions (like revenue, reasonable profit, etc.) have to be 
taken into consideration than those within the scope of Decision 2012/21/EU, as 
explained above. However, the EU Framework give more precision on the way to 
establish that amount of compensation, i.e. on the basis of either the expected costs 
and revenues, or the costs and revenues actually incurred, or a combination of the 
two, depending on the efficiency incentives that the Member State wishes to provide 
from the outset158. Two main methodologies are defined: the net avoided cost 
methodology and the methodology based on cost allocation. 
 
- Absence of affectation of the development of trade to an extent contrary to the 
interests of the Union: to comply with this condition derived from Article 106.2 
TFEU itself,  the EU Framework provides for the possibility to impose additional 
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157 However, pursuant to Paragraph 61, this requirement is not applicable to compensations listed in Article 2(1) 
of the 2012/21/EU Decision, so including compensation for the provision of SSGI as referred to in that 
provision. 
 
158 In accordance with paragraphs 40 and 41 of the EU Framework, Member States, in devising the method of 
compensation, must introduce incentives for the efficient provision of SGEI of a high standard, unless they can 
duly justify that it is not feasible or appropriate to do so. 158 However, pursuant to Paragraph 61, this requirement 
is not applicable to compensations listed in Article 2(1) of the 2012/21/EU Decision, so including compensation 




requirements or requesting commitments from the Member States159, where serious 
competition distortions would be detected, e.g. where the entrustment either has a 
duration which cannot be justified by reference to objective criteria or bundles a 
series of tasks (typically subject to separate entrustments with no loss of social benefit 
and no additional costs in terms of efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of the 
services). The EU Framework refers also to the situation where a Member State 
entrusts a public service provider, without a competitive selection procedure, with the 
task of providing an SGEI in a non-reserved market where very similar services are 
already being provided or can be expected to be provided in the near future in the 
absence of the SGEI160.  
 
- Transparency, reporting and evaluation: for each SGEI compensation falling 
within the scope of the EU Framework, the Member State concerned must publish on 
the internet or by other appropriate means the results of the public consultation or 
other appropriate instruments referred to above161; the content and duration of the 
public service obligations; the undertaking and, where applicable, the territory 
concerned; the amounts of aid granted to the undertaking on a yearly basis. Member 
States shall also report to the Commission on the compliance with the EU Framework 
every two years, as from June 2014.  
 
Last, but not least, the Commission proposes as appropriate measures for the purposes of Article 108(1) TFEU 
that Member States publish the list of existing aid schemes regarding public service compensation which have to 
be brought into line with the EU Framework by 31 January 2013, and that they bring those aid schemes into line 
with this Communication by 31 January 2014162. 
 
o A de minimis Regulation specific to SGEI. This Regulation was adopted a few months after the rest of 
the package, on 25 April 2012163. The main provision aims at exempting from EU State aid rules aid of 
up to EUR 500.000 per undertaking over a three-year period granted as compensation for the provision 
of SGEI. This threshold is higher than the general de minimis threshold of EUR 200 000 (over three 
year) pursuant to Regulation (EC) N°1998/2006164, still applicable for State aid in any other sectors 
(except some specific ones, e.g. transport, fisheries and agricultural sectors). The new Regulation 
provides for a non-rebuttable assumption that such low compensations cannot affect trade between 




159  159  However, pursuant to Paragraph 61, these additional requirements are not applicable to compensations 
listed in Article 2(1) of the 2012/21/EU Decision, so including compensation for the provision of SSGI as 
referred to in that provision. 
160 See also others situations referred to in Paragraphs 57 and 58. 
161 161 However, pursuant to Paragraph 61, this publication is not required for compensations listed in Article 2(1) 
of the 2012/21/EU Decision, so including compensation for the provision of SSGI referred to in that provision. 
162 See Paragraphs 70-71 : Member States had to confirm to the Commission by 29 February 2012 that they 
agreed to the appropriate measures proposed. In the absence of any reply, the Member State concerned was 
deemed not to agree. 
163 Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 
of the TFEU to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing SGEI, in OJ L 114, 26.4.2012, pp. 8-13. 
164 See Commission Regulation of 15 December 2006, in OJ L 379, 28.12.2006, p. 5. 




B3. General Exception for Services of General Economic Interest (article 106§2 TFEU). 
 
The Altmark Package is a specific application to State aids’ rules of a more general exception provided by 
Article 106.2 TFEU (see introduction), which establishes a limitation regarding the application of any EU rule, 
including competition rules to, notably, the SGEI. Indeed, these rules apply insofar as they do not obstruct the 
performance of these particular tasks. They apply conditionally. The exception is then granted with regard to the 
nature of the tasks assigned to those services. However, this exception shall not lead to affect the trade between 
Member States to such an extent that would be contrary to the interests of the Union. Therefore, it appears that 
the exception contains itself a limitation. 
 
In the first place, the definition of the concept of SGEI is of paramount importance since the favor granted by 
article 106, paragraph 2, TFEU depends on it. It must be noted that Member States have a large discretion 
regarding the content to be given to the content of such services, i.e. to define what should be classified as being 
in the general economic interest (e.g. postal, transport, energy services). The ECJ only controls if such a 
discretionary power has been abused (control of the manifest error)166.  
 
However, the entity in charge of such a service must have been entrusted by a State to do so by an act of public 
authority (e.g. legislation, grant of a concession).  
 
To benefit from article 106, paragraph 2 TFEU derogation, an undertaking must provide a SGEI. Such a concept 
must be defined in two steps: 
 
o Services of economic interest: 
 
As explained above, the notion of services is defined by article 57 TFEU as “normally provided for 
remuneration […] where such services do not relate to the freedoms of movement of goods, capital and persons; 
and insofar as the concept of economic activity is a broad one, so is the concept of service of economic interest. 
 
Besides, it was noted that only few activities contain absolutely no element of an economic character. Therefore, 
in this regard, the scope of application of article 106, paragraph 2 is quite broad as well. It generally applies to 
fulfill charitable, public welfare-related, social and cultural purposes. For instance, environmental protection in 
the area of waste disposal167 or the universal supply of gas and electricity at the lowest cost and in a socially 
responsible manner168 was said to be economic services by the ECJ. 
 
o Services of general interest: 
 
The service provided must be in the interest of the public. The ECJ defined such a criterion as follows: “services 
which operate on the behalf of all users throughout the territory of the Member State concerned […] irrespective 
of the specific situations or the degree of economic profitability of each individual operation”169. More 
generally, SGEI must be of direct benefit to the public. 
 
                                                            
166 ECJ, 21 September 1999, Albany International, C-67/96, ECR I-5751. 
167 ECJ, 23 May 2000, FFAD, C-209/98 
168 ECJ, 23 October 1997, Commission v. France (EDF-GDF), C-159/94, ECR I-5815 




Once it has been established that a service is of general economic interest, the exemption solely applies if the 
assigned tasks are obstructed by the application of EU competition rules170. Such an obstruction can be of legal 
origin or factual. The hindrance is legal when the carrying of the SGEI would be in breach of a EU law. It would 
be factual if the application of such EU competition rules would make it financially impossible. The criterion to 
assess financial feasibility is the “economically acceptable conditions” one171. The assessment must be objective 
and not subjective, i.e. the ECJ, on a case-by case analysis, considers whether it would be possible to carry the 
service while observing the EU law but not whether this particular undertaking is able to do so. 
 
On the other hand, such an exemption shall not be of such an extent that it would be contrary to the interests of 
the Union. In this context, the concept of trade between Member States is not interpreted as it is in the context 
articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Rather, it involves considering the diverging interests of, on one hand, the Union 
and, on the other hand, the Member States. Therefore, the priority is the Union’s objective to settle an internal 
market. That is the criterion to assess this last condition of application of article 106, paragraph 2, TFEU. 
 
Last, but not least, Article 106, paragraph 2, TFEU, must be also taken into consideration by reference to others 
EU provisions. First of all, in accordance with Article 14 TFEU (as enlightened by Protocol n°26 on SGI) and 
Article 36 of the Charter of fundamental rights, whose respective scope has been explained above. 
 
Secondly, in accordance with the Free Movement rules, and in particular with the directives on public 
procurement172: such interrelation between the two set of rules is illustrated by the Altmark test and the Altmark 
package. Indeed, we saw that where public procurement rules applied to select the undertaking to be entrust with 
the operation of a SGEI, the 4th criteria of the Altmark case might be satisfied and that the public service 
compensation would not be considered as a State aid (should the three others conditions are met). We saw also 
that within the scope of the Almunia Package, compliance with public procurement rules is required as condition 
of compatibility of the State aid in the form of public service compensation. 
  
III – Conclusive remarks related to the new EU special treatment of Social Services 
 
It stems from the overview of the application of EU law to social services that the specificities of such services 
are more and more taken into account to justify some adaptations to EU rules (A.). This special treatment must 
be confirmed and strengthened by a more united and inter-related approach between free movement and 
competition rules (B.). 
 
A. The specificities of social services are now taken into account by EU law 
 
In its White Paper on SGI of 2004, the Commission seemed to be in favor of “a systematic approach in order to 
identify and recognize the specific characteristics” of SSGI173. But a systematic approach is not necessarily a 
specific one. It’s why the 2006 Communication on SSGI174 has just identified some common and specific 
“organizational characteristics” for SSGI, without calling for a systematic adaptation or derogation to EU rules. 
However things are changing. The Almunia Package and the proposal for reforming public procurement 
directives contribute to this evolution. 
                                                            
170 ECJ, 19 May 1993, Corbeau, C-320/91, ECR I-2533. 
171 ECJ, 10 February 2000, Deutsche Post, joined cases C-147/97 and 148/97, ECR I-3271. 
172 On this issue, see Section 5 of the SGEI Guide. 
173 See COM (2004) 374 final, 12 May 2004. 





Concerning the Almunia Package, as explained above, the new rules related to State aid in the form of public 
service compensation have integrated the specificity of SSGI defined as SGEI “meeting social needs” by 
including them within the scope of the Decision 2012/21/EU, i.e. by exempting them from the requirement of 
notification laid down in Article 108(3) TFEU. But also by exempting them from various requirements set up by 
the EU Framework on State aids in the form of public service compensation which cannot fall within the scope 
of the Decision175. 
 
Regarding the reform of EU public procurement rules, as also pointed out above, the will to take into account the 
specificity of the social services is maybe more manifest, by setting up a high threshold (EUR 500 000) under 
which the directive shall not apply and by establishing a specific regime above this threshold (i.e. imposing only 
the observance of basic principles of transparency and equal treatment and highlighting the importance of 
ensuring "quality, continuity, accessibility, availability and comprehensiveness of the services, the specific needs 
of different categories of users, the involvement and empowerment of users and innovation"). 
 
The question is now whether these two sets of provisions will pave the way or not to other adaptation of EU 
rules applicable to social services and which ones. At this stage, we do think that the main concerns for SSGI 
have been addressed but that clarification is still needed on the concept of SSGI in itself, which will suppose a 
more united approach by EU law.  
 
B. The treatment of social services by EU law needs a more united approach 
As we saw, the concept of “economic activity” is both a key one to apply EU law to social services and a 
difficult one to define, involving some diverging ways of applying the free movement and competition rules to 
them. Two examples may illustrate such a divergence.  
 
The first example is related to the treatment by EU law of compulsory affiliation to complementary schemes: 
they may be considered not in line with the free movement of rules but complying with the competition rules. 
Indeed the Court held: 
 
-  on one hand, that the fact that a national legislation concerns only the financing of a branch of social 
security (e.g. insurance against accidents at work and occupational diseases), by providing for 
compulsory affiliation of undertakings covered by the scheme at issue to the employers’ liability 
insurance associations entrusted by the law with providing such insurance, does not exclude the 
application of the EU Treaty rules, in particular those relating to freedom to provide services176 
 
-  and, on the other hand, that a decision taken by organizations representing employers and workers in a 
given sector, in the context of a collective agreement, to set up in that sector a single pension fund 
responsible for managing a supplementary pension scheme and to request the public authorities to make 




175 See Paragraph 61 of the EU Framework, by reference to Article 2(1) of the Decision. 
176 See Case C-18/95 Terhoeve [1999] ECR I-345, paragraph 35 and the above-mentioned Kattner Stahlbau 
Case, paragraphs 75-76.. 




The second example is about health cares in hospital: the Spanish national health system has not been considered 
by the Court as offering an economic activity within the ambit of competition rules178 while the Court held that 
hospital medical treatment may fall in the sphere of services within the meaning of free movement rules179. 
 
Besides, as pointed out by some authors, “the Court has not produced a workable ‘bright line’ to distinguish 
when State activity is caught by the Internal Market and competition rules of the [EU treaties] and when State 
activity is ‘non-economic’ and remains outside the reach of [EU] law”180. 
 
According to another author, “The key to reconciling these conflicting findings may be the concept of SGEI”181, 
in the way that the exception of Article 106(2) TFEU would give more leeway for Member States to regulate 
SGEI than the traditional free movement exceptions do.  
Indeed, one may admit that the overriding reasons in the public interest which may justify restrictions to freedom 
of movement are restrictively construed by the Court as exception to fundamental principles and submitted to a 
strict control of necessity and proportionality, while the reference to a SGEI may not be considered anymore 
only as an exception but as corresponding to a specific system entrusted in the common values of the EU (see 
Article 14 TFEU and Article 36 CFREU) and making a balance between the achievement of the Internal Market 
and the competences of Member States to organize and finance their SGEI (see Protocol n°26). 
 
Regarding the social field, that may look a reasonable option, should Member States accept to model their social 
services, or, at least, their essential ones, i.e. regarded by them to be of special interest for their citizens, constituting 
economic activities as SGEI182. However, such an option does not totally set aside the necessity to have a clear 
definition of the concept of SGEI itself and a more united approach between the different sets of EU rules. 
 
Attention may be paid to the on-going and progressive evolution of the relationship between public procurement 
and State aid rules, in order to contribute to such a united approach183.  Even if “the State aid rules and the rules 
on public contracts and concessions have different aims and scope”184, there is a need of convergence between 
these two categories of rules, as pointed out by the Commission in its Green Paper on the modernization of EU 
public procurement policy185. Indeed, in order to guarantee purchases at the best price, consistency between EU 
public procurement policy and the rules in the field of State aid is required for making sure that “no undue 
economic advantage is conferred on economic operators through the award of public contracts”. 
 
A key concept to ensure more convergence in the specific area of social services as SGEI might be the concept 
of quality. Even if it is not explicitly presented to that purpose, the fact is that quality of service is the current 
leitmotiv of the Commission policy towards public services. Indeed, the last Commission communication of this 
                                                            
178 See CFI, Case T-310/99 FENIN [2003] ECR II-357, paragraph 39: “It is not disputed in the present case that 
the SNS, managed by the ministries and other organizations (…), operates according to the principle of 
solidarity in that it is funded from social security contributions and other State funding and in that it provides 
services free of charge to its members on the basis of universal cover. In managing the SNS, these organizations 
do not, therefore, act as undertakings.” 
179 See the above mentioned Smits and Peerbooms Case. 
180 See SZYSZCZAK and CYGAN, Understanding EU Law, Sweet&Maxwell, 2005, page 129. 
181 See VAN DE GRONDEN, “Social Services of General Interest and EU Law”, in SZYSZCZAK, DAVIES, 
ANDENAES and BEKKEDAL (eds), Developments in Services of General Interest, T.M.C. Asser Press & 
Springer, 2011, p. 150. 
182 Ibid., p. 151. 
183 On this topic: SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, Hart Publishing, 
2011. 
184 See under question n°5.2 of the SGEI Guide. 




topic, untitled: “A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe”186, is focusing on the 
example of SSGI to promote quality, making reference to the adoption, in October 2010, by the EU’s Social 
Protection Committee, of a voluntary European Quality Framework (VEQF) for social services187. The fact is 
that such an initiative contributes to develop a common understanding of the quality of these services within the 
EU and wants to be flexible enough to be applied to a variety of social services in the national, regional and local 
context in all Member States. 
 
But is a non-binding framework sufficient to ensure both unity in the implementation of EU rules and legal 
certainty for Member States (i.e. for the providers of SSGI and their users)? A first step might be made with the 
future new directive on public procurement which intends to make sure that contracting authorities are able to 
apply specific quality criteria for the choice of service providers, such as the criteria set out in the VEQF. Then 
would it be a relevant model to draft a binding EU instrument, notably an EU regulation based on Article 14 





Brussels, December 2012. 
  
                                                            
186 See COM (2011) 900 final, 20 December 2011. 



















         ANNEX 3 
 
The Social Protection Committee    
Informal Group on the application of the RULES to SSGI 
 
 
Name of the respondent:       
 
 
Evaluation form - Feedback and suggestions on future work 
1. Clarity of the EU legal framework applicable to SSGI (State aid, internal market and public 
procurement rules) 
 
A great number of measures have already been taken in order to enhance awareness on the 
application of EU rules (State aid, internal market and public procurement rules) to SSGI, to better 
adapt these rules to the specific characteristics of SSGI and to facilitate a better understanding and 
implementation of these rules by the public authorities in the Member States (20061, 20072 and 
20113 Commission Communications, 20084 and 20105 Council Conclusions, Seminars, 1st, 2nd and 
3rd SSGI Forums, 2007 Commission FAQs6, Interactive Information Service7, the 20088 and 20109 
biennial reports, the 2010 Commission Guide10, activities  of the SPC, including the 2008 SPC 
report and its operational conclusions11….). 
Considering the work already done, is there in your opinion already enough clarity as to how to apply 






Please justify shortly your answer (in general terms) referring to either workable solutions or problems 
identified in practice.   
 
      
 
What initiatives could Member States take to help regional and local public authorities better 
understanding and applying EU rules? 
 
      
 
                                                 
1 Communication on social services of general interest "Implementing the Community Lisbon 
programme: Social services of general interest in the European Union", COM(2006) 177, 
of 26 April 2006. 
2 Communication on "Services of general interest, including social services of general interest: a new 
European commitment", COM(2007) 725 final of 20 November 2007. 
3 Communication "A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe", COM(2011) 900 
of 20 December 2011. 
4 16062/08/ 
5 17566/10/ available on http://www.socialsecurity.fgov.be/eu/docs/agenda/06-
07_12_10_conclusions_ssgi_en.pdf  
6 SEC(2007)1514 and SEC (2007)1516 of 20 November 2007. 
7 This service is accessible on the following webpage: 
http://ec.europa.eu/services_general_interest/registration/form_en.htm 
8 Biennial Report on social services of general interest, SEC(2008) 2179 of 2 July 2008 
9 Second Biennial Report on social services of general interest, SEC(2010) 1284 of 22 October 2010 
10 SEC(2010) 1545 final of 7.12.2010. 





The next Forum on SSGI 
 
Since 2007, three Forums on Social Services of General Interest have been organised; in Lisbon 
2007, in Paris 2008 and in Brussels 2010. These Forums were High Level EU conferences organised 
by the Presidency of the Council and co-financed by the Commission.  They have involved EU 
institutions and stakeholders. 
 
The Commission communication of December 2011 recalls the organisation of the next forum in 




Please express your views on   
a. the interest in having the next Forum 
      
 
 
b. subjects to be tackled 
      
 
 
c. the approach and methods to be applied to its  implementation 




You will find materials on the previous forum (3rd forum in Brussels) on these links: 
 
- Summary report of the 3rd Forum on SSGI 
EN : http://www.socialsecurity.fgov.be/docs/nl/news/ssgi_summary_report.pdf  
FR : http://www.socialsecurity.fgov.be/flipping-book/SSIG-FR/files/pmo_forum-fr_03.pdf  
 
- Materials: http://www.socialsecurity.fgov.be/eu/en/agenda/26-27_10_10.asp  
 
  
                                                 









2. Evaluations of the work carried by the Group 
Please, give feedback on the work of the informal working group up to now focussing in particular 
on: 
 
a) working methods (arrangements of the meetings, seminars, interaction / dialogue between different 
parties, the use of the Huddle Workspace etc.)   




b) relevance of the issues discussed (very relevant  -  not so relevant; specify the issue) 




c) relevance of the studies / questionnaires referred to (specify the study) 





d) asked contributions of the members (presentations, papers, opinions)  






















          ANNEX 4 
Social Services of General Interest – The Case of Malta 
 
1. Introduction  
‘Services of general interest’ (SGIs) are those services that are provided in the interest of the public and 
are of direct benefit to the public while ‘Services of general economic interest’ (SGEI) are economic 
activities that public authorities identify as being of particular importance to citizens and that would not 
be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions) if there were no public intervention. The 
concept of ‘Social Services of General Interest’ (SSGIs) on the other hand is not defined in the Treaty and 
is hence left up to each Member State to define.  
 
SSGIs remain restrained in a ‘grey’ area with regards the conditions of application of Community Law, 
on the border between economic and non-economic activities, due to the fact that unlike economic 
activities, non-economic activities fall outside the application of the competition and internal market rules 
of the Treaty. 
 
The following presents the situation in Malta regarding the provision will of Social Services of General 
Interest. 
2. Interaction between different sets of Rules 
Guaranteeing uniformity between the rules on public procurement, State aid and freedom of movement 
will ensure that SSGIs will conform to all the applicable rules. It is the existence of the effect on trade 
between Member States that makes SSGIs subject to such rules. 
Application of Public Procurement Rules  
Compliance with public procurement rules must be ensured in the case of cross border provision of social 
services. Such rules do not require public authorities to outsource SSGIs; therefore authorities are free to 
decide whether to provide the services themselves, directly or in-house. Given that SSGIs are subject only 
to a few of the provisions in Directive 2004/18/EC, the public authorities may choose the procedure they 
consider the most appropriate for the specific service in question, provided that the procedure chosen is in 
line with EU principles such as transparency and non-discrimination. 
 
Compliance with purely local public procurement rules could indirectly lead to unlawful discrimination 
against economic operators from other Member States interested in providing the SSGI. Such compliance 
may also result in restricting the public authorities’ choice to a small number of local operators and 
consequently diminishing the beneficial effect on Europe-wide competition. However certain 
requirements relating to the local context may be acceptable if they can be justified by the particularities 
of the service to be provided and are strictly related to the performance of the contract.  
 
Following public procurement rules ensures that there is no unfair economic advantage being granted to 
the service provider, thereby reducing but not eliminating the presence of State aid. 
 
Malta follows public procurement rules when procuring all social services. This ensures good 
governance, transparency, value for money for the service obtained from the market, and provides equal 
opportunities for different market players. 
Application of State aid Rules 
Although the EU only has limited powers in the field of social policy, competition rules affect the way 
social services are offered in Member States. As a result of this, social services cannot escape from the 
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applicability of the provisions on State aid. However, the provisions of significant social services should 
be protected from adverse effects that may result from the application of market rules. 
 
Member States are to decide on the manner and level of financing of the SSGI that they implement in 
accordance with EU rules. Therefore, since public funding is the main resource for social services, there 
is the possibility that such measures would give rise to State aid. As was held in Poucet and Pistre, if the 
activities concerned are exclusively social, i.e. the principle of solidarity is predominant, then they are 
likely not to be regarded as economic and will hence not involve State aid. Such a scheme must however 
be operated on a redistributive basis, the rates must be determined by law and the benefits must also be 
determined by national legislation. 
 
Even though public procurement rules and State aid rules have different aims and scopes, there is the 
need of convergence so as not to create any undue economic advantage for an economic operator through 
the award of public contracts. A clear link between public procurement and State aid rules ensures the 
appropriate compliance of SSGIs to such rules. 
Free movement rules 
SSGIs of an economic nature are also bound to respect the internal market rules. Restriction on free 
movement may be justifiable in certain social services schemes e.g. because the service pursues an 
objective of social policy, as is in the case of care for the elderly.  
3. State of Affairs in Malta 
The concepts of SGEIs, SGIs and SSGIs are not defined in Maltese legislation; however reference is 
made to the general concept of Public Services. The provision of social services in Malta is mostly 
determined by central Government, and the benefits are framed in national legislation in such a way so as 
to apply equally to all operators. Local authorities provide social services either directly or by contracting 
external providers. There are also private providers who offer their services independently. 
 
The Social Security Act (CAP 318 of the Laws of Malta) provides for two basic social security schemes, 
namely the contributory scheme, and the non-contributory scheme. The Contributory Scheme is a system 
where a person pays a weekly contribution, a ‘pay as you earn’ system. This includes pensions and other 
benefits. On the other hand, the Non-Contributory Scheme is based on a financial means-test of the 
person claiming the benefit.  
 
In 2012, total expenditure on social security benefits amounted to €782.6 million, reflecting an increase of 
€54.6 million when compared to 2011 figures.  
Comparative Social Security Benefits (January-December)1 
Description  Jan-Dec 2010 Jan-Dec 2011 Jan-Dec 2012 
€ thousands 




Total Social Security Benefits 
 
GDP at Current Market Prices 


























                                                 
1 NSO – National Statistics Office – Malta, News Release 063/2013, 2 April 2013. 
111 
 
4. Specific Social Services 
The following section focuses on three specific social services offered in Malta: education, health care 
and social housing schemes. 
Education 
Article 43(1) of the Education Act (CAP 327 of the Laws of Malta) establishes that it is the duty of the 
State to provide for the primary education of the children of Maltese citizens who are of compulsory 
school age, i.e. between the ages of 5 and 15. The State may also provide childcare centres and 
kindergarten for infants between the age of 0 and 5 years. 
 
Article 44 of the said Act also provides for the State’s duty to provide for the secondary education of the 
children of Maltese citizens being children who have completed their primary education. 
 
Education provided by State schools and public providers of further or higher education is offered to 
Maltese citizens without any fee being charged. Stipends are also payable to students who continue with 
their education after having completed their secondary education, as established in Article 126(3) of the 
Education Act. 
Health care 
The public health care system provides a comprehensive list of health services to all entitled persons. No 
user charges or co-payments apply but a few services including elective dental services, optical services 
and coverage of certain formulary medicines are means-tested. This social service is funded through 
taxation and national insurance contributions. Comprehensive primary health care services are offered 
through health care centres and clinics found across the Maltese Islands. A number of other private 
hospitals, clinics and other facilities provide private health care. Care in these private facilities is funded 
by private insurance or out-of-pocket payments. Secondary and tertiary care is mainly provided by 
specialised public health centres of varying size and function. The main acute general services are 
provided by one new main teaching hospital incorporating all specialised, ambulatory, inpatient care and 
intensive care services. Malta has become almost self-sufficient in terms of providing most tertiary care. 
Patients are sent overseas for highly specialised care required for rare diseases.Further to the above 
mentioned services, certain population groups are also entitled to free medicines on an out-patients basis. 
Irrespective of income, entitled persons have access to those medicinal products listed on the Government 
Formulary List, which are prescribed for a particular disease or condition listed in the Social Security Act.   
Maltese citizens are also offered the Pharmacy of your Choice Scheme. The fundamental aim of this 
scheme is to facilitate a more comfortable and equitable access to the Government’s free pharmaceutical 
service (mentioned above), by shifting this service from the Health Centres’ pharmacies to any 
community pharmacy of the patients’ own choice.  
Social housing Schemes  
The provision of housing and housing assistance is granted to individuals that are in particularly severe 
need. Registration on waiting lists is based on income ceilings and priority is given to particular target 
groups and according to their housing conditions.  
 
Social housing schemes are directly supported by public resources through the Housing Authority, which 
is established under the Housing Authority Act (CAP 261 of the Laws of Malta). The Authority has been 
developing, promoting and financing the development of housing estates and other residential 
accommodation in efforts to generally improve housing conditions in Malta. It provides various schemes 
and initiatives targeting those most vulnerable and in need of its assistance.  
 
The Housing Authority is currently working on a new policy and schemes are being reviewed in order to 
provide the best service to the country.  
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5. The latest SGEI package 
In December 2011 the European Commission adopted a revised package of State aid rules for the 
assessment of public compensation for SGEIs. This package shows that the specificities of such services 
are increasingly being taken into account so as to ensure adaptation to EU rules. Malta welcomes the 
improvements brought about by the latest SGEI package, particularly the widening of the scope of what 
qualifies as an SGEI. 
 
The most common query related to SSGIs is based on the fact that such services are of a purely local 
nature. It is highly unlikely that economic operators from other Member States would be interested in 
providing the service in question, especially when the contracts for the provision of the social service on a 
specific market are of a very modest value, as for example in situations involving social solidarity with 
vulnerable members of society.  
6. Concluding remarks 
The Services outlined above provided by Malta under the national education system which implements 
the National Curriculum Framework, free health care services under the National Health Service and 
social housing schemes, are non-economic activities of a purely social nature. By organising such 
systems, Malta is fulfilling its duties towards its own population in the educational and social fields by 
carrying out its public functions.  
 
The area of SSGI remains an area of particular interest and as it continues to evolve will require further 
guidance and clarification on their treatment under EU rules. The role and classification of not for profit 
providers of social services remain of particular interest and necessity given the role of such organizations 
in the provision of social services. Official documentation, such as the Commission ‘Guide to the 
application of the European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to 
services of general economic interest, and in particular to social services of general interest further 
articulation in documentation’ (SWD (2013) 53 final/2) are most welcome. The Guide in particular 
provides guidance and additional clarity to Member States in their application of EU rules to Social 




      
     ANNEX 5 
 
 
The EU rules and the provision of social services in Germany 
 
German contribution to the report ‘EU Economic Rules & Social Protection’ 
 
 
1) Concepts used in a national context 
 
 In German law, the public service obligation derives from the so-called ‘welfare state 
principle’ set forth in the German constitution: ‘Germany is a democratic and social 
Federation’. At the national and municipal level, it is provided for in social security law, tax law, 
budget law and municipal law and implemented by the local authorities. 
 
 Welfare associations take a significant part in fulfilling this requirement.  
They work in close cooperation / partnership with the public authorities – they work 
autonomously and are entitled to design social services as they deem it necessary. In doing so, 
they take users’ needs as their guiding principle.  
In certain areas (e.g. elderly care) German social law even prescribes primacy of private 
providers; in these cases public authorities have to ensure that social services are available but 
shall only provide by themselves for these services if a private provider, non-profit or for-profit, 
is not at hand. 
 
 Contributions by private providers are also reflected by many individual initiatives of private 
associations (‘start-ups in social business’), as, for example, debt counselling, family support, 
help for people with HIV/AIDS and the palliative and hospice care.  
 
 In Germany, many social services function within the so-called ‘triangular relationship’.1 This 
‘triangular relationship’ ensures the efficiency and quality of social services and is laid down in a 
number of German social law provisions. Germany welcomes the voluntary quality framework 
for social services adopted by the SPC, esp. the development of local service provision schemes 
in cooperation between public and private actors, but rejects any further action in this field at EU 
level because of the purely national competence of the Member States. 
 
 Legal examples of cooperation / partnership and private primacy in providing SSGI (quoting the 
German Social Security Code (Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB)): 
 
o Art. 17 SGB II – close cooperation between employment agencies and other actors of 
local labour market  
o Art. 4 SGB XII – close cooperation between public authorities and non-profit providers 
in the area of social assistance 
o Art. 3 and Art. 4 SGB VIII – partnership between public authorities and non-profit 
providers in the area of youth assistance 
o Art. 11 SGB XI - primacy of private providers in the area of elderly care  
 
                                                 
1 Service provider, public authority and user/beneficiary are linked by legally binding agreements on performance 
and quality of a social service provision, remuneration, user participation etc. Every service provider who wants to 
start a social service to satisfy a demand and at the same time fulfils quality standards and quantitative requirements 
can enter an agreement (on performance, quality and remuneration) with the public authority responsible for the 
supply with services of general interest. The agreement is comparable to a license in order to provide a service and 
get paid by the public authority (cost carrier) in accordance to the number of clients who have (freely) chosen the 
service. Since every provider who is interested in providing a social service and who meets the requirements 
established by the local authority can enter an agreement this mechanism of a ‘triangular relationship’ meets 
European principles of transparency, equal treatment and non-discrimination. 
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 Many services, which are covered by the term SSGI, are characterized by self-administration 
(e.g. statutory accident and health insurance, as well as statutory pension schemes). 
  
 Regarding the interaction of the economically oriented EU concept of internal market 
harmonization/liberalization and social issues, see sub points 4 and 7 
 
2) Application of public procurement rules 
 
Important aspects concerning public procurement law 
 
 Public procurement law has been conceived to create a legal framework for non-discriminating 
accessibility, transparent procedures and equal treatment for all interested bidders regarding public 
tender procedures as well as for the efficient use of public funds.  
 
 In Germany the legal construction in German social law of the ‘triangular relationship’ offers a well-
functioning solution for the diversity and plurality of service providers and for the guarantee of 
freedom of choice for the users. The existing system of the ‘triangular relationship’ with its right of 
free choice by the users meets the needs of users, of funding public authorities and service providers 
in an adequate and efficient way as well as the EU law principles  of equal treatment, non-
discrimination and transparency. In this respect the competition model of the ‘triangular relationship’ 
is compatible with the Internal Market rules of the EU and leaves no room for the application of 
public procurement procedures. 
 
Current aspects about public procurement  
 
 On the basis of current law, social services are classified as so-called ‘B’ services meaning that, 
pursuant to Art. 35 (4) of Directive 2004/18/EC, there is merely an obligation to provide notice of the 
results of the awarding procedure (ex post). Before the backdrop of the negotiations on the reform of 
the EU public procurement law from a German perspective it is important, that the new rules will not 
lead to more bureaucracy and costs and will leave room for the application of existing practices of 
the member states.  
 
3) Application of the state aid rules 
 
Important aspects concerning state aid 
 
 In general the special financial support by the state for SSGI is recognised by the EU. 
 
 It is also recognized by European primary law (e.g. protocol No. 26 of the TFEU) that national 
authorities have a wide discretionary power on the definition of SGEIs. 
 
Current aspects about state aid 
 
 Providers of SSGI are rather satisfied with the new regulation system (‘Almunia package’) 
 
 Exemption for social services seems to be comprehensive but: 
o feasibility has not improved (citing of the relevant rules in the act of entrustment is 
necessary) 
o act of entrustment: validity for a period of ten years is sometimes not easy to handle 
 
 SGEI de minimis regulation: clarification of requirements for the ‘mini’ entrustment act foreseen for 
SGEI de minimis aid would be welcomed. 
 




Act of entrustment / mandates 
 
From the German perspective there are two different public ‘mandates’ in state aid law and in public 
procurement law: 
 
The act of entrustment in state aid law is not a public mandate which instructs the social service 
provider how to run a service. 
 
The entrustment results from concrete agreements on provision, quality and remuneration. These 
are negotiated between the public authority and the providers. In this relationship, the providers are 
autonomous and they fulfil their own tasks. 
 
 The act of entrustment in state aid law fits into the German system as far as provision, quality and 
remuneration agreements are considered as a legal act. 
 
On the other hand, the public mandate in public procurement law doesn’t fit into the system of 
Social law in Germany because of the service provision follows the requirement of the ‘triangular 
relationship ’: This ‘triangular relationship’ means that the user chooses the provider like on a market 
after the provider has first been ‘licensed” by the public authority. Thus, in a first phase competition 
takes already place between different providers, while they compete and negotiate to conclude 
agreements with the public authority.  
 
Mechanisms to avoid overcompensation 
 
 SSGI are value-based and fulfil tasks overlapping with social requirements. 
 
 Staff in the social sector does not only work with persons who are vulnerable or in need. Staff also 
puts emphasis on mobilising civil society and in developing community life/neighbourhoods, 
implements objectives of social policies like solidarity and equal opportunities, contributes to the 
creation of social relations and networks, enhances voluntary work and civil commitment. 
  
 Evidently, SSGI fulfil a complex set of objectives bearing many more implications than a service in 
the narrow sense. The whole range of effects of social work listed above cannot be put into a relation 
to costs. These effects are not measurable, but they are worthwhile to be funded by public means. 
 
 Generally speaking, providers of SSGI apply normal accounting rules and obey the EU/SGEI 
requirements for separate accounting of SGEI and other activities, as far as they are applicable. 
 
4) Testing the Market? 
 
 Before getting to market (testing) issues, it has to be considered, that a sound demarcation between 
commercial/market-oriented services on the one hand and social services on the other is crucial, as 
liberalization and (harmonizing) internal market rules tend to be put against social rules by the EU. 
 
 This demarcation has to fully consider the specific qualities of social services: Different from other 
services, social services generally are person-centred, they have a focus on integrating people into 
society and/or implementing their fundamental social rights. They operate along the principle of 
solidarity and inclusion. They often generate redistributive effects and promote social justice. Often 
they are also characterized by voluntary participation and self-administration as an expression of 
active citizenship. Further, social services are subject to special organizational conditions, which 
differ from other services. Social services are committed to a common good and a social added value 
for society/community (with their functions of compensation, participation, activation, and 
innovation). They strengthen social cohesion and have a social purpose. Social Service providers do 
not calculate like for profit investors. They are very often obliged to the General Interest. In addition 
they operate with a long-time approach with regard to problem-solving. Finally, most social services 





 The welfare principle therefore puts social services into the realm of the social sector, which takes 
care of people, who do not belong to the market system. The social sector thus differs substantially 
from the market economy and its (harmonization/liberalization) rules. 
 
 It is therefore important to choose not only a functional approach or a market-oriented approach, but 
a material and substantive method, that is based on a synopsis of the above mentioned criteria and 
primarily on the nature and purpose of social services. Particular importance has to be assigned to the 
fact, that the relevant provisions in the TFEU and the Service Directive make no distinction based on 
whether social services stem from the private or the public sector.  
 




5) Cross-border trade effect 
 
 In general, social services are provided on local or regional level; therefore there are only few cross-
border trade effects. 
 
 Transnational (non-profit) service provision exists in specific cases, usually connected to specific 
needs (care in Spain) and local partners – not as a business strategy. 
 
6) Interaction between different set of rules 
 
 State aid rules have to be clear as far as the act of entrustment and the public mandate are concerned. 
There mustn’t be any form of mandatory relationship between a public authority and an organisation 
of the statutory welfare associations receiving public grants, because these organisations act 
autonomous. However, the act of entrustment has to imply a certain obligation for the organisation 
receiving public grants , because it has to fulfil a task of general economic interest. This requires 
some kind of flexibility  in order to make an act of entrustment feasible.   
 
 Concerning the 4th Altmark criterion requiring a tender - as one option – we have the logical situation 
that the ‘triangular relationship’ in German social law replaces a due procedure of public 
procurement. Acknowledging alternative models of free choice etc. means also meeting the 4th 
Altmark criterion. 
 
 Regarding the interaction of the economically oriented EU concept of internal market 
harmonization/liberalization and social issues, see sub points 4 and 7. 
 
 
7) Social concerns and requests of providers of SSGI 
 
 High importance of a sound and strong leeway of the Member States in creating the character of 
a (S)SGEI. Regarding the regulation of social services, the EU has only very limited powers. 
Otherwise the Member States would be bound to considerations of the Commission concerning 
social needs of the people at the local, regional and national level. But diversity in terms of different 
social needs, mentality and culture can only be guaranteed, if Member States keep being responsible 
for social services. 
 
 In this context, it should be mentioned, that the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Member 
States  must not lose their ability to self-responsible political and social organization of living 
conditions. (Ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvE 2/08 from 30.6.2009, para. 226, 249 ff.)  
 
 There are tendencies, which indicate, that - in absence of harmonization rules in the social field, 
(mostly/purely economic) Internal Market rules and competencies are applied to SSGI. This fact 
raises concerns, as thereby an EU-wide undesirable harmonisation beyond the EU Treaty regime 
(bypassing the respective Treaty arrangements) could take place without considering the above 
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mentioned specifics. Particularly, social services are basically not subject to the harmonization 
principle, are not market-oriented and have specific features (see above sub point 4). This 
circumstance shall be better reflected and considered in the future than it has been done up until now.  
 
 In the light of many material and national specifics of social services (see above sub point 4), the 
latter cannot be submitted without differentiation to quite broad and/or very economical rules 
regarding market liberalization. These specifics alongside the very limited power of the EU regarding 
social services justify as a general rule an exemption of social services from the scope rsp. the 
applicability of market liberalization rules. 
 
With regard to the application of public procurement procedures to the social sector, which implies 
the possibility for public authorities to choose an offer of a social organisation by only considering 
the lowest price some concerns have been raised in the welfare sector.  
 
 The EU is going to introduce additional rules in public procurement law. General procedures of the 
member states of authorising service providers should be exempted. 
 
 Concerning the relevance of state aid law for social services, it‘s necessary that all national 
authorities apply this law thoroughly and feel responsible for the correct way of entrusting providers 
etc. Further requests: 
o consideration of the local character of most social services 






















      
     ANNEX 5 
 
 
Social services system in the Czech republic (CR) 
 
The legal framework for the social services system is Act no. 108/2006 Coll., on Social Services and 
Decree No. 505/2006 Coll. The basic principle of financing the systém is the multi-resource financing (it 
consist of several resources – care allowance, users´ payment, state, regional and municipal subsidies, 
health insurance, ESF fund and others, like private endownment, donations etc.). The government’s long-
term strategic intention is to position the social services and healthcare services system so that it becomes 
sustainable in the long-term from the perspective of public budgets and which is able to adapt to changes, 
while ensuring availability of the required quality and efficient care to all citizens.  
 
A key step is the continuation of the reform focused on promotion of availability of social services by 
means of an effective and transparent management environment, networking and distribution and 
monitoring of financial funds invested from public funds to social services. One of the partial outputs of 
the reform will be a model map for monitoring social phenomena relating to social vulnerability or 
exclusion.The Act on Long-term Medical and Social Care, which is being prepared, will regulate the 
provision of social and medical services to people in need of combined medical and social care. Such 
services shall be provided in home environment, in outpatient and inpatient centres. 
 
The concept of promotion of transformation of residential social services to other types of social services 
provided in the user's natural community and promoting social inclusion of the user in the society is 
implemented by means of a pilot project “Promotion of transformation of social services”, focused on 
transformation of institutional social care services for people with disabilities and people suffering from a 
mental disorder co-financed from the ESF. Result of this project may be also applied appropriately to the 
care for older people. 
 
The project “Promotion of processes in social services”, which is implemented in the period of 2010 to 
2015, is focused on promotion of availability of social services to their users by means of effective and 
transparent management environment, networking and distribution and monitoring of financial funds 
invested from public funds to social services. Results of this project will become the basis for measures to 
be implemented in the financing system of social services in order to ensure sustainability of such system. 
 
One of the outputs of the project mentioned is the Legal Analysis. There are four segments of LA – 
Analysis of the primary law, Analysis of the impact of judgments a attitudes of CJEU, Analysis of 
transposition of directives into legal rules of CZE and assessment of the impact into social services 
financing policy, Recommendation for conception and legislative activity in the field of social services 
and its financing policy. In nine chapters it shows detailed analysis of legal rules of CZE in social services 
and the financing of the system in the relation to the community law in the field of social services of 
general interest.  
 
This output help Ministry to start the process of creating and implementing outputs of improving the way 
of the financing and set more accurate criteria for the system of social services cost calculation but not 
omitting their specificity. The first step is to create the mechanism of the balance payment to ensure that 
the government subsidies to the providers of social services are reasonable, based on the same rules, 
which are public, transparent and creating the healthy environment in the field. The mechanism should be 
in order from the year 2014. 
 
Modifications of the social services system will continue in 2013 in order to set up in a right mix of 
system management subsidiarity both with regard to the creation of the necessary service network and its 
functioning. The modifications will also include a solution for medical care provided in social institutions 
and social services provided in medical facilities. The government supports steps leading to optimizing 
number of beds in hospitals and social services facilities, which will reflect specific regional needs and 
which will also ensure, within the framework of public expenditure, available and quality social and 





Social economy in the Czech republic  
The Czech concept of social enterprises is broad with great emphasis on economic and social objectives 
(business and social missions) that should be in balance. Most of the existing social enterprises in the CR 
are focused on the employment of disadvantaged people (the so-called integration social enterprises). 
Many of them have the status of sheltered workshops that employ people with disabilities. In addition to 
the above mentioned integration social enterprises in the Czech Republic there are also social enterprises 
that provide charitable services in the field of social inclusion and community development activities 
including the environmentally-oriented (green) enterprises or enterprises selling fair trade products. 
Nongovernmental organizations run a social business (or would like to begin with) in their 
complementary activities in order to use profits to fund their core charitable activities / mission. 
 
Most of the existing social enterprises engage persons with disabilities, which is influenced by tradition 
and relatively clearly defined subsidies from employment services and status of this type of disadvantage 
compared to other types. But there are also businesses that employ Roma, young people leaving 
orphanages, homeless people, people with drug history, etc. Social enterprises in the CR take different 
legal forms - it depends on specific conditions, the type of services, products or access to the founders. 
 
There is no legal definition of social enterprises, though some factual and technical requirements have to 
be fulfilled while asking for start-up grants or development phase (scaling-up) grants from the ESF and 
the ERDF global grants (e.g. at least 40% of disadvantaged employees, over 51% of profit to be 
reinvested, principles of local development, empowerment of employees). The eligible applicants are 
enterprises or self-employed individuals. These forms of business legal entities are eligible: limited 
liability company, joint stock company, limited partnership, cooperative, public company and business 
legal entity operating under the authority pursuant to special legislation. The applicants may also be some 
nongovernmental organizations - non-profit societies and registered religious legal persons. 
 
The structure of financial instruments for funding social enterprises in the Czech Republic is not as rich as 
in other countries. The reason is a slow development of social economy and a small number of social 
enterprises as well as long-time conservatism and limited interest in this topic amongst politicians. Most 
financial instruments and mechanisms (being used by social enterprises) are primarily designed for small 
and medium-sized enterprises. Only 2 instruments directly aimed at social enterprises were identified.  
 
The first one is the Global grant “Social economy”, HRE OP, ESF, the non-investment grant for social 
enterprises, provided from the Human Resources and Employment Operational Programme (HRE OP, 
ESF). It is focused on payment of selected costs associated with activities as marketing, wages and other 
costs related to employment of disadvantaged people (social and health insurance) etc. It creates the 
support of social integration through employment or self-employment of socially excluded people and 
support of local development, support of start-ups - new social enterprises or new disadvantaged 
individual entrepreneurs. 
 
The range of the support is from CZK 100,000 (some EUR 4,000) up to EUR 200,000 - the maximum 
amount of support is defined by the de minimis limit.  
 
The second instrument is the Global grant “Investment support of social economy” and is provided from 
the Integrated operational programme (ERDF). The mission is an initiation of economic activities that 
will be long-term income source of own social enterprise and using local material and human resources, 
to create jobs for people from disadvantaged social groups.  
 
The range of the support goes from CZK 300,000 (some EUR 12,000) up to EUR 200,000 - the 
maximum amount of support is again defined by the de minimis regime. 
 
A subsidy is available up to 80% of eligible project costs, and these funds will be covered by 85% of 
ERDF and 15% of the state budget. The recipient will provide at least 20% of eligible project costs from 
his own (other) sources.  
 
It is necessary to respect rules of sustainability, according to EU regulations. Funds are distributed only in 




     ANNEX 7 
 
 
Social services of general interest in Poland  
 
Concepts used at national level 
- notion of „Services of General Interest”: does not appear In Polish legislation. Instead in 
different pieces of legislation notion of public services or public utility services (including social 
services) is used. The main task of these services is fulfillment of the needs of society. 
- Public tasks can be realized by local authorities or other entities (incl. private companies). Public 
tasks can be entrusted to different entities. Act of entrustment is based on the contract of 
entrustment of public tasks. 
- In-house provision in Polish law is clear in the situation when public authority provides services 
by its organizational entities. There are different judgments related to case when public tasks are 
entrusted to company established by local authority for this purpose. 
- According to Polish law entrustment of public tasks to independent entities is based on the 
contract of granting subsidy from public budget or public procurement (buying services). 
Contract of granting subsidy must be concluded on the specific legal basis (e.g. Act on public 
benefit activity). In this case public procurement rules are excluded. 
- Public benefit activity is performed only by non-profit organizations defined in law whose main 
purpose of activity is realization of public tasks listed in the Act, which have legal personality 
and do not belong to public finance sector as well as churches and other religious organizations.  
- Since the non-profit organizations are generally entrusted to perform public tasks the selection of 










Mandating performance of public tasks to the NPOs under Public Benefit Activity 
Act (PBAA procedure) vs. Public Procurement 
- What are the differences and why it should not be replaced? 
 
1) PBAA procedure is competitive, but the possibility of taking part in the competition is limited to 
NPOs. There is no possibility to limit the possibility of taking part in public procurement procedure 
to NPOs (no such social clause) 
2) As PBAA is addressed to NPOs it is more economic. There NPO which is chosen in the competition 
cannot achieve any profit because of this. Public body covers only listed costs, and in case of any 
savings NPO has to give back the rest of subsidy to the state or municipal budget. Moreover  in many 
cases financial input of the NPO is required in the competition so it is cheap for the public authority 
to mandate public task under PBAA procedure but there is no threat of dumping prices. Why? – see 
points 3 -4. 
3) In public procurement procedure there is a pure construction of civil law contract, and there is a civil 
law remuneration for a service bought from the entrepreneur. The remuneration is paid for the result 
only, and the public authority does not even see particular costs. In PBAA procedure there is no civil 
law remuneration but a public law subsidy for a designated purpose, and all the necessary costs are a 
part of agreement. Public body is entitled to control spending each penny (grosz) from the public 
subsidy as well as from financial input of the NPO at every stage of the procedure – from the stage of 
studying the offer in the competition to the stage of final report and even longer. At first stage 
(competition) public authority estimates if the table of costs in NPO’s offer is reasonable. Than in 
case of signing a contract public authority may control all the documents. After terminating the task, 
not only results are controlled but it is also checked if all the necessary costs were covered and if it 
was a proper amount. In case of breach of the contract or if costs were cheaper than in contract part 
(or whole in case of serious breach) of the subsidy is given back.  
4) As each single cost of a public task shall be settled with an invoice or other proper document, there is 
no risk of dumping prices, illegal employment, avoiding taxes and other breaches the law (sometimes 
tempting for public procurements mandatories, especially those which were chosen because of the 
cheapest price). The NPOs need to and want to act in transparent way! 
5) Why else is PBAA procedure effective? 
 
The possible models of covering costs 
a) 
PUBLIC TASK 
The costs Covered from 
A  




The costs  Covered from: 
A The subsidy from 
authority 1 (e.g. 
local authority) 
   
B  The financial 
input of the NPO 
  
C   Voluntary work  
D    The subsidy from 




In public procurement procedure only model “a” is possible. In PBAA procedure structure of financing 
may be different, so it is easier for the authorities to ensure some of their public tasks in a cheaper way 
(isn’t it important during crisis?). 
 
6) Local community may obtain social service of good quality for reasonably cheap price, often cheaper 
than in public procurement.  
7) Taking into account the level of control that public authority has over performing public task (and 
spending public money!) in PBAA procedure - there would be only one alternative  - creating extra 
in-house unit for the purpose of a particular task, employing workers by public agency itself. It still 
would be probably more expensive and less effective (the procedure of creating new institututional 
structure within public body lasts longer than PBAA competition). 
8) Cooperation between public sector and the third sector increases social capital, that is not 




















     ANNEX 8 
 
SSGI IN LITHUANIA 
 
SOCIAL SERVICES – the services aimed at providing assistance to a person (family) who, by reason of 
his age, disability, social problems, partially or completely lacks, has not acquired or has lost the abilities 
or possibilities to independently care for his private (family) life and to participate in society. 
 
The objective of social services – to create conditions for a person (family) to develop or to enhance the 
abilities and possibilities to independently solve his social problems, maintain social relations with 
society as well as to assist in the overcoming of social exclusion. 
 
The following persons are entitled to social services: citizens of the Republic of Lithuania; aliens, 
including stateless persons, holding a permanent or temporary residence permit in the Republic of 




• are directly responsible for  
- organisation and planning of provision of social services 
- determination of individual needs for social services  
- supervision of social services  
- Preparing and implementing municipal programs of disabled social integration  
- Organising the primary health care (financed by Compulsory Health Insurance Fund) 
- Granting target compensations for nursing or attendance (financed by State budget) 
- Besides institutional social services establishments, municipalities have approximately 450 
noninstitutional social services establishments:  
 - temporary lodging houses  
  - crisis centres  
 - day centres  
  - family support centres (services)  
  - community centres  
In 2010-2011 
• About 760 establishments of different subordination providing social services  
• Regular providing of social services to 91,200 persons with disability, elderly persons, children 
deprived of parental care, individuals and families at social risk, other persons  
• 27,600 individuals and 4,800 families were provided with social services at home  
• 161,400 persons used common social services (free catering, provision with essential items, 
personal hygiene products, transport services) 
• 221 062 social assistance benefits recipients in 2011 (181 285 in 2010, 73 512 in 2009)  
In 2010 
• Infrastructure of social services was changed  
• The key changes were related to the county reform  
• Ministry of Social Security and Labour  
- coordinates the activities of social care institutions  
- carries out the analysis and evaluation of services provided by social care institutions 
(prices, staff composition, number of recipients of services, use of funds and fund 
demand)  
- provides methodical aid  
- organises referral of persons to social care institutions  
- examines residents’ complaints regarding the referral, etc.  
The Strategy for the Reorganisation of State Social Care Institutions 
• not more than 4 persons should live in a room, and  
• the capacity of a care institution should not exceed 300 places  
Not all county governor administrations (being founders of social care institutions) have satisfied these 
requirements  
• Due to the new requirements (approved on 01-09-2010),  
- the target number of places in social care institutions for adults was reduced by 100,  
- children and youth with disability – by 20,  





Programme for the Modernisation of Infrastructure of Institutional Social Care Establishments 2011-2015 
• only licensed social care institutions will have the right to provide social care (long-term, short-
term and day social care): 
• Institutional social care establishments  
• day social care centres,  
• crisis centres,  
• lodging houses,  
• psychosocial rehabilitation centres and institutions for drug addicts (day social care at home) 
Conditions for Licensing 
• compliance with social care standards  
• with regard to individual needs and legitimate expectations, to ensure targeted assistance, based 
on mutual trust of workers and recipients, the guarantee of the human right to dignity, etc.  
• Seeking to ensure life quality for the residents of social care homes and create the conditions for 
institutions to prepare for licensing,  
the MSSL initiated the implementation of a measure aimed at the modernisation of infrastructure of 
institutional social services from the European Union Structural Funds  
Social integration of disabled people 
• Is organised by applying the principles of  
- equal rights, equal opportunities, discrimination prevention, destigmatisation, 
guaranteeing self-sufficiency and freedom of choice, accessibility, decentralisation  
• The system of the social integration of the disabled comprises  
- the provision of medical, professional and social rehabilitation services  
- satisfaction of special needs by taking special assistance measures  
- support for the employment of the disabled  
- the provision of social support, granting and payment of pensions and benefits from the 
State Social Insurance Fund  
- granting and payment of benefits from the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund  
- provision of education services  
- ensuring of equal opportunities to participate in a cultural and sports life as well as 
other areas of public life  
 
Types of Social Services: 1. Social services of general interest; 2. Special social services. Social services, 
as well as types of social services establishments are defined by a Catalogue of social services approved 
by the Government or an institution authorised by it. 
 
Social Services of General Interest are provided to a person (family) whose abilities to independently care 
for his private (family) life and to participate in society may be developed or compensated for by the 
specific services provided without permanent assistance by specialists: information, counselling, 
mediation and representation, social and cultural services, organisation of transportation, organisation of 
catering, provision of necessary clothes and footwear, other services regarded as SSGI. 
  
Special Social Services are provided to a person (family) in respect whereof social services of general 
interest are insufficient to develop or to compensate for the abilities to independently care for his private 
(family) life and to participate in society: social attendance; social care.  
 
Social attendance means the totality of the services aimed at providing to a person (family) complex 
assistance not requiring permanent attendance by specialists. Assistance at home, development and 
maintenance of social skills, temporary lodging as well as other services are regarded as social 
attendance.   
 
Social care means the totality of the services aimed at providing to a person (family) complex assistance 
requiring permanent attendance by specialists. Social care, according to its duration, is divided into day, 
short-term and long-term care.  
 
Assistance in Cash: in the specific cases established by a municipality, where it is expedient to organise 
social services of general interest and social attendance in respect of a person (family) in cash, these 
services may be changed into a cash benefit – assistance in cash. The payment of assistance in cash is 
regulated by a description of the procedure for paying for social services as approved by the Government 






Management of Social Services and Management Entities: the management of social services covers the 
planning and organisation of social services, division of competence, assessment, monitoring and control 
of the quality of social services at state and municipal levels. The main social services management 
institutions are: the Ministry of Social Security and Labour; municipalities. 
 
Payment for Social Services: the amount to be paid for social services is established taking into 
consideration the type of the social services provided to a person (family) and the financial 
possibilities of the person (family) to pay for the social services. It may not exceed the amount of 
expenses on the social services provided to a person (family). The amount to be paid by a person 
(family) for social services is established by a municipality on the basis of a description of the 
procedure for paying for social services as approved by the Government or an institution authorised 
by it. Sources of payment shall be a person’s (family’s) income, property in money, funds of the 
person’s adult children and other persons concerned intended to cover expenses on the social services 
provided to the person (family). 
 
The amount to be paid for for Social Services: for short-term care – may not exceed 80 % of the 
person’s income; for long-term care – taking into consideration person’s income and property; the 
amount to be paid by an adult for long-term care may not exceed 80 % of the person’s income, where 
the value of the person’s property is lower than the ratio of property value as established by a 
municipality of his place of residence (where exceeds – the amount to be paid per month shall 
increase by 1 % calculated in respect of the property value; for long-term care in respect of a child 
with a disability may not exceed 80 % of his income; social care for a child deprived of parental care 
and child at social risk – free of charge. A person (family) who receives a social benefit or whose 
income (a family’s average income per one family member) is less than two times the amount of state-
supported income (€ 202) shall be provided social services and social attendance free of charge.   
 
Social Services are financed from funds of the state and municipal budgets, funds of social services 
establishments, EU structural funds, foreign foundations, sponsorship (donations), person’s (family’s) 
payments for social services and other funds.  
 
Besides institutional social services establishments, municipalities have approximately 450 
noninstitutional social services establishments (temporary lodging houses, crisis centres, day centres, 
family support centres (services), community centres), which provide assistance to different social groups 
(persons released from places of imprisonment, victims of violence, children at social risk or children 
from families at social risk, persons with disabilities, elderly people, families, etc.). 
 
LONG-TERM CARE (LCT) 
There is a central system of LCT In Lithuania, which is supplemented on a municipal level. Lithuanian 
Government adopts long-term national programs, strategies, requirements and standards. Municipalities 
are directly responsible for organisation and planning of provision of social services, for determination of 
individual needs for social services, for supervision of social services. They prepare and implement 
municipal programs of disabled social integration, also organise the primary health care (financed by 
Compulsory Health Insurance Fund. Municipalities are also responsible for granting target compensations 
for nursing or attendance (financed by State budget). LTC is organised in day centres, home care centres, 
residential social care institutions and nursing or general hospitals. There is no single legal act regulating 
LTC. LTC for the persons in need is provided by through several branches: social services, target 
compensations for nursing or attendance and long term healthcare.  
 
Long term healthcare: The Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania endorsed the Framework of 
Development of Health System of Republic of Lithuania in 2011-2020 years where the development of 
long-term care is foreseen. Long-term healthcare is provided irrespective of age, taking into consideration 
the health condition, the progress of disease and any complications. Long-term healthcare includes 
maintenance treatment, nursing and palliative care services.  
 
Social services are granted for all residents in need. The need for social services is determined 
considering a combination of principles of co-operation, participation, complexity, accessibility, social 
justice, relevance, efficiency, comprehensiveness. This need is established on an individual basis 
according to the person’s dependency and possibilities to develop or compensate for independence by 





provided to children deprived of parental care, persons or families of social risk. Social services are 
provided by public or private providers. Persons have free choice of service provider.  
 
SOCIAL HOUSING 
Municipal apartments let at a rent fixed by the state represent social housing in the country. After the 
privatisation of the housing stock, only 3% remained as public social housing, which is now let for rent to 
particularly disadvantaged groups. Besides social rental housing, subsidies to mortgage loans are also 
given by the state to disabled families, orphans, families raising more than three children, and young 
families. Municipalities are the only providers of social housing in Lithuania. The construction and 
management of publicly owned housing is entirely financed by public funds. Rents in municipal social 
housing vary depending on location but on average they are lower than market rents are lower by tenfold. 
Social housing tenants include disadvantaged groups such as orphans, disabled, invalid children, retired 
couples, young families and families with many children. 
 
STATE AID 
On 1 June 2004 Seimas adopted the Law on Social Enterprises which made a base for establishing social 
enterprises, stipulated the conditions for legal persons seeking to obtain the status of social company and 
also defined the target groups persons who can be employed in that kind of company. 
 
The aim of Social enterprises – by employing target groups of persons, who lost their professional and 
general capacity for work, are economically inactive or unable to compete in the labour market under 
equal conditions, to promote the return of these persons to the labour market, their social integration as 
well as to reduce social exclusion. The Law provides for the financial support by the State to Social 
enterprises in order to compensate additional expenses, related to employees’, pertaining to the target 
groups, lesser work productivity, limited efficiency, etc. 
  
Social enterprise may receive 3 types of State aid: partial salary and social security contributions 
compensation, work place establishment subsidy and training subsidy. Specific type of Social enterprises 
– Social enterprises of disabled persons – can receive additional financial support from the State: subsidy 
for the working environment arrangement to disabled persons, subsidy for additional administrative and 
transport expenses and subsidy for compensation of assistant. 
 
Total amount of financial support to 1 Social enterprise over 3 years – not more than LTL 51.75 million 
(€ 15 million). Simplified Public Procurement procedures are applying for Social enterprises. The profit 
of the Social enterprises is taxed at the rate of 0 %, if: the number of employees (target groups) – not less 
than 40 % (during the tax period); an entity does not carry out the non-supported activities of Social 
enterprises or the income received from such activities – not more than 20 % of the total income (during 










There are several important historical factors that have influenced the organization and financing of social 
services in Finland.  Amongst them worth mentioning is the strong autonomy of local government, i.e. 
municipalities, including their independent taxation right, the late development of the welfare state, 
modest resources of the state in the past, remote geographical position with large sparsely populated areas 
and scattered population as well as the influence of the Nordic welfare model.  
 
In the recent development of social services the binding rules and governing principles of the European 
Union have played a role as well. They stem from the fundamental freedoms of internal market which 
have far-reaching effects on various policy fields. National traditions and arrangements can be ignored if 
and when they run into conflict with the EU rules. Therefore, the social services are under a totally new 
scrutiny where the spotlight is cast on the functioning of the market forces and the potential distortion of 
market competition.  
 
Although public authorities still can decide whether they will provide social services themselves or 
whether they want to externalize the provision of such services to third parties, there are growing 
pressures to look for private sector entities to run the services and to fund new investments. The reasons 
for the development are manifold with clear reference to the EU-level policies and debate. For obvious 
reasons the discussion at the EU-level has focused on the market side of social services where the EU 
competence is strong. Benefiting from the use of the EU-wide markets is seen as an integral part of the 
modernization process of social services. The discussion how to make public service performance more 
effective and efficient without outsourcing the provision of the services has remained on the margins. The 
range of policy options has been reduced. Increasing the taxation level is not considered to be a realistic 
option any more. Tax competition in the circumstances of unlimited freedom of cross-border movements 
has led to a situation where governments are encouraged to lower fiscal burdens either to encourage the 
inflow of productive resources or to discourage the exodus of those resources. The EU has introduced a 
strict limitation to government budget deficit and government debt. Hence extending the share of public 
provision in social services has not been seriously on the agenda in Finland.                   
 
During the 20th century the public sector grew gradually in Finland, replacing partly the more traditional 
forms of mutual help and benevolent voluntary organizations. Nevertheless, one can still observe 
important remnants of the role played by non-public organizations in providing social services in the past. 
Many modern forms of social support were originally initiated by non-governmental organizations 
operating with their own private resources, including extensive volunteering.  In the course of time 
support from the state to NGOs has increased, along with the efforts of the NGOs to create new ways of 
fund-raising. For instance Finland’s Slot Machine Association was established by NGOs active in the 
social and health care sectors. Later on the government granted the Slot Machine Association a monopoly 
status in organizing certain kind of gambling games. The profit gained by the gambling business is even 
today allocated to the non-governmental sector.  
 
Step by step the state aid for NGOs increased in compensation for the functions of general interest they 
fulfilled. Despite the fact that the municipalities have taken over many of the former functions of the 
NGOs in social service delivery, the non-governmental non-profit organizations still play a very 
important role in providing certain highly specialized services especially for the target group they 
represent. The users of the services are often also members of the organization. In that way the users can 






In Finland municipalities are responsible for organising sufficient social services for their residents.  
Consequently, the main responsibility for providing social services is vested in the municipalities. The 
municipalities provide social services that are financed by tax revenues on a solidarity basis. The 
regulation of the provision of social services is highly decentralised, and the decisions on the mode of 
service provision are at the discretion of local authorities.  According to the law on welfare services local 
authorities can 
1) provide social and health care services by themselves or 
2) purchase social welfare services from private service providers. 
 
Direct public provision is still the most common way although the share of private provision of social 
services has increased since the 1990s. Private providers can be divided into two distinctive categories. 
The third sector service providers (NGOs) play a traditional role in certain areas of social services, but the 
share of the profit-seeking private companies is on the increase. Until now the role of the private 
provision has been considered as supplementary to the public services but there are indications that the 
situation is gradually changing. AA very recent phenomenon is the growing significance of the 
multinational companies replacing smaller service providers both in the public and the third sector. The 
background factors explaining the development point out to the increasing financial pressures on public 
services, economies of scale of big private service companies as well as incorporation of the economic 
activities of the NGOs, which is partly a consequence of applying public procurement and completion 
rules. Direct public support for the third sector social welfare service providers is shrinking in general.    
 











Children in day care centres 31.12. 88,7 (87,9) - 5,6 (6,8) 5,7 (5,3) 11,3 (12,1)
Institutions and professional family 
homes for children and young 
people, care days/year 30,1 (25,2) 2,4 (3,1) 21,0 54,3 (50,7) 67,5 (71,7)
* Institutions for children and young 
people, care days/year 35,8 (40,2) 3,4 (4,8) 19,5 45,3 (35,5) 60,7 (55,0)
* Professional family homes for 
children and young people, care 
days/year 16,3 (1,9) (0,3) 0,4 (6,9) 83,2 (90,9) 83,7 (97,8)
Mother-and-baby-homes, care 
days/year 3,3 (0,9) - 92,4 (97,5) 4,2 (1,6) 96,7 (99,1)
Shelters for battered family 
members, care days/year 21,1 (13,8) - 75,1 (85,8) 3,7 (0,4) 78,9 (86,2)
Residential homes for older people, 
care days/year 88,6 (88,3) - 8,4 (10,1) 3 (1,5) 11,4 (11,7)
Institutions for people with 
disabilities, care days/year 82,7 (83,4) - 16 (16,1) 1,3 (0,5) 17,3 (16,6)
Service housing for older people, 
clients 31.12. total 48,3 (43,1) - 28,6 (42,4) 23,1 (14,4) 51,7 (56,9)
*Service housing with 24-hour 
assistance for older people, clients 
31.12. 45,1 (40,5) - 28,1 (40,7) 26,8 (18,8) 54,9 (59,5)
Group housing services for people 
with disabilities, clients 31.12. total 53,1 (52,8) - 19,9 (25,4) 27,1 (21,8) 46,9 (47,2)
* Staff also available at night 44,4 (43,2) - 22,4 (29,5) 33,2 (27,3) 55,6 (56,8)






The applied concepts  
 
The national legislation does not recognise the EU concepts regarding social services and social services 
of general interest introduced by the EU1. Harmonization of the legal basis of different social protection 
systems in member states has not been the objective of EU integration. There is no definite answer which 
services are included in the notion of social services of general interest in Finland. In many cases it is 
very difficult to distinguish the economic and non-economic aspects of social services - they are more or 
less intermingled. No established principles and methods of interpretation are available in the national 
legislation which could be of help when pondering the borderline cases. Furthermore, certain 
characteristics of the Finnish social security system are very country-specific and do not fit well into the 
general EU framework, for instance the public support for NGOs through the Slot Machine Association2 
and the role of authorized private employee pension institutions.  
 
The public responsibility for financing and organising social services has been the result of a political 
process that reflects the political will and the emerged needs of the population. The process of defining 
public responsibilities has not been based on the characteristics of the services– a fact that does not fit 
well with the requirements of any legal approach. The characteristics of SSGIs are inevitably rough and 
broad and leave room for interpretation. Uncertainty prevails as regards how much flexibility is 
compatible with and permitted by the EU Treaty and the EU rules.  
 
Public procurement rules 
 
The aim of the public procurement legislation is to further price-conscious provision of high-quality 
services. It is a good and useful instrument to be applied under conditions characterized by competitive, 
well-functioning markets. But public procurement procedures have also shortcomings. Tendering 
procedures are sometimes highly complex to use and do not necessarily lead to savings or services of a 
better quality. All possibilities provided by the law are scarcely used because of high learning and 
transaction costs. It is easy to determine price; quality is not easy to be determined, especially in regard to 
social services. Sometimes promoting cooperation would contribute more to an improved quality of 
services and reduction of total expenditure than efforts to increase competition. As a result of the strict 
procedures applied to public procurement the cooperation between public and non-profit sectors has 
become more formal and restricted. The consequences of procedural mistakes can turn out to be 
disproportionate, which easily leads to risk avoidance behavior by public authorities. Private companies 
can avail themselves of the opportunity of referring to infringement of the EU rules in their own interest, 
which does not serve the general interest, for instance by creating unnecessary delays.  
                                                 
1 At present the government is examining the need to lay down provisions in national law on the procedure of 
granting state aid as reimbursement for carrying out public obligations according to the EU rules on services of 
general economic interest. The only reference to the concept of SGEI is found at the moment in the act on 
transparency of economic activities of certain kind of companies.   
2 Finland’s Slot Machine Association is a non-profit public corporation owned and set up by NGOs. The State has 
guaranteed it a monopoly of certain gambling activities.  The profits are distributed as government grants to NGOs 
promoting health and social welfare of the population.   
Housing services for people with 
mental disorders, clients 31.12. 9,3 (12,8) - 21,7 (25,5) 69,1 (61,7) 90,7 (87,2)
Housing services for substance 
abusers, resident days/year 34,8 (31,0) - 59 (67,7) 6,2 (1,3) 65,2 (69,0)
Overnight shelters, resident 
days/year 78,4 (81,1) - 21,6 (18,8) - 21,6 (18,9)
Detoxification centres, care 
days/year 56,8 (52,2) - 42,2 (47,3) 1 (0,5) 43,2 (47,8)
Rehabilitation centres for substance 
abusers, care days/year 44,6 (31,8) - 39,2 (57,5) 16,2 (10,7) 55,4 (68,2)
Inpatient health care, care days/year 94,2 (95,1) 1,6 (1,2) - - 4,2 (3,7)
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There are no generally approved guidelines on how to prove that there is no market for certain services. 
Using public procurement procedures is the most reliable way, but sometimes a lighter method would be 
of use. In particular, it is extremely difficult to specify or prove cross-border trade effects. That leads to 
coincidental interpretations, and uncertainty prevails. Cross-border tenders in social services are scarce.  
Markets of social services are far away from optimal markets, but the rules do not reflect this explicitly 
enough. The rules are the same without taking sufficiently into consideration the defects in the 
functioning of the markets. 
 
The relationship between public procurement rules and state aid rules remains obscure. How to choose a 
service provider in the case of SSGI is still very unclear, complicating the applicability of SGEI rules - it 
is not plain enough if it is possible to use some open and non-discriminatory selection procedure other 
than public procurement procedure which is laid down in public procurement laws. Many questions 
deserve more clarification, for example the public - public cooperation, PPP -arrangements, definition of 
in-house and independent units.  The local authorities are increasingly uncertain about how to rationally 
organize the provision of some services together in a larger area in ways that are legal.  
 
The discernible indirect effects of applying the State aid rules 
 
The application of EU rules has affected the organization of social services of general interest in multiple 
ways. The EU State Aid rules have influenced funding, organizing and controlling the provision of social 
services in Finland.  
 
The rules treat independent local authorities as a part of state administration. The trust in local democracy 
is called into question when obligations to report to higher administrative levels are increasing and when 
supervision and control mechanisms are tightened. Shrinking financial support to social activities might 
be a result of the fear to break or infringe the State Aid rules.  
 
The non-profit organizations have lost their special position as recipients of state aid when running 
activities considered being of economic nature. The main funding agent, the Slot Machine Association 
(RAY), has withdrawn from funding those service activities of NGOs that are considered to be of 
economic nature. Activities of NGOs are increasingly regarded as economic, which means in practice 
also a higher taxation rate. Tax reliefs for non-profit organization are under constant scrutiny. This has led 
to a large-scale incorporation of the service part of the activities carried out by NGOs.  
 
Separate companies established by NGOs for service production frequently start to operate as any other 
profit-seeking firm, losing their identity as organizations of general interest. The business corporations 
owned by NGOs provide their services in competitive markets like any other business company. 
Normally, public authorities tend to apply the public procurement procedure when they intend to purchase 
services for target groups. The direct link between the members and the service delivery is broken. After 
the incorporation of the economic activities of NGOs it is more problematic to involve volunteers or to 
promote direct user engagement in the delivery of services.  
 
The new business entities owned by NGOs are legally and administratively separated from the parent 
non-governmental organization. Corporate acquisitions and buy-outs become easier to implement. The 
stability of the service delivery system may become more fragile. Especially difficult situations have 
arisen when an important service provider has faced a bankruptcy. This has put the care relationships and 
continuity of the service provision in danger. Still, the public sector is in principle responsible for the 
secure and uninterrupted delivery of services in all circumstances, without having the possibility to utilize 
direct means to interfere in the functioning of the markets when acute problems emerge. Replacement 
costs can be extremely high. Vulnerable people are very sensitive to the changes evoked by alteration of 
personnel or customary courses of action. The rules should be more responsive and flexible in that kind of 
situations.  Finland considers it important that the Commission would clarify the criteria on support for 
undertakings in economic hardships during the process of modernization of the state aid rules.    
 
The existence of municipally owned agencies or agencies owned by joint municipal authorities has been 
called into question on the grounds of the EU law. Municipal and joint municipal agencies are not 
independent legal persons but part of the organization of a municipality or a joint municipal authority. 
The municipality or joint municipal authority is thus liable for the obligations and responsibilities of its 
agencies. Municipal and joint municipal agencies have been entrusted with the provision of many services 
of general economic interest. They are run according to business principles. Because of the dependent 
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nature of these agencies on the local authorities they can avoid insolvency situations. That is considered 
to be a factor that can distort competition. Furthermore there are some differences how the municipally 
owned agencies are taxed. The offered solution for avoiding the infringement of the EU rules has been the 
incorporation of the municipally owned agencies, their conversion into independent business 
corporations, following the same line as in the case of NGOs’ service activities.  
 
These examples show that as a result of the application of EU rules, there is a pressure to streamline and 
harmonize the company types that are engaged in economic activities. At the same time the pluralism of 
possible organizational forms and business models is reduced. The examples show also the crucial 
importance of being able to draw the borderline between economic and non-economic activity, which 
remains a concern for many authorities as well as private operators in the area of social services. The 
application of the EU rules gives automatically more weight to the competition and efficiency aspects in 
the service performance – sometimes at the expense of safeguarding the continuity of service delivery and 
promoting users’ involvement in the service performance.               
 
 
Challenges faced in applying the EU rules to social services in Finland 
 
The application of the EU rules regarding state aid, public procurement and internal market has had 
positive implications on some aspects of social service provision. The cost-consciousness has improved, 
the supply of the services has diversified and more attention has been paid to the effectiveness of the 
service provision as well as to the possibilities the private market can offer.  The use of market 
mechanisms has become more wide-spread when outsourcing the services. There is no obligation in the 
rules to externalize the service production. Yet, outsourcing the service production versus keeping the 
production in-house cannot be always considered as a real option due to the decisions made in other 
policy fields. Quite often the driving force behind the outsourcing of social services has been the aim to 
reduce the public spending. We lack clear evidence on that.  More research is needed. But still many 
complaints remain concerning the complexity of applying the rules, the loss of flexibility in the decisions 
concerning the desired way to support service providers and even the detrimental effect on the quality of 





To sum up the challenges faced when using the regulatory framework interwoven by various sets of EU 
rules can be classified as follows:  
 
1. Disregard of the mission of social services 
 
Ambiguous concepts used in the legal framework leave a lot of room for interpretations, which increases 
legal uncertainly. The concepts adopted derive from a theoretical conceptualization of functioning of the 
markets and are rather alien to the real life situations where social services are delivered. The loose 
economically perceived concepts originally applied to very different contexts are imposed upon the 
established national legislation and do not fit well to the overall legal structure regulating the public 
domain of welfare services. The main concerns deal with questions such as whether there is a market or 
not, whether the activities are economic in nature or not, weather there is cross-border competition or not.  
No clear-cut answers can be provided and the final interpretation of the rules is done at a supranational 
level, far away from the communities where the decisions have to be made.  
 
From the point of view of the mission of social services the economic considerations of the functioning of 
the internal markets are often regarded as secondary. However, the compliancy with the legal acts 
demands that attention should be paid in the first place to the competition aspects in the service markets. 
The rules regulating the competition are enacted at the highest level of the normative hierarchy – a fact 
that gives them primacy and predominance over any other legal or political concerns. The social mission 
should be judged on the basis of its possible effects on the smooth functioning of the markets. It is not 
difficult to see that value conflicts are unavoidable. The values of security, familiarity, permanence, 
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continuity, proximity, close personal relationships etc. are inseparable from the quality aspects of many 
social services. However, these values are not vital ingredients of competitive markets, and it is difficult 
to incorporate them into the rules. It has proved to be very challenging to avoid abrupt changes of service 
providers or changes in the customary course of action when relying on the market competition. 
Efficiency gains are often counterbalanced by losses of the quality of the social services experienced by 
the users or the workers in welfare service units.     
 
2. Disregard of the imperfections of the markets 
 
The rules are only vaguely adapted to the peculiarities of the markets where social services are provided. 
The market imperfections (uncertainty of demand, imperfect consumer information, capital market 
imperfections, locked-in situations, monopolies, externalities, lack of real choice as well as lack of the 
capacity to make rational choices) make it hard to achieve the promised goals of better quality and better 
cost effectiveness of the service provision. When applying the rules the promises become blurred and 
sometimes even counterproductive taking into consideration the transaction costs involved in the 
application of the rules. The complexity of the legal norms constitutes a cost factor that is seldom 
calculated in monetary terms. The larger the market failures the greater are the risks that the public money 
ends up in the hands of private profiteers. Speculative profits can easily undo the efficiency gains 
involved in using the market mechanisms. The rules should also hinder the tendency of private operators 
to cherry pick the most profitable customers at the expense of the more costly and more complex cases.       
 
3. Disregard of the dissimilar premises of different types of actors in the markets  
 
The rules are to be applied horizontally to all types of organizations operating in the market. The 
ignorance of the substantial differences in the organizational forms of economic actors generates a 
favorable playing field for certain type of businesses and reduces the public authorities’ opportunities to 
compensate other forms of undertakings that are not ideally fitted to such ()competitive environment that 
the application of the rules presumes. Ultimately the pluralism of the types of service providers is in 
danger. Without any diversification of the treatment, all the players have to adapt to the same kind of 
business behavior as the mainstream profit maximizing businesses in order to succeed in the market 
competition.      
 
4. Disregard of the local nature of the decisions that have to comply with the rules    
 
Especially in the personal social services the rules influence activities and decisions that are very local in 
nature. The right application of the rules requires a high level of expertise in legal issues that is not 
always at disposal neither in small municipalities nor in small-scale undertakings. This gives an impetus 
to create larger centralized units that are better equipped to handle complex legal affairs. Consequently, 
the distance between the service users and the decision makers becomes wider. Training, education and 
capacity building can alleviate the problem but do not totally eliminate it. In unfavorable market 
conditions the supplier side can exercise more influence on the purchaser of the services than appropriate. 
That is a menace especially to small municipalities.   
 
5. Disregard of the great variety of social services and the conditions under which 
they are produced  
 
Despite the growing number of studies on social services of general interest in the EU, there are gaps that 
have not been under examination/investigation. The studies tend to simplify the reality in their focus on 
the most representative cases. The range of the countries studied is normally reduced to the most 
populous ones, reflecting a certain type of a welfare regime. The services included in the research 
represent the most important sectors of social services in terms of the number of clients or the total 
expenditure on the services.  
 
However, the most problematic issues often emerge when applying the EU rules to atypical sectors of 
social services where the volumes are low but the importance of those services for the users is vital, since 
there are no real alternative ways to relieve the situation of a small target group. The same is true for 
small countries with limited numbers of providers of very specialized services as well as with very 
limited market potential. In those cases, the exit of one important actor from the provision of the service 
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in question can have unforeseen and dramatic consequences for the whole clientele of that particular 
service. Extra efforts are needed to maintain the expertise needed, to preserve the trust in the functioning 
of the overall system as well as to promote the cost containment. Especially vulnerable service sectors in 
that respect have been specialized services for sensory disabled people and other patient groups few in 
number, specialized psychiatric services, services for substance abusers etc. Short-term savings may lead 
to increased long-term costs. Sometimes granting state support to a private provider in order to avoid 
shutting down a service unit might help to overcome the immediate financial problems, which could be an 
economic solution in comparison to the costs involved in restructuring the whole system without any 
guarantees of more effective and better functioning services for the target group at issue.     
 
In the framework of the modernisation initiative the Commission has promised to clarify and better 
explain the notion of State aid and the criterion of impact on cross-border trade and competition. A 
clarifying communication on these issues would be most helpful for the authorities of the member states 
when they assess the nature of different measures including state support. Illustrative examples of 
economic and non-economic activities in the field of social services should be provided in order to reduce 






















Subject: Contribution from France to the Final Report of the Social Protection 
Committee informal working group on the application of European Union rules to 
social services of general interest – SSGI in France. 
 
Social services of general interest (SSGI) play a crucial role in society because they convey values of 
equality, inclusion and solidarity, they participate in the social and territorial cohesion, and have a 
stabilizing role both economically and socially, which mitigates the effects of economic crises. Their aim 
is to provide all citizens with access to essential services, recognized as a fundamental right within the 
meaning of Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union European. The priority given to 
the fight against poverty and social exclusion in the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy, takes the 
quest for quality in the provision, accessibility, development and modernization of these services. This 
idea is also reflected in the Social Investment Package recently published by the Commission in February, 
2013, or at the national level in the “Multi-year plan to fight against poverty and social inclusion” (Plan 
pluriannuel de lutte contre la pauvreté et pour l’inclusion sociale) where the issue of the use of these 
services or benefits is central. 
 
However, the development of SSGI is suffering from apparent technical nature (legal, financial) of 
Community law. To apply European rules in the management of local public services and in particular 
their financing, one have to master EU concepts and specific notions, somehow different from those 
existing in national law. 
 
 
1. – Concepts used in a national context 
The main difficulty for the stakeholders lies in the translation of notions and concepts, stemming from the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), or from the European regulations, in 
the local conditions of each country. Related concepts do exist however at the national level. 
 
1.1 – Types of services 
Public service 
National law knows the concept of public service. Some activities are characterized by the legislator as 
activities of general interest, or as public or national interest, but there is no legal definition of what 
general interest or public service are. 
 
The functional aspect of public service may still be defined as an activity of general interest supported by 
a public person or a private person under the control of a public authority. We distinguish public order 
services and public law services (defence, justice), those aimed at the social and health protection, those 
educational and cultural and those of an economic nature. The legal regime of public service is based on 
the principles of continuity, equal access and mutability (adaptability) of service. 
 
Social services 
Social and medico-social services and institutions are defined in Article L.312-1 of the Code of Social 
Action and Families (code de l’action sociale et des familles, CASF), as amended by the Law of January 
2, 2002, covering social welfare institutions and services to the children, people with disabilities, the 
elderly and persons and families in need. 
 
SSGI 
French law does not know the concepts of services of general interest (SGI), social services of general 
interest (SSGI) or services of general economic interest (SGEI), but affirms the concept of “public 
service”. It is recognized that SSGI include, in addition to childcare services and social housing services, 
social services defined in Article L.312-1 of Code of Social Action and Families. 
 
Beyond the definition, French stakeholders demand a list of SGEI, to clearly define their scope. Although 
a clarification exercise was conducted through the Prime Minister's circular of 18 January 
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20101(following the Altmark and Monties-Kroes cases), the outline of the concept remains unclear. 
French authorities refuse to do so for the moment, SGEI are qualified on a case by case basis, in areas and 
territories that may vary. 
 
1.2 - Types of interventions 
Public procurement 
A public procurement contract is a contract concluded for pecuniary interest between a contracting 
authority (public authority) and public or private operator, to meet the authority’s needs for works, 
supplies or services. The public procurement legal regime requires public authorities to launch a call for 
tender before the selection of a contractor. Public procurement code requires compliance with the 
principles of freedom of access to public procurement, equal treatment of candidates and transparent 
procedures. 
 
Delegation of public services (“délégation de services publics”) 
A public service delegation agreement is a contract by which a legal person of public law entrusts the 
management of a public service of its in charge to a public or private delegatee, whose remuneration is 
substantially related to the outcome when operating the service. 
 
The legislative body of the community has first to decide management mode it will use, before choosing 




The initiative may also come from an association or organization that submits to the public authority a 
project with a general interest purpose. After reviewing the application, the public authority may decide to 
support this project through a grant. This procedure is not a priori covered by public procurement or state 
aid rules. Depending on the amount and duration of the grant, a yearly or multiannual performance 
convention must be signed. The same project can receive several fundings. 
 
In house 
A public authority may decide to provide by itself a public service. It has several options, including the in 
house procedure. “In house” concept covers situations in which the provision of service is performed by a 
legally distinct entity. The control exercised by the public authority over the legally distinct entity must be 
similar to that which it exercises over its own departments, and the essential part of the activities of the 
legally distinct entity is carried out with the controlling public authority. 
 
These contracts are excluded from the scope of the public procurement code. In addition, rules on state 
aid do not apply when there is not an economic activity. For example, the management of active solidarity 
income (revenu de solidarité active, RSA) by the municipal social action centre (centre communal 
d’action sociale, CCAS) is not an economic activity. 
 
Act of entrustment (“mandat”) 
A legal definition does not exist in French law. Provided that they contain the necessary informations, the 
public contract, the delegation of public service agreement and the yearly or multiannual performance 
convention, can constitute an act of entrustment within the meaning of Community law (see the Decision 
2012/21/UE and the Communication 2012/C8/03). 
 
2. - Application of public procurement rules 
 
In France, public procurement rules have been integrated by the relevant stakeholders. However the 
systematic use of public procurement procedures, which guarantee a degree of legal certainty, is at the 
expense of the possibilities offered by the regulations on state aid (see point 3). 
 
Designated as non-priority services in Annex IIB of Directive on public procurement 2004/18/EC, social 
services are currently subject to a simplified procedure (definition of technical specifications and 
publication of contract award notice). This has resulted into national law by applying the socalled 
                                                 
1 Circulaire du 18 janvier 2010 relative aux relations entre les pouvoirs publics et les associations: conventions 
d'objectifs et simplification des démarches relatives aux procédures d'agrément. 
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“adapted procedure” from Article 28 of the Public procurement code, which is a procedure for some of 
these services regardless of their amount, the terms of which are freely set by the contracting authority, 
subject only to the principles governing public procurement, namely the freedom of access, equal 
treatment of candidates and transparency. 
 
The future of the treatment of social services in the context of public procurement is more uncertain when 
one considers the text under discussion. Indeed, the distinction between priority services / non-priority 
services is expected to disappear, and the proposed new text builds a specific regime for social services. 
Those whose value is less than EUR 500 000 would be excluded from the scope of the Directive. Above 
this amount the social services and other services listed in Annex XVI, would be subject to lighter regime 
in comparison with other services, but that appears as a new constraint regarding the obligation to publish 
a contract notice and an award notice. 
 
The French authorities objected to this proposal because it has the effect of bringing within the scope of 
public procurement rules some sectors currently excluded, such as certain cultural services. Moreover, the 
proposed threshold of EUR 500 000 is restrictive given the realities of practice. 
 
3. - Application of state aid rules 
Despite the progress made by the Almunia-Barnier package towards the recognition of the specificities of 




-  either it is a non-economic service, the aid granted does not fall within the scope of state aid rules; 
-  or it is a small aid allocation (de minimis thresholds of EUR 200 000 or 500 000), it will be 
considered compatible and will not be subject of notification; 
-  or the aid will be of a much higher amount, but will be considered compatible and exempted from 
notification under the conditions stipulated by the Commission Decision of 2011. Those conditions 
are: a maximum term of entrustment, a preliminary calculation of compensation, and an absence of 
overcompensation. 
 
In France, the most symptomatic examples of misunderstanding of European concepts are the issues of 
the act of entrustment and the calculation of the compensation. 
 
3.1 – Act of entrustment 
 
According to the European judicial construction, the local authority must explicitly qualify the service of 
general economic interest within the meaning of Article 106.2 of the Treaty, in an official and enforceable 
act: the act of entrustment. 
 
Within the meaning of the Community law, the act of entrustment is the instrument by which the public 
authority entrust a company to provide a particular mission of public service. But in France, the law 
provides specific and various procedures to do so. A constituent of these procedures, taken separately, do 
not necessarily filled all the criteria characterizing an act of entrustment within the meaning of the 
Community law. 
 
In France, the question arose about various procedures such as the approval (procédure d’agrément), 
authorization (procédure d’autorisation), declaration (procédure de déclaration) or empowerment 
(procédure d’habilitation) procedures of public and private bodies to perform a mission of public service. 
The difficulty of applying the community concepts is illustrated in these situations. 
 
Several examples in the social and medico-social sector can illustrate this point: 
-  mandate within the meaning of the Community law, can be constitute by the administrative 
authorization for the creation or extension of social and medico-social establishments and services 
(établissements et services sociaux et médico-sociaux, ESSMS, Article L. 313-3 Code of Social 
Action and Families) issued by the chair of the General Council, when coupled with the 
entitlement to social assistance and authorization to provide care to the insured. 
-  however, the administrative authorization for the creation or extension of social and medico-social 
establishments and services does not constitute a mandate within the meaning of Community law. 
It is indeed a police decision that allows a corporation to operate an activity. 
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-  the mayor of a municipality is entitled to entrust the management of a long-term care institution 
(Etablissements d'Hébergement pour Personnes Agées Dépendantes, EHPAD), to the institutions 
authorized by the chair of the General Council by a public service delegation agreement or a public 
procurement contract. It may constitute a mandate within the meaning of Community law if the 
document contains the particulars required. 
- in some situations, the initiative comes from a NGO or a body of private law, which shall submit to 
the public authority a social service delivery project. Without tender or "act of entrustment", the 
NGO has been entrusted by the public authority with the mission of providing the service. 
 
These examples highlight the challenge in meeting the requirements of the act of entrustment which is yet 
the only way to waive the rules on competition and state aid that govern the internal market. Failing that, 
the funding may be considered by the Commission and the ECJ as a state aid. 
 
3.2 - Compensation 
 
The amount of public service compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover the net costs 
incurred in the discharge of public service obligations, including a reasonable profit. The calculation of 
the compensation is based in part on an accumulation of vague notions. 
 
For example, the concept of reasonable profit is defined as the rate of return required by a mediumsized 
company inquiring about the opportunity to provide the SGEI for the duration of the act of entrustment, 
taking into account the level of risk. Those concepts are not yet fully understood by local authorities. 
 
Great difficulties of understanding and application are thus generated. To overcome the complexity of 
calculating compensation, communities often resort to the procedure of public procurement. This 
illustrates the difficulty of understanding European texts and jurisprudence. By lack of knowledge the use 
of public procurement procedures becomes systematic. Indeed, it is tempting to turn to procedures such as 
public procurement, which machineries are best known by authorities who can secure their relationships 
with companies or associations. This movement void of meaning and usefulness European rules which set 
up exemptions and light regimes for social services. 
 
4. Interaction between different set of rules 
More than interaction between the different set of rules, in France we are witnessing a massive use of 
public procurement, which remain the only legal procedure providing public authorities with a degree of 
legal certainty, to the detriment of rules giving flexibility when financing social services. 
 
Local communities play a key role in the application of EU rules but not all of them have the same ease of 
appropriation (concepts and conditions), leading to an uneven qualification of SGEI, depending on the 
nature of the service concerned and the degree of mobilization of the actors. The difficulties encountered 
by the actors, led the French authorities to develop a "SGEI Management Handbook" for local authorities 
and central authorities, to provide a simplified and detailed presentation of European rules for state aid 
and to improve knowledge. It will be released soon. Other stakeholders have also recently published a 
practical guide to SSGI for mayors and elected local authorities2. 
 
5. Cross-border trade effect 
Social services have by definition limited cross-border dimension. These services are typically provided 
in a particular context, which varies from one Member State to another, due to administrative, 
organizational and cultural differences. 
 
The Commission by easing the rules on SGEI, through the specific de minimis regulation for SGEI n° 
362/2012, adopted on April, 12 2012 (aid measures up to EUR 500,000 over ant period of three fiscal 
years per undertaking are outside the notion of state aid), took into account the low impact of these 
services on the European market and the low risk of distortion of competition. 
 
  
                                                 





6. Social concerns 
Social services of general interest underline our system of social cohesion. Besides difficulties to fully 
grasp the EU rules governing social services, at national or local level, stakeholders have other concerns. 
Expanding the scope of the public procurement Directive (Annex IIB in its current and Annex XVI in the 
project discussion), the new EU text on Concessions which will apply to social services that were not 
subject so far ... The texts currently under discussion do not undermine progress towards liberalization 
and an increased commercialization of the social sector, which does not bode a lower cost, or guarantee 
the quality or accessibility of social services. Our legal system is largely irrigated by the Community 
regulations which some see as a threat to our present social system. Some fear that in the short or medium 
term only sovereign missions (justice, police, defence ...) will be exempted from the free play of 
competition. 
 
The French authorities will continue to support initiatives to make specificities of SSGI recognized in 
European rules or in Community sectoral legislation. The will also defend the competence of national and 
local authorities in the definition of SSGI missions and organization, to ensure that the specificities of 

























EU RULES AND THE PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES IN REPUBLIC OF 
SLOVENIA 
PERCEPTION OF THE NOTION OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF GENERAL 
INTEREST 
 
As in most European countries, Slovenia does not have a single definition of social services of general 
interest. There is a very general definition of public services contained in the Act on Institutes which is 
regulating status issues of some institutions providing services in the field of education, culture, science, 
health, social care and other non-profit sectors. Public service is defined as service which is defined in the 
laws adopted by the National Assembly or in the acts of the local community, so that its permanent and 
continuous provision is provided in the interest of the state or local communities. Public services in 
Slovenia are carried out by institutions that are owned by the State or local authorities or private 
contractors implementing a concession contract. Special legislations for specific areas more precisely 
define the public service. 
 
Public services within the social protection system are based on the principles of solidarity, universality, 
equal access and non-profit. Due to these features such services are significantly different from 
commercial services, which are subordinated to the logic of the market and its laws. These features of 
public service are essentially features that apply to social services of general interest in the European 
Union and can be defined in the following bullet points: 
•  services are implemented in the public interest (which must be clearly expressed in the legislation of 
the state or the local community); 
•  services are implemented as a non-profit (or cost price of services provided and controlled by the state 
or the local community, excess of revenue over expenditure shall be invested in development, the 
majority of services wholly or partly financed by the state or local community, for some, it is also 
necessary to provide the user contribution) ; 
•  services must be accessible to all who need them (the state and the local community are responsible 
for determining the network of providers); 
•  services are regulated by regulations of the State or local community (special regulations issued by the 
state or local communities determine their content, form, number of performers, their education and 
work methods and documentation used to), their funding is based on the principle of solidarity (to be 
exempted from all services regardless of the financial condition of some of the services a system of 
payments based on the census, the financial capacity of the individual are required for access to 
services). 
 
SOCIAL SERVICES OF GENERAL ECONOMIC INTEREST IN SLOVENIA AND 
EU RULES 
 
According to the Social Security Act (Official Gazette. RS, 3/07 -UPB, 114/06 – ZUTPG, 23/07 – pop. in 
41/07 – pop.) two social services fall under the Decision of the Commission: home care and institutional 
care for the elderly. Both are in accordance with article 41 b of the Social Security Act and the Rules on 
standards and norms for social care services (Official Gazette. RS, 52/95, 19/99, 28/99, 19/99, 90/08) 
carried out by public institutions or concessionaires. The Rules on the methodology for pricing of social 
services (Official Gazette. RS. 87/06, 127/06, 8/07 in 51/08) applies to both public institutions and 
concessionaires and is setting out the general parameters (in some cases eligible costs) for the calculation 
of prices and features for individual services. 
 
In accordance with the Regulations of the concessions in the area of social protection (Official Gazette. 
RS. 72/04 and 113/08), which determines their limited duration, the conditions for an exemption of the 
concession to provide those public services from the application of Commission Decision are satisfied. 
According to the SSA the Community of Social Institutions of Slovenia perform some other services in 
the public interest, such as the management of a single information system of providers and users of 
social care services, which are for some other reason (namely tariffs set independently of eligible costs) 
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not due to its application. Nor are social services provided by contractors selected through annual 
tendering procedures. 
 
Social care service of support of the family at home is organized at the level of local communities. 
When calculating the price of this service the first step is to calculate the full costs of services. 
Municipalities are required to subsidize at least 50 percent. From the total cost of service in addition to 
municipal subsidies, subsidies of Republic of Slovenia for the purposes of active employment policies are 
also deducted. The difference between total costs and possible republican and municipal subsidy is the 
price of the service, calculated per unit, i.e. hour of service. 
 
In 2007, the total costs of these services amounted to about 15.2 million euros, of which grants 
municipalities amounted to 7.6 million euros, 1.9 million euros subsidy from the State, user input and 
relatives more than 4.5 million euros and additional payments of municipalities for those users whose 
ability to pay did not allow to pay the service wholly or partially own 1.1 million euros. Republican and 
municipal subsidies and municipial additional payments show amounts of compensation within the 
meaning of Commission Decision. 
 
Social care service of institutional care is organized at the national level. For its performance 60 public 
institutions were established and public tenders selected 25 private concessionaires. Duration of 
concessions is limited to 40 years and may be renewed.  
 
The Rules on the methodology for pricing of social services prescribe specificities of the calculation of 
the price of this service. The eligible costs of standard services as well as the method of charging above 
standard living space are defined in details. The consent of the responsible Ministry is required for the 
admission of the prices and price changes of standard services, as proposed by the contractors, for 
additional services its consent is not required. As eligable costs there are specifically recognized the costs 
of labor, materials, depreciation and major repairs, but they are limited to a maximum height or with peer 
relationships. As an element of the price the cost of financing to compensate for the capital invested can 
be recognized. When calculating the price and management accounting is necessary to use the standard 










This contribution is not a binding legal document representing the Belgian position.  It is a contribution 
to thinking on SSGI issues in the context of the discussions in the European Social Protection Committee. 
This note is taken from a paper written for a presentation presented to the Working Group on 5 July 
2012. Given the deadlines and the type of exercise to be carried out (3/4 pages maximum), this 

















The Belgian preparations for the informal working group of the European Social Protection Committee 
on the application of EU rules on work in Social Services of General Interest (referred to below as SSGI) 
have so far taken place as the need arose.  
 
As the working group does not take formal decisions that are binding for Belgium , the process itself is 
informal too (mail slots, informal meetings) and comes in addition to the formal coordination of the Inter-
ministerial Economic Committees on issues pertaining to the single market  and State aids. This leads to a 
soft participatory process that eventually becomes some kind of "information point" for the administrative 
services concerned.  
 
Timid feedback is beginning to come in, particularly on the question of State aids, as a more formal 
working group on State aids and compensation of public service has been set up.   
 
                                                 




In fact, several reasons explain the difficulties in discussions on these subjects. The fragmented social 
protection landscape in Belgium, due to the split of competences between the various levels of authority, 
does not facilitate the coordination task. The informal nature of discussions at European level does not 
favour participation at the national level, since the agents do not consider it as a priority and there are no 
decisions to be taken. Finally, the subjects under discussion considered in this subgroup are either 
extremely horizontal (organization of services, relations between authorities and service providers), or 
very technical, with overlapping social and economic competence (public supply contracts for social 
services, State aids and the compensation of public service), so that no one really feels in charge of the 
dossier or sufficiently skilled technically (or politically) to deal with these subjects.  
 
In addition, a certain hesitation is perceptible in people in charge of these questions, since current practice 
is not 100% in compliance with all the requirements (of hard law or of soft law) set down at European 
level. Under these circumstances, administrative services tend to hide behind a smoke screen of 
confidentiality.  
 
On these points, we feel that the subjects under discussion should be approached in a clearer manner by 
applying and announcing a methodology, and laying down working hypotheses. This would greatly 
facilitate work at national level. 
 
The main difficulty encountered is the reference to the "market" concept (or the concept of an economic 
undertaking or activity) in European Union law (whether with regard to State aids, the service directive or 
public supply contracts) which in our opinion does not sufficiently correspond to the real social landscape 
of institutions in Belgium.  
 
These are concepts developed and decided at European level for economic services of general interest; 
more specifically they refer to companies that are given missions in the general interest (we feel that there 
has been a real shift in these concepts), for which there can be national and international markets. These 
concepts get little attention as far as the social level is concerned. On the other hand it does seem that, 
market tools (particularly for public supply contracts) are being strongly encouraged2 at the European 
level in recent years. In addition, it seems that for a few years, some public authorities have been using 




The concept of SSGI is not a usual one in Belgium. This concept currently has no legal existence, neither 
at European, nor at Belgian level3. This is a European expression used specifically in the European 
Commission Communications of 2006, 2007 and 2011 and in the two-yearly reports on SSGI. 
 
Although there is no definition as such, the concept is used as a reference at European level to create 
categories and to treat social protection services in the broad sense: Social Security schemes (mandatory 
or optional) and all social services "provided" directly to persons (social housing, job-recovery, aid to the 
poor,...). Taken as a whole, this categorization could also be used for the social service landscape, for 
which little theory has been developed, and for social protection in Belgium, with the proviso that any 
categorization has its limits.  
a) Social	and	Health	Services	
These cover a very large number of services, often front-line services that are open to the entire 
population or to major target groups in view of their features.  It is fairly difficult to have an 
overview of all these services, given their specificities, and to accurately determine what is 
                                                 
2 See in particular the application of the Almunia package on compensation of public service, or the integration of 
mandatory Social Security services in the scope of the proposal for a directive on public supply contracts in Annex 
16. 
3 As concerns the legal grounds derived from the concept of SGEI and used for SSGI, see: Comment et jusqu’où le 
Traité de Lisbonne peut-il servir de base légale en matière de services sociaux d’intérêt général, Note by the Belgian 
Presidency in 2010, http://socialsecurity.fgov.be/eu/docs/agenda/26-27_10_10_traite_lisbonne.pdf   
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meant by social services (example: helping children with homework can also be considered a 
social service).  
In any case, the following can be integrated: social housing sector, integration of disabled 
persons, provision of long-term care, hospitals, mental health centres, family planning centres, 
organizations providing training for jobless persons,...  
The nature of the organizations providing this type of social services is diverse: they can be 
non-profit organizations, local and regional authorities, religious communities, and even 
commercial companies. Responsibilities for supervising this type of service by and large lies 
with the local, regional or community authorities. Several trends can be observed: "de-
institutionalizing", "de-medicalizing", increasing recourse to the work of collective groups with 
growing user participation (Eurofound4). 
On the whole, there seems to be a trend to create "partnerships" between the public sector and 
the associative sector in Belgium in the social field (LAVILLE and NYSSENS 5). 
 
b) Social	Security	&	Social	Assistance	
Social protection in Belgium traditionally includes Social Security and social aid schemes.  
Social Security6 
If only the organizational or the "governance" aspects are concerned, it could be said that in 
Belgium, the management scheme consists of delegating public services to a series of public 
institutions (public Social Security institutions make up the primary network) as well as private 
or public institutions (the secondary Social Security network).  
Today, for the primary network, this delegation of public service is organized both by legal 
texts where missions are clearly defined and by "performance agreements" signed between the 
competent ministry and the administrative service concerned. 
For the secondary network, players in the field that are generally directly in contact with the 
population (payment of services, enrolment of persons, for example), must respect legal 
conditions to provide "missions in the general interest" or legal assignments if they benefit 
from public budgets. By and large these are given by means of approvals. Conditions 
concerning the nature of the operators, (usually a non-profit organization of some kind is 
required), bookkeeping and representation are also required by Belgian law.  
Additional or supporting missions or activities are also provided by a series of players. At this 
time, the discussion on whether their activities are or are not of an economic nature is still open.  
Social Assistance7 
Social assistance, considered as the “last safety net” for the citizen, is a residual right, in the 
sense that the citizen must have exhausted all other rights to be entitled to it. It is granted 
subject to the condition of not benefiting from sufficient resources (determined by means of 
                                                 
4 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/socialprotection/casestudies/belgium.htm  
5 Laville Jean-Louis and Nyssens Marthe, Les services sociaux, entre associations, État et marché. L'aide aux 
personnes âgées, Paris, La Découverte « Recherches/MAUSS », 2001. 
6 The public social insurance contributory scheme that targets ensuring access to healthcare and security of income in 
the event of social risks in old age, illness, incapacitation, occupational accidents, maternity or sudden disappearance 
of family support.  
7 Non-contributory scheme (for no consideration), social assistance is awarded in view of the needs of persons.  
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social surveys on income) and is granted at the local (municipal) level. Social aid or assistance 
can take many different forms given that there is a very large margin of manoeuvre left to the 
local authorities to meet the needs of needy persons8. 
c) Social	Economy	Service	Providers	
In Belgium, competence for the social economy is currently shared between the federal level, 
the Regions and the German-speaking Community. The social economy sector includes 
organizations that target providing added social value rather than maximizing profit. These 
initiatives and undertakings respect the following basic principles: priority of labour over 
capital, independent management, their final purpose being service to members, the 
community and stakeholders, a democratic decision-making process, sustainable development 
respecting the environment.  
 
Proximity services have an important place among social economy initiatives, particularly by 
means of approval from the regional authorities. Certain services provided by the Public Social 
Assistance Centres (CPAS) intended for vulnerable groups also fall under the social economy, 
as do missions of mutual societies not included in mandatory Social Security.  
 
One of the objectives targeted by social economy undertakings is the insertion or reintegration 
of persons whose integration on the labour market is difficult – this is also considered as a 




It is interesting to try to harmonize or at least attempt a comparative analysis of the concepts of 
"economic activity" in the various States. The concept that comes closest in Belgian in 
commercial and administrative law is that of a commercial activity. The Commercial Code 
(Articles 2 and 3) defines a whole series of activities presumed to be commercial that do not 
include social services. The law on consumer protection of 1991 applies in the absence of a 
profit-seeking motive, in order to protect the consumer.  
 
There is greater similarity to the concept of an economic activity in the "concept of commercial 
or industrial activity" that is used to apply labour law (the law of 16 March 1971 on labour) to 
employers covered by these activities. In this case, social services can be concerned by the law 
on labour insofar as they meet several criteria: the activity in question can be exercised by 
persons under private law and it is not a public service mission that is exclusively associated 
with public authority. The flexibility of the administrative jurisdictions in this field can be 
explained by concern to optimally protect workers (teleological interpretation)9.   
Non-Market services 
The concept of non-market services has been used for more than 30 years in Belgium and 
includes the following features: non-profit, often benefiting from subsidies, and essentially 
present in the sectors of health, social action and culture. 
By definition, the service sector does not function according to market logic. It represents 
about 15% of jobs in Belgium.  
  
                                                 
8 https://www.socialsecurity.be/CMS/fr/citizen/displayThema/private_life/PRITH_5/PRITH_5_1.xml  
9 Laville Jean-Louis and Nyssens Marthe, Les services sociaux, entre associations, État et marché. L'aide aux 




As concerns social services, as far as we know public supply contracts are used little in 
Belgium. In the study ordered by the European Commission on the organization of social 
services, it is interesting to note that public supply contracts are definitely not the preferred 
means of organizing the sector of social housing, long-term care, childcare or employment 
services in Belgium. The sector of social-professional integration does seem to be more 
concerned by the use of public supply contracts. 
 
The use of public supply contracts seems to be a difficulty encountered by many social services 
for which continuity of public service (guarantee of service to social insured parties or citizens) 
applies.  
 
If a social action service provider must be chosen, by and large this is done by means of 
accreditation systems or legal conditions ensuring the quality of the service. In addition, 
subsidy mechanisms are very detailed as concerns compliance with conditions.  
 
However, there is considerable case law that targets changing the status from a public service 
contract to a subsidy, particularly if it appears that control of the content lies with the service 
provider rather than the public authority. Administrative departments consequently had to 
recall the differences between the instruments of subsidies and public supply contracts in their 
circulars. The definition of depletion of the public authority or the use of non-recoverable 
funds (for a cause in the general interest...) was used for a subsidy. The Court of Auditors also 
specifies the concept of a subsidy:  by its very nature, a subsidy consists of a financial 
intervention granted by a person under public law to encourage certain activities or 
operations.  
 
In addition, it should be noted that subsidies are highly regulated. They give rise to a precise 
and detailed audit of expenditures, resources and reimbursements -- which are often partial -- 
of costs, and do not allow for a profit, unlike public supply contracts.  
 
Although there are very many players in the Social Security sector and one can talk about 
outsourcing, the rules for public supply contracts are not applied to award Social Security 
funds. In this sector, too, a system of accreditation is generally applied. Budget allocations are 
discussed at government level. 
 
However, social considerations and public supply contracts have been promoted for several 
years in Belgium. For example, it is possible to promote employment of vulnerable persons by 
means of social clauses. In addition, markets can be reserved for sheltered workshops. Finally, 
certain public authorities, particularly in the field of renewal of social housing, use framework 
contracts. This makes it possible to choose two companies, particularly targeting reintegration 
of disadvantaged persons, to do occasional renewal work on apartments when they become 
vacant.   
 
At this time, we can see a trend to open up to other players in the form of public supply 
contracts for the provision of very specific services which until now were provided by players 
in the social economy via a system of approvals.  
c) State	Aids	
The first thought that comes to mind on the subject of State aids starts with a question of 
realism: if, as the Commission has underlined in its second two-yearly report, 90% of SSGI 
benefit from public finance for their operation... why deal with the question of this finance 
from the standpoint of State aids which, in principle, are prohibited?... To our way of thinking, 
this makes the possible analysis particularly restrictive, even if derogations do exist. 
 
Sector screening is now going forward in the context of the Almunia package, but we observe 
that public authorities lack knowledge of European rules. 
 
Constant references to regulations on State aids in the regulations for public supply contracts 
are particularly surprising, first in terms of coherence, and second in the institutional context 
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(almost total absence of the concept of a market, little use of public supply contracts for social 
services).  
 
Recently, a judgment of the Court of Justice10 was given in the hospital sector in Belgium 
where representatives of the private hospital sector questioned financing awarded to a public 
institution (IRIS hospitals). On reading the judgment, it seems that the Commission did not 
succeed in applying the regulation that it had decided itself on compensation of public services. 
It seems to us that cross-border interest or intra-Community exchanges are rarely present in the 
sector of SSGI.  In fact, in the Conclusions of the Council in 2010 the Commission was asked 
to consider this question:11 
“Invitations to the Commission:   
 1. without prejudice to the Commission’s right of initiative, to further clarify the Interactive 
Information Service, particularly by means of the Commission  Guide, and, if need be, other  
appropriate non legislative instruments, its views on:  
… 
b) the concept of a" certain cross-border interest " in the context of the application of  
public procurement rules to social services of general interest;  
 
c) the concept of affecting trade between Member States in the field of the application of 
the rules on State aids to social services of general interest of economic nature; “ 
 
In addition, a recent decision of the Belgian Competition Council had to decide whether 
coordinating social economy associations for putting people back to work could be considered 
a restrictive trade practice... and consequently be prohibited under Article 101 TFEU12. 
The limited duration of the authorization of compensation (10 years) seems to be a focal point 
of concern for the social sector, particularly for the integration of handicapped persons.  
The sector of the social economy generally uses different sources of financing (aids to small 
business, aids for social-professional integration, minimum income aids or ESF financing). The 
rules for cumulating aids are often complex and undertakings do not always have information 
on the type of aid awarded by the public authorities. Moreover, the undertakings and the public 
authorities also wonder about the rules on cumulating aids given the regulation on the 
minimum income of 2008 and the regulation on minimum SIEG.  We also see that public 
authorities award similar financing but use different schemes, particularly because the legal 
framework has changed considerably in recent years. For example, in Wallonia integration 
undertakings are financed by a notification scheme, by the GBER in the Flemish Region and 
by rules for SIEG in the Brussels Region. For public authorities there are real difficulties in 
complying with the new schemes, particularly when the measures are revised. The complexity 
of the rules may encourage certain public authorities to use new minimum rules in order to be 
more certain of complying with the rules, rather than setting up complex systems for 
calculating compensation of services. One of the questions raised by the sector and the public 
authorities is the concept of terms of reference which is hard to reconcile with national 
legislations.  
d) Services	Directive	
Long political and technical discussions were held at various levels of authority to transpose 
the services directive. Each level of authority transposed the service directive for social 
services in its own way (article 2.2 j)). 
At the federal level, the transposition of this article was done very broadly for concepts that did 
not exist at national level (authorization of payments).  
                                                 
10 T-137/10, Brussels Coordination of social and health institutions (CBI) vs. the European Commission. 
11 Council Conclusions: Social Services of General Interest: at the heart of the European social model»,  
3053rd EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL POLICY HEALTH and CONSUMER AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 6 
December 2010 : http://socialsecurity.fgov.be/eu/docs/agenda/06-07_12_10_conclusions_ssgi_en.pdf  
12 Competition Council, Decision n° 2013-V/M-07 of 5 March 2013, Case CONC-V/M-12/0016, Comptoir de Russie 
SPRL/Régie du Travail pénitentiaire, Entente wallonne des Entreprises de Travail adapté ASBL, Fédération 
bruxelloise des Entreprises de Travail adapté ASBL and laamse Federatie van Beschutte Werkplaatsen VZW », 
published in the Belgian Official Journal of 3 April 2013;  
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For rest and health care homes, the Council of State (administrative jurisdictions giving 
opinions on draft regulations) asked for a review of conditions concerning authorizations to 
exercise this activity, in view of the services directive.  
A case is currently pending before the Court of Justice on the question of whether senior 
citizen centres in Brussels do or do not fall under the definition of social services in the 
services directive, and consequently whether they must apply for approval or not.13  
4. Markets	in	the	social	sector?	
 
It is clear that markets also exist in the social sector. Still, an agreement must be found on the concept of 
what a market is, and on the segmentation of such a market. So a certain type of competition can exist 
between operators in the non-profit sector for certain types of services.  
 
Independently of European law, a tendency to see the social sector presented as merchandise exists in 
Belgium, be it for hospitals or the social economy14.   
 
The technique of vouchers, which seems to be encouraged by the Commission15 was used recently for 
cleaning, running household errands, ironing and occasional sewing jobs and for the transport of the 
elderly or persons with reduced mobility. If some of the services covered do not fall into the social service 
category, the focus of attention raised by the Belgian Court of Auditors in this very interesting 
assessment16, called for prudence in using this type of technique (service vouchers).  
 
Despite limited cross-border interest in the social sector (social policies are very strongly anchored in the 
territories), it would be good to know whether the primacy of European law accelerates this trend to 
"merchandization ". Measuring the impact (real and potential) of the value added of this type of European 
regulation is much needed today. 
 
Impact on Social  
The impact of European regulation on the social sector is hard to measure today, given that it is still little-
known at national level.  
 
As far as we can see, disputes will develop based on new arguments that can be drawn from European 
law both as concerns challenges of public financing (case of hospitals) and the choice of operators.  
 
A shortcut is taken at times in order to "secure" outsourcing of services: in order to avoid the application 
of rules on State aids, there is a trend to conclude public supply contracts for services that were not 
subject to them before. As a result, how is it possible today to argue that the integration of vulnerable 
persons on the employment market is a non-economic activity?  
 
Finally, if the structural funds condition the award of aids in compliance with the rules on compensation 
of public services, the administrative burden, that has already been regretted, is not likely to improve.  
                                                 
13 Case C-57/12, Fédération des maisons de repos privées de Belgique (Femarbel) ASBL versus the Commission 
communautaire commune. The conclusions of the Advocate General consider that these centres fall under the 
definition of social services. Consequently, conditions of approval should meet all the conditions of the services 
directive and not go beyond it. 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30db9b15f6aae1a948d59cd189b2d0be17d2.e34KaxiLc3qM
b40Rch0SaxuLax50?text=&docid=135003&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=788084  
14 On this subject, see the thoughts of UNIPSO, a platform for the non-market sector in Belgium: "Theoretically, the 
increase in competition should make it possible to improve efficiency of the market (correspondence of supply and 
demand). In fact, these mechanisms above all open the market to commercial companies with the risk of causing 
"merchandization" of the sector and a loss of the relational tie. Given the requirements of profitability, there is a risk 
that non-contractual aspects of services to the population are neglected and that the more solvent beneficiaries are 
preferred to the detriment of the poorer ones. Accessibility to quality services for all types of income will thus be 
jeopardized. An evolution towards a two track supply of services would be inevitable with on one hand, commercial 
services for the well-to-do and minimum public services for the disadvantaged". This text is available on line: 
http://www.ufenm.be/spip.php?rubrique125  
15 SWD(2012) 95 final, p.14 available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7623&langId=en 






Despite the fact that we are coming to the end of the work of the European Social Protection Committee, 
this is just the beginning. The approach initiated by the Chairman of the Group consisted of looking at the 
real situation of social services initially, and then questioning the application of European law -- and this 
approach should be encouraged. Too often, the work of the subgroup consisted of politely listening to 
legal presentations -- which were very interesting -- on European law and the market policies that it 
implements (public supply contracts, State aids, services directive).  
 
Measuring social trends and instruments implemented by the Member States for their social services, and 
an in-depth analysis of market instruments in the social sector seem to be indispensable stages before 
continuing to maintain or deny that competition law will improve or jeopardize the efficiency of social 
services.   
 
An annual peer review consisting of several targeted questions (like those on the market instruments) 
addressed to specific, targeted sectors should point to the work to be done next, if any.  
 
It seems that, in the light of the work of the group, the Commission doctrine applicable to large social 
service networks (SIEG) should continue to show increased flexibility and envisage the pertinence of its 
application to services where the market aspect is relatively small. Measuring the impact of competition 
policies would also contribute to measuring whether this doctrine is the one that will ensure the most 
adequate social protection, fight against social exclusion and ensure a high level of education, training 
and protection of human health, in keeping with Article 9 of the TFEU. 
 
Given the deliberations of the working group, it would be interesting, based on reality in the service field, 
to continue to consider potential clashes between economic regulations and the fundamental features of 












In Denmark, social services do not, in terms of their conception, differ that greatly from services of 
general interest, except that their target group is usually society’s most resource-deficient people.  
 
Local authorities are responsible for supplying social services while the enabling legislation is a 
Government responsibility. However, this legislation prescribes that the quality of the services in the 
Municipalities should be laid down in detail and monitored. Private players are assuming larger roles.   
 
Social services are undergoing constant modernisation, notably with a view to meeting requirements for 
efficiency, improved quality, individual user considerations, etc.  
 
Free choice of supplier - an example of organization of social services in Denmark 
Since 2003 recipients of home care services have been entitled to free choice of supplier. 
 
Per 1st of April 2013 a new legislation on the free choice of supplier of home care services has been 
adopted. 
 
It is presumed that the new Act will release (Free up) resources since it gives the municipalities more 
flexibility in planning how to provide homecare services. The municipalities will gain additional 
opportunities for entering contracts with private suppliers of home care services and thereby be able to 
achieve more cost efficient solutions as to care of the elderly. . 
 
It is still mandatory for the municipalities d to offer recipients of home care services the possibility of a 
free choice of supplier. According to the new legislation the municipalities must give recipients of home 
care services a choice between two or more suppliers. One of these suppliers may be the municipality 
itself.   
 
To accomplish this commitment the municipality must as a minimum: 
1) Make a contract with two or more suppliers and/or 
2) Offer the recipient of home care services a “free choice voucher” which gives the recipient 
access to enter into agreements with a private company that supplies home care services. It is 
expected that this will give the recipients more freedom in planning their everyday life. p.  
 
With the new Act the government has given the municipalities access to use all possibilities within the 
framework of competition law to make contracts with private suppliers of home care services.  
 
The new law will not change the surveillance- duties of the municipalities or the municipalities’ duty to 




A local council must base quality requirements for providers of personal and practical assistance on the 
local authority’s quality standards. The local authority’s quality standards for home-help services should, 
i.a. describe the decisions made on the content, scope and performance of the service.  
 
One objective of the quality standard is to ensure uniform decisions in the local authority so that citizens 
with similar needs are granted the same assistance. In addition, the quality standard should ensure that 
citizens know their rights. 
 
In conclusion, the quality standard, including quality requirements to the provider, is a tool that could 
guarantee conformity between political goals, actual execution of powers and the activities of providers. 
According to the regulations, the local council must at least once a year draw up a quality standard and 








SSGI country report Austria 
 
 Organisation of SSGI in Austria 
 
SSGI are mainly provided in the area of social security and social services. Social security systems are 
mainly organised via self-administration (administration via representatives of the insured person or via 
the employer in particular concerning sickness, accident and pension), but also organised directly via 
public bodies. The services are financed in different ways ie public funding from the general budget, 
financing via special funds etc. The whole area of the statutory social security is based on a pay as you go 
system. All bodies involved in sickness accident and pensions are organised in an umbrella organisation. 
Benefits are paid out by public authorities or insurance bodies, which are again based on a self-
administration. 
 
Social services as such are mainly provided at local and regional level. Services provided are in the field 
of child care, residential homes and nursing homes, day care centres and community services (including 
services for vulnerable groups), residential and/or employment facilities for people with special needs and 
advice and support for people with special problems (and many more specific services). 
 
All social services are subject to regular screenings and based on active involvement of clients. Constant 
attention is paid on improvements, in particular in the area of service orientation and consumer protection. 
Other focus points are improvement of quality, controlling and establishment of benchmarking and 
indicators. 
 
Please note that the above is an extract from previous replies to the questionnaires distributed by the 
Commission in the past years only. 
 
 Discussion process in Austria 
 
Back in 2007 the then ministry of social affairs and consumer protection commissioned a study with the 
aim to investigate the possibilities of a legal framework for SSGI. Said study also took a look at the then 
current legal provisions relevant for SSGI (primary and secondary Union law). The study has been 
brought to commissioner Spidlas attention as well as to the SPC.  
 
A conference of national experts and actors involved has been organised to strengthen the national 
discussion process in 2008. 
 
All relevant stakeholders and parties involved are informed on a regular basis by the ministry of social 
affairs, employment and consumer protection, in particular concerning new developments (ie new guide 
2013). In order to form a national position new documents issues by the commission are sent out for 
stakeholders and parties involved for comments.  
 





Austria is a country organised as a Federal Republic with split competences between the federal and the 
Länder level. This is particular important in the field of SSGI. 
 
As an example: In the field of long term care the federal level sets the legal framework for any kind of 
provision of services. Current developments can be found in the NSR from 2012 and NRPs. Concrete 
services are provided by the regions and/or at the community level.  
 
The responsibility for the provision of SSGI lies principally within the competence of the Länder, local 
municipalities, cities and even boroughs. One of the main exception to this are measures concerning 
labour market policies. Despite the rather regional organisation of the public employment service the 
competence for the general labour market policy lies with the federal ministries. 
 
Most of the services in Austria are provided by regional and local authorities at the respective level. 
Some, however, contract external providers. In addition to this private providers offer their services 
independently.  
 
Since the responsibility lies within a smaller entity with the freedom to decide based on local necessities 
different models are currently in place. Each borough might have its own approach to SSGI, based on the 
relevant legal situation within the Land the borough is situated in. 
 
In addition to this a so called §15 agreements (§15 Bundesverfassung) can be agreed on between the 
federal and the Länder level, ie provision of health services, child care services. 
 
 Public Procurement Law 
 
One basic assumption for the application of procurement law is the existence of a functional (competitive) 
market. The majority of SSGI covers tasks in the public interest and are therefore provided by the state itself 
or state owned and financed entities to a very large extent, which means that they are not provided within the 
context of a functional market. Consequently the procurement law is not applicable in these cases. The 
procurement law only plays a role, when social services are contracted out (“outsourced”) to private 
providers and the lighter regime for services mentioned in Annex II B of directive 2004/18/EC applies. 
 
The proposal for a new directive on public procurement is coordinated and negotiated by the Federal 
Chancellery of Austria. The federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection 
positively remarked the fixing of the threshold amount for social and other specific services at € 750.000. 
However, the definition of social services persists to be rather unclear as services mentioned in Annex II 
B of the current Directive 2004/18/EC are not adequately included in Annex XVI of the discussed new 
public procurement directive. 
 
As regards the proposal for a new directive on the award of concession contracts Austria maintains the 
position that there is no need for further legal acts in this area. The current rules guarantee a flexible 
award of social services, which is essential for maintaining high quality and customer orientation. It 
should be kept in mind that many social services are provided by voluntary welfare associations, which 
do not operate for profit. In such cases a “market price” cannot be established and therefore the rules for 
calculating the estimated value of a contract are not fit for purpose. 
 




In Austria the majority of SSGI are not only provided on a local and regional level, but also regulated on 
this level. The federal level itself does not have a lot of competences in this area.  
 
 Perspectives and reflexions 
 
A first discussion about SSGI started way back in noughties and has never stopped since. One of the 
milestones from the Austrian point of view was the conference held in Austria during the presidency 
(April 2006) with the emphasis on modernisation and dynamics within the sector. This conference 
brought together many national as well as international experts. Another important conference including 
all stakeholders was organised in 2008.  
 
Because of the major interest in the topic of SSGI work has been carried out on EU level as well as on 
national level. Results provided by the SPC SSGI working group have proven useful in the day to day 
work. The voluntary quality framework, agreed on in November 2010, has been welcomed by all 
stakeholders involved. 
 
The interactive information service established by the Commission in 2008 was another major 
improvement and contributed to a much better understanding. Misunderstandings have been addressed 
and the service has provided legal certainty in some areas. Nevertheless, there still seem to be some 
problems on a local or regional level. However, these problems are being dealt with on these levels and 
not reported to the national level.  
 
One of the main issues related to SSGI on EU level are different definitions in secondary EU law. This 
seems to one of the sources for misunderstandings. Since definitions and references to SSGI are spread all 
over various regulations, directives, green books, white books etc. it seems more and more complicated to 























Social Services of General Interest in Portugal 
 
In Portugal, there is no clear legal notion of what is considered a service of general economic interest 
(SGEI) or a social service of general interest (SSGI). These concepts are not known to most public 
administration authorities. The most known concept is “Public Services”, activities of general interest 
under direct or indirect State’s responsibility, because such activities, including economic, result in the 
satisfaction of collective needs and can not stay in the availability of private providers. The first reference 
to SGEI (water and sanitation, energy, telecommunications, postal, health, local and regional transport, 
education, broadcasting and television services) in the Portuguese framework dates back to 1999; all these 
sectors are framed by national regulatory authorities, that define their objectives of general interest, and 
are subject to procurement rules.  
 
The Portuguese Public Contract Code regulates the mandatory procedures for public procurement and 
also defines the rules applicable to the execution of public contracts. The Portuguese model of electronic 
public procurement is unique in Europe. The project began in 1999 with university professors and later 
was joined by companies from the information technologies market. They developed a public 
procurement platform – “Portal BASE” - for central and local public administration – which is computer 
open, transparent and non discriminatory, aimed at dematerialization of public procurement procedures. 
The portal is a space for dialogue for those involved in a public contracting procedure, but also for the 
public in general. As a benchmark information space in matters relating to public procurement, the portal 
compiles in one place the most important information on public contracts signed, publishes, amongst 
other things, the launch of tender processes and other procurement procedures, the signing of contracts 
and any penalties applied for infractions of the Public Contract Code, disseminates technical contents and 
the relevant legislation, facilitates observation and awareness of public expenditure. 
 
Portuguese SSGI can be grouped into two major types of services: social security schemes, and other 
services provided directly to the population. The services used daily by consumers, in particular 
education, health and other social services, are the responsibility of both central and local governmental 
authorities, private non-profit agencies and profit providers, these latter providing, mainly at high prices, 
long term care for the elderly and childcare. Generally, there is no cross-border provision.  
 
The provision of social housing in Portugal has always been very limited and its nature and scope 
strongly depended on the political and social context of the Portuguese society and its evolution. Central 
authorities are responsible for developing legislation concerning social housing, and for financing its 
direct provision. Since 1999, providing social housing is one of the responsibilities of municipalities, with 
the scope to fight poverty and social exclusion. At the central level, social security authorities are also 
responsible for a residual number of social houses. Although there is not a national legal definition of 
social housing in Portugal, the term is widely used, and it is understood as “housing which is neither 
produced nor traded as merchandise”. Social housing includes the direct provision for the re-housing of 
families living in shanty towns, the direct provision for sale or for rent at a regulated price to 
persons/households below a certain family income, or defined as vulnerable, or the financial support for 
rehabilitation of houses for families within certain household income limits. It is intended for people in 
need, and it depends on whether or not they have a house, or of their housing conditions, their monthly 
income, or of special situations, in particular health status or physical or mental disability. Delivery of 
social housing by external providers is limited by regulations and criteria applied by the different public 





Long-term health care (or integrated care) includes convalescent care, rehabilitation and reintegration for 
all citizens who need them, such as chronically ill people in a situation of dependence, or people with 
incurable diseases. Interventions are integrated, both in health and social support, aimed at the global 
recovery, promoting independence and improving the functionality of the dependent person, through his 
rehabilitation. Health care had, until now, no relevant costs for citizens, but because of the economic 
crisis, social and health support services users, even families with economic difficulties, are obliged to 
make a small monetary contribution to the service, based on the user’s income. There is a national 
network of integrated care, ensuring its provision through public and private units, hospital staff and 
home visits.   
 
With regard to employment services, the national public mission is to promote the creation and quality of 
employment and fight unemployment through the implementation of active employment policies and 
vocational training; the central authorities develop work experience training programs, and support the 
creation of self-employment, including the use of unemployment benefits to create self-employment. 
Programs are aimed at the entire population, but there are programs specifically designed for immigrants, 
for people with disabilities and difficulties in access, maintenance and progression in employment, for 
people with economic needs and for the unemployed (social support to attend professional training 
courses); most programs are financed by EU and have no significant costs to users.  
 
Social security is the responsibility of a public central institution integrated in the Ministry of Solidarity 
and Social Security, which manages the social security schemes, and the treatment, repair and recovery 
from illness or disability arising from occupational risks, in accordance with the principle of universality, 
which consists of all people’s access to social protection provided by the system. The protection scheme 
for accidents at work is private - employers and workers celebrate insurance contracts with insurance 
companies; insurance is mandatory. Social welfare takes place through the provision of cash benefits, 
access to the national network of social services and programs that fight poverty, dysfunction, 
marginalization and social exclusion.  
 
There are three types of social security schemes: a) citizenship’s social protection system, in order to 
guarantee the basic rights of citizens and equality of opportunity, promoting well-being and social 
cohesion; it provides protection to vulnerable groups such as children, youth, disabled and elderly and 
other people facing economic or social difficulties, and benefits for the poorest, like social income or 
social pensions; b) welfare system, for all employees, which covers sickness, maternity, paternity and 
adoption, unemployment, occupational diseases, old age and death; the benefits are self-financing - 
beneficiaries and their employers are obliged to contribute; c) complementary system: supplementary 
professional schemes covering workers belonging to a company, a group of companies or others 
employed in an industry trade, as well as self-employed (as lawyers).   
 
The national Ministry of Solidarity and Social Security is also responsible for the organization of 
institutions where children between 0 and 3 years old are cared for in a group-system. At regional level, 
the Social Security Centers have the responsibility of enabling the implementation of national policies in 
their regions. As regards kindergartens, for children aged 3, 4 and 5 years, the national Ministry of 
Education is responsible to ensure the pedagogic quality of the teaching. Also local authorities 
(municipalities) bear responsibility in their organization. The Ministries are responsible for funding. 
There is a public and a private network. The public network comprises all contexts set up by and working 
under central and local public administration. The private network comprises all other contexts run by 
private and cooperative schools, private institutions of social solidarity, charities, mutual trusts and other 
non-profit institutions providing care and education. They are supervised and inspected by the Ministry's 
inspectors. The majority of early childhood education and care services are outsourced in the sense that 




is open to all institutions that fulfil the requirements needed (physical conditions, technical and human 
resources conditions) to work as service provider. Once licensed, a management agreement is concluded 
between the District Centers and the different institutions. The agreement includes the minimum norms 
regarding functioning, that has to be fulfilled by the service provider. Also, for private institutions which 
deliver services without public support, licensing is compulsory.  
 
The Law mentions that in certain cases, the private institutions of social solidarity might be shut down. 
These situations occur when the institution presents serious deficiencies in the facilities, security, 
functioning, hygiene and comfort, which put at stake the user’s rights or their quality of life. Once 
selected, external providers have the obligation to perform the service. Besides the accomplishment of the 
commitments assumed in the contract, the provider has to give all the data required by Social Security: 
for instance, the number of clients that each month benefits from the service. The Law that regulates the 
delivery of social services by private providers does not set any numerical limits on the providers which 
are active in the sector. The only limitations are dictated by local needs: that means whether the service is 
needed or not in the particular region where the institution proposes the creation of the service. There is 
no cross-border provision. 
 
It is not mandatory that providers are non profit, but the services targeted to those in need are not 
normally of interest to the private sector. In the Portuguese framework, profit social providers can provide 
services for children and young people, for the elderly, for people with disabilities (occupational activity 
centers, residential homes, monitoring and animation services), for people with mental illness, or for other 
vulnerable groups: residences for people with HIV/AIDS, community integration services, or family and 
community support services, such as community centers and shelters. The decision to license the activity 
of profit social providers is within the competence of central public authorities. The granting of license to 
operate depends on their facilities, equipment and staff to develop appropriate activities.  
 
Social security authorities pursue the objectives of social action through direct management of social 
institutions (the so-called integrated establishments), or by establishing agreements with private non-
profit institutions of social solidarity. Agreements, only for non-profit private institutions, include 
management of State’s social facilities, with no monetary compensation, and other forms of cooperation, 
such as social institutions providing social services in their own establishments, and receiving a sum for 
each social service and each user. The conclusion and maintenance of the agreements depend on the 
fulfillment of certain conditions, and they can be reviewed or terminated. In addition to financial support, 
it is also provided specific technical support through various programs and measures for investment in the 
creation or renovation of facilities of the non-profit sector. In the social security services area, the rules of 
public procurement generally don’t apply, because the activity does not involve profit, or involves only 
enough ensuring sustainability of the institutions - providers are chosen directly by the State in 
accordance with criteria defined by law. The system is mainly financed by the State, using taxes and 
workers and employers contributions to the social security system - these services are not viewed as 
having "economic nature“.  
Currently, in Portugal, there is a reform of social services as a result of the concerns about the economic 
crisis and the future financing of the system; this process is promoting a greater commitment between 
public authorities and civil society organizations, that are responsible for running most of the existing 
social services for children and elderly people, at low cost, or at no cost for the users. 
 
Lisbon, 1-4-2013 
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